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ABSTRACT
How do politics influence the geographic distribution of science funding? I
investigate this question in the context of presidential politics. Science policy scholars
endeavor to develop a systems-level understanding—using empirical data and
quantitative analysis—of how governments make decisions about science. In the United
States, one of the most important decisions that governments make is the allocation of
federal funding from agencies such as the National Institutes of Health and National
Science Foundation to researchers and universities. Science policy scholars typically
explain the distribution of science funding through scientists’ or universities’ merit. I
challenge these explanations’ assumption that presidential politics does not play a role.
I use the theory of presidential particularism to examine the role that presidential
politics plays in the distribution of science funding. The allocation of science funding is a
form of distributive policy, which is susceptible to various political stakeholders’
targeting funding to important districts. Scholars of the presidency such as Wood (2009),
Hudak (2014), and Kriner and Reeves (2015a) have found that presidents also engage in
this behavior, which they call presidential particularism.
Through quantitative analysis of 22,115 county-year observations spanning the
period 1984-2018, across the National Institutes of Health, National Science Foundation,
and the Small Business Innovation Research program, I find evidence suggesting that
scientists in electorally-competitive states, counties in Congressional districts that are
represented by a Member of the same party as the president, and states that regularly vote
Democratic, hold an advantage in receiving more science funding than other scientists. I
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also find evidence that peer review—when agencies make a credible commitment to
following its recommendations—is an effective antidote for presidential particularism. I
also find that, on average, counties can expect a decrease in the amount of science
funding they receive in election years, although more counties will receive funding.
Finding evidence for presidential particularism in science indicates that science is
subject to what I call the Politics of Science Cycle, in which funding is contingent on its
political impact. Science policymakers should re-envision science as a vast ocean—in
contrast to the contemporary metaphor of an “endless frontier”—because science is a
common-pool resource that must be stewarded by all of its stakeholders—not just
governments. My dissertation opens the door for more research into presidential
particularism in science, the theory of presidential particularism, and the broader
relationship of politics and science.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
The year is 2016. The location is an average American city that academic
conferences frequent, such as Washington, D.C., Pittsburgh, San Jose, or Chicago. Drs.
Matt Moore and Perry Loess are 3rd year assistant professors who are meeting up for
lunch while presenting their research at the annual meeting for a large scientific
professional society. The convention center’s high vaulted ceiling echoes slightly but the
two friends can lean in close and catch up over lunch.

Perry: “How is everything going?”

Matt: “It is going really well! I just was awarded my first grant from the National
Science Foundation.”

Perry: “Congratulations!”

Matt: “I know, $125,000 for investigating midaltitude ionospheric irregularities
is a huge boost. I applied twice and was rejected. Until now.”

Perry: “I have applied for three grants now from the National Science
Foundation. I keep getting rejected. I need to learn how to crack that nut.”

1

Matt: “You just have to keep trying. Eventually the reviewers will see the merit in
your work.”

Now I will pause the parable of Matt and Perry to analyze their conversation.
They are talking about winning research grants because doing so can be life changing for
scientific researchers. Scientists work their entire professional lives to conduct research
that contributes to human knowledge. Scientific research is expensive because it requires
infrastructure, time, and expertise. One way that scientists fund their research is by
applying for research grants from the federal government. Other scientists of course also
apply for the same research grants, which are scarce in nature, and this means that there is
a competition between scientists.
The federal government awards most research grants based on a formula that
evaluates the scientific researcher’s merit, the project’s potential to contribute to human
knowledge, and the importance of the research to society (Teplitskiy, 2018; Tomkins et
al., 2017; Batagelj et al., 2017; Mervis, 2014, 1997; Chubin and Hackett, 1990; Atkinson
and Blanpied, 1985; Walsh, 1975a, 1975b). Earning a scientific research grant is a signal
that a researcher is at the top of his or her game. Failing to earn a grant has real negative
consequences for a scientist’s career (Gross and Bergstrom, 2019; Ruben, 2017).
Scientists work very hard to win research grants because doing so is vital for career
success. Winning a research grant is a signal of prestige (Teplitskiy, 2018; Chubin and
Hackett, 1990).
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Going back to the conversation between Matt and Perry, who can I infer is the
better researcher, based on which person was awarded funding? At face value, the answer
is Matt. But it is important to dig deeper and understand what is really happening.
Matt and Perry share similar—if not the same—profiles in every way except one.
Matt and Perry both performed extremely well in graduate school. They had the same
advisor. They both won awards for their dissertations from prestigious academic
societies. But the job market is tough in their disciplines and both young scholars took
jobs at universities that are just now becoming research universities. Matt and Perry both
spent late nights in their labs and months caretaking their experiments to develop insights
into the problems on which they worked. In short, they both worked equally hard to earn
the same credentials as researchers.
The difference between Matt Moore and Perry Loess is the university for which
each works. At face value, even considering this difference makes it hard to explain why
Matt could earn a grant and Perry could not. Both Matt’s and Perry’s universities are
aspirational research universities that spend about $100 million per year on research
activities, of which $40 million is funded by the federal government. But when I zoom
out from looking at these individual researchers and, instead, understand their universities
in the context of broader society, I realize that the only tangible difference is that Matt’s
university is located in an electorally competitive state and Perry’s university is located in
a state that reliably voted for Republican presidential candidates in the 2004, 2008, and
2012 elections. Could this one difference really be so significant as to decide the career
outcomes between otherwise equally meritorious scientists?
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The answer that most people would shout is “No!” Whether a scientist lives in a
politically important state should not decide whether they get scientific funding and
influence their career prospects. What if scientists in politically important states can
expect more funding than scientists in other states? I wrote the parable of Matt and Perry
to illustrate an effect that I find in my dissertation. My research suggests there is
significant reason to believe that electoral politics influences the geographic distribution
of scientific funding to counties and states.
Science is important for society and government because it produces new
knowledge and technology that shapes all human interactions. There is no single
definition of science. Science is a multidimensional concept that can be defined
historically, methodologically, or by its aims (Gorham, 2012). For the purposes of my
dissertation, I define science using the definition proposed for research by the
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development in the Frascati Manual
(2015). In my dissertation, science refers to the systematic study of the physical, natural,
and human world through observation and experimentation to create knowledge and
technology. The knowledge and technology that science produces affect human welfare
by expanding our capacities for nearly every arena of life, from transportation and
communication to health and waging warfare.
Science requires massive investments from society, which are mediated through
government (Neal et al., 2008; Nelson and Winter, 2004; Hart, 1998; Arrow, 1962;
Nelson, 1959; Bush, 1945). Government leads the conversation about what types of
science, who should conduct the science, and where the science should be conducted.
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Government plays the role of funder because science produces knowledge. Knowledge is
a good that is very hard to exclude people from and which one person can consume
without leaving less for other people—otherwise known as a public good (Suber, 2009;
Stiglitz, 1999; Romer, 1990). A central problem of science is assuring that the groups of
people and societies who pay to conduct it, are able to absorb the benefits from science.
The problem of absorptive capacity also means that private companies cannot engage in
scientific research for which there is no guaranteed return on investment. It is simply
irrational for companies to spend money on developing knowledge from which they
cannot gain a return on investment. Some scholars such as Arrow (1962) refer to this
situation as a market failure, because private firms make the right decision for
themselves, but it is the wrong decision for the benefit of society. These scholars argue
that it is government’s responsibility to help correct this market failure.
Government corrects for this market failure by funding the riskiest types of
science research—basic research, applied research, and technology development.
Vannevar Bush, who helped shaped the vision of this enterprise, argued that the “impetus
can come promptly only from the Government…[because] expenditures for research in
the colleges, universities, and research institutes will otherwise not be able to meet the
additional demands of increased public need for research” (Bush, 1945, p. 17). Industry
cannot fill this gap because basic research is “noncommercial in nature” (Bush, 1945,
p.17). Bush points to federal support for agricultural research as an example of how
important it is to have both public and private funding for R&D. In other words, without
government intervention, there would be market failure in which there is a greater
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demand for basic knowledge that can be converted into technology than what the
suppliers can produce (Arrow, 1962). It is important to illustrate the government’s role in
supporting science by briefly tracing it through history.
The government’s role in science has evolved since the founding of the Republic.
The key axis of this evolution is the degree to which government takes the responsibility
for driving a research agenda and funding. This evolution can be divided into two major
periods. The first period is the American government’s relationship with science before
World War II and the second period is the relationship after World War II.
Before World War II, the American government had relatively little interest and
involvement with science. The early American Republic had a limited involvement with
science. Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution outlines that Congress should “Promote
the Progress of Science” by ensuring that there is a patent system. While many of the
Founding Fathers, including Benjamin Franklin and Thomas Jefferson, were privately
interested in science, the country did not pursue a large-scale scientific agenda. The
vaunted historian of science A. Hunter Dupree (1986) notes that the government’s early
investments in science focused on coastal surveys, navigational aids, and exploration.
While political leaders of the early Republic did discuss ideas such as a national
university and a national museum, these ideas could not gain enough support from
Congress and were not pressing issues of the day (Dupree, 1986). The central issue was a
general concern by lawmakers about the constitutionality of using taxpayer dollars to
directly support science—it was seen as usurping the powers of the states and civil
society (Dupree, 1986).
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The next major advance in the government’s relationship to science came in the
Civil War. At the start of the Civil War, the United States had three science agencies—
the Coastal Survey, the Smithsonian Institution, and the Naval Observatory (Dupree
1986). Joseph Henry, head of the Smithsonian Institution, Alexander Bache,
Superintendent of the Coastal Survey, and Charles H. Davis, Chief of the Navy’s Bureau
of Navigation, recognized the need for a permanent scientific committee that could
advise the federal government (Dupree, 1986). The scientific committee they envisioned
became the National Academy of Science. But the National Academy of Science was not
able to influence the direction of the war—it started too late and had too many
organizational struggles of its own to help anyone else (Stewart, 1948). There was no
Civil War-style Manhattan project. But the Civil War was significant for science—and
the subject of what I study in my dissertation—in another way.
Arguably, the most significant legacy of the Civil War in terms of the relationship
between the federal government and science is the federal government’s support to the
states for agricultural research, and also its recognition of the importance of directly
supporting agricultural research and education in the states. In 1860, Abraham Lincoln
signed the Homestead Act, which effectively took management of public lands away
from western states because it allowed the federal government to subsidize people to
settle those lands (Dupree, 1986; Ross, 1938). Western states were, as can be predicted,
not happy (True, 2017). At the same time, an idea had been circulating since 1856 that
proposed having the federal government make equally sized grants of land to the states
for building “colleges in which science and not the classics should be the leading idea”
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(Morrill in Dupree, 1986). The western and southern states, much larger in land area than
the northern states, had opposed the land-grant university idea because they felt that they
should receive larger grants of land due to their size (True, 1928). But without the
Southern states being represented in Congress, the land-grant university idea became a
convenient way for the northern states to compensate the western states for the public
lands lost in the Homestead Act. The legacy of agricultural research in the United States
is that the federal government could distribute tax dollars to the states in support of
science (Dupree, 1986).
Science remained on the trajectory largely through the end of the First World
War. In the First World War, scientists were conscripted into the military organization
(Dupree, 1986). The National Academy of Science recommended that President Wilson
form the National Research Council (NRC) to centralize and coordinate war effort
research (Dupree, 1986). The National Research Council’s goal was to develop an
interface between the military and educational, industrial, and research organizations
(Dupree, 1986). The NRC faced the challenge that it did not have a budget of its own and
the military would not pay for its work. Therefore, the military required scientists
working on its behalf to join the military so that they could access military budgets
(Dupree, 1986). As scientists gave up the autonomy of working in their own labs, many
long-term projects that were important for furthering human knowledge suffered
(Dupree, 1986). The challenges of World War I emphasized that science can provide
important knowledge and technologies, but it also showed scientists the peril of giving up
the autonomy to decide their own research agendas.
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World War II is a turning point in the government’s relationship with science
because it marks the first time that the federal government combined the distribution of
federal funds to the states, to promote a national research agenda. As Europe became
embroiled in war in 1939 and 1940, governmental and scientific leaders realized that
scientific research would be vital to winning the war. President Franklin Delano
Roosevelt created by executive order the National Defense Research Council (NDRC),
which became the Office of Scientific Research and Development (OSRD), to centralize
and coordinate efforts to translate scientific research into technology (Stewart, 1948).
OSRD was headed by Vannevar Bush, who had previously served as president of the
Carnegie Institution of Washington. The government required expertise that the
government lacked and could only find in academia (Dupree, 1986; Stewart, 1948).
Many in academia remembered the career-derailing setbacks of doing military service in
World War I and wanted to avoid this fate (Dupree, 1986). While the war effort was very
important, most academics just did not see an advantage in giving up their positions at
universities and their research agendas as scientists (Hart, 1998).
The system developed by OSRD was a prototype for a system of federal support
for research that is familiar to citizens of the 21st century. OSRD surveyed the military
and federal government for research priorities (Stewart, 1948). Instead of creating
government laboratories in the way that research in World War I was conducted, OSRD
contracted out research to scientists so they could work in their own laboratories with
their own students. In all areas except aviation (which was overseen by the National
Advisory Committee for Aeronautics), OSRD distributed funds to scientists for
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developing wartime technologies (Stewart, 1948). The most famous example of OSRD’s
contract system of research is the “Manhattan Engineer District” (more commonly known
as the Manhattan Project), which was responsible for developing the atom bomb.
Universities such as the University of Chicago and the University of California
contracted with OSRD and the military to conduct research. In fact, the University of
California officially managed the federal laboratory at Los Alamos, which built the first
atomic bomb, during the war (Office of the President, University of California, ND).
As the war came to a close, policymakers and scientists envisioned an “endless
frontier” of science, in which the government would support science conducted for
expanding human knowledge rather than for immediate commercial gain. But in the
immediate aftermath of the war, the vision for a federally-supported research enterprise
took a back seat to other issues such as demobilization. OSRD was dissolved in 1947 and
federal support for science dwindled (England, 1982; Lomask, 1976). Between 1945 and
1950, the Office of Naval Research (ONR) was the only federal agency to distribute
funding for basic research (Sapolsky, 1990). In 1950, the National Science Foundation
(NSF) was founded and took over the mantle from ONR for distributing federal funding
for science.
The post-war science system—as exemplified in agencies such as NSF and
NIH—is defined by the distribution of science funding from the federal government to
universities (Stephan, 2015; Weinberg et al., 2014a; Atkinson and Luke, 2011; Savage,
2000; Martino, 1992; Dupree, 1986; Conant, 1983). On average, the NSF has spent over
$4 billion per year on funding scientific research during the period 1976-2018 (AAAS,
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2019). As of 2019, more than 80% of NIH’s $36 billion budget is distributed to
researchers across the country through scientific grants (National Institutes of Health,
2020b). Post-war science is also defined by increasingly larger and more audacious
projects. The instrumentation required to carry out science increased in size and
complexity (de Solla Price and Tukey, 1963; Weinberg, 1961). The most obvious
examples are programs such as the Apollo project, large instrumentation such as the
particle accelerator at Fermilab, and large institutions devoted to scientific research such
as the National Laboratory system of the United States.
Since 1980, the relationship between science and government has consisted of
more universities participating in the science system, with federal funding levels
remaining constant as a percentage of federal discretionary spending (AAAS, 2019;
Marburger, 2015). Further, the actual amount of non-defense research and development
declined between 2012 (its all-time high) and 2020. More researchers and universities
compete for a smaller total pot. Exacerbating this fact, the number of people in the United
States holding a doctoral degree has doubled since 2000 (U.S. Census Bureau, 2019). In
short, winning a science grant from a federal agency is a critical rite of passage for many
scientists, yet the competition for science grants is increasing because the total amount of
funding is not growing at the same pace. As competition for federal science grants heats
up, it provides an opportunity to investigate the relationship between science and the
government.
Science and government have a very close relationship. Scientists rely on
government for providing a structure that helps the scientific community identify
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priorities that need to be studied and that funds scientific inquiries. While government
may rely on the advice of the scientific community, ultimately the decisions of where
funding goes are a governmental process. There is a name for a government’s decisions
about a purposive course of action: policy.
Governments make decisions about what science to conduct, how much of it
should be conducted, and where it should happen. Another word for government’s
decisions—and non-decisions—is public policy (Anderson, 2015). The history of the
relationship between government and science illustrates at least several ways in which the
government made decisions about science. Examples include the creation of agencies, the
use of advisory bodies for making governmental decisions, and the distribution of
funding. In the simplest terms: governments make public policy about science.
Policies can be categorized based on the likelihood that governments must use
coercion, and the scale of the decisions that governments make. In 1964, Theodore Lowi
(1972a; 1964) proposed the idea that different policy types lead to different political
behaviors. Lowi reasoned that policy creates politics because different types of policy
involve different degrees of governmental coercion and scales of decision. Lowi
proposed four different types of policy, which he delineated using the axes of the
likelihood of which government must coerce people to follow the policy, and whether the
policy involved one big decision that would change society or many small decisions that
add up. Coercion refers to the way government shapes behavior, either through punitive
measures or incentives.
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Distributive policies are ones in which the government allocates resources (Smith
and Larimer, 2017). These policies experience a remote likelihood that coercion will need
to be used and these policies lead to many small decisions (Lowi, 1972). An example of a
distributive policy are federal grant programs to state and local governments to
emphasize capabilities in science, homeland security, education, and so forth. Sometimes,
distributive policies lead to logrolling, which is the practice of exchanging favors in the
form of reciprocal voting, and pork-barrel spending, which is the notion of Members of
Congress’ directing funds to their districts to improve their electoral chances. Distributive
policies lead to distributive politics.
Constituent policy describes governmental decisions about the administrative
structure of government (Smith and Larimer, 2017). Lowi did not fully describe
constituent policy and scholars since have often ignored it (Smith and Larimer, 2017). I
view constituent policies as ones that change the overall political environment—they are
infrequent and big in scope—and they are rarely conflictual. The reason they are rarely
conflictual is that they are made in policy subsystems and issue networks on which the
media is not focused.
Regulatory policy consists of decisions in which the government uses coercion to
keep people from taking a certain course of action (Smith and Larimer, 2017). The
government is highly likely to use its coercive ability and governments are likely to make
a lot of discrete decisions about individual cases. Examples of regulatory policy are fair
labor laws, anti-trust laws, environmental protection laws, and health and safety
standards.
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Redistributive policies take resources from one group and distribute them to
another one (Smith and Larimer, 2017). These policies are very large in scope and
therefore are made infrequently, and they are very conflictual. The best examples of
redistributive policies are social welfare programs such as Social Security, Medicare, and
unemployment insurance.
While all the policy types are important and can be found in science policy,
distributive policy is the policy type that I am most interested in for my dissertation.
Distributive policies are some of the most commonly practiced and important policy
types for science policy. Examples of distributive policies in science include scientific
research awards, fellowship programs, and contracts with outside groups to carry out
research on behalf of the federal government. These policies together consist of the way
in which the federal government facilitates the conduct of research. Lowi’s (1972) basic
thesis is that policy creates politics. Extending this thesis to science policy, it means that
programs in which the federal government distributes funding for science will also
experience political patterns such as logrolling and pork barrel spending.
Distributive politics are political patterns such as logrolling, bargaining, and pork
barrel spending that happen when elected politicians try to distribute funding to districts
that are electorally important for them and their co-partisans. Theories of distributive
politics explain how politicians maximize their own reelection potential by creating and
implementing policies to better direct benefits to their constituents. Theories of
distributive politics explain variances in the geographic distribution of distributive
policies. The general idea is that elected politicians represent geographic districts—
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whether they are Congressional districts within states or are the states themselves. One of
the best examples of distributive politics are the river and harbor policies of the 1970s.
John Ferejohn in his landmark work Pork Barrel Politics: River and Harbor Legislation,
1947-1968 (1974), finds that distributive politics frequently leads legislators to distribute
resources to electorally important districts and not to where they are needed most.
The knowledge that distributive policies create distributive politics is the basis for
my dissertation. In my dissertation, I question an assumption that most scholars,
scientists, and members of the public make about distributive science policies, which is
that funding is awarded based on merit rather than political influence. This assumption is
completely understandable because most science agencies that award federal funding
employ a process called peer review, in which people who have the same expertise as
those proposing to do the research help to decide which proposals deserve funding. The
common narrative is that these reviewers evaluate all proposals’ merit, which normally
falls under the criteria of scientific novelty, feasibility, and the ability to contribute to
society.
Merit is important in science because it goes back to the radical foundation of
science itself. Scholars such as Kuhn (1962) and Polanyi (1962, 1944) argue that science
is self-governing and is its own “republic.” This view of science as being independent
from politics is called the value-free ideal and holds that scientific research should only
be evaluated on its merits. The evaluative criteria used under a merit-based approach are
that the research is novel, feasible, and contributes to human understanding of the natural
and human worlds (Polanyi, 1962). The strategy for managing resources in the scientific
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community is peer review. Peer review is the process by which people with similar
expertise as those who are proposing research projects review the projects and make
recommendations about their merit. But peer review is not without its critics. When peer
review is used by scientific agencies for making decisions, it is thought to insulate the
agencies’ decisions from politics (Chubin and Hackett, 1990; Jasanoff, 1990).
Criticism of the peer review process alleges biases of demographics, prestige, and
composition. While these critiques are mostly cogent, there is a problem with the
assumption that just having peer review is enough to protect agencies from awarding
funds by any criteria other than merit.
In my dissertation, I question the assumption that all peer review processes have
the same capability for insulating agencies from their political environment. In fact, I find
that just having peer review is insufficient, because peer review is an advisory process
that produces recommendations, which agencies can accept or reject depending on the
statutory rules governing agency workflows. For example, the National Institutes of
Health defaults to giving awards to the grant proposals recommended for funding by peer
review, whereas for the National Science Foundation, peer review is just one of the
components of funding decisions. If there is leeway for agencies’ political leadership to
influence funding decisions, then it opens the door for distributive politics to happen.
Distributive policies normally bring with them their own distributive politics of
elected officials’ trying to “bring home the bacon” to their constituents. While the
distributive politics tradition leans heavily on studying Congress, science policy is more
heavily influenced by the second branch of government: the executive branch. While
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Congress appropriates science funding, the decisions about how to allocate the
appropriated funds lie with the executive branch—which is led by the president.
Presidents also engage in distributive politics, and this behavior is called presidential
particularism.
The president plays a very influential role in science policy. Presidents can shape
the staffing of leadership positions, use of science advice, budget requests to Congress,
and the distribution of funding. First, presidents staff the agencies with surrogates
through the appointment process. All of the agencies in the federal government with a
primary mission for research and development are in the executive branch. Most of these
agencies’ leaders are nominated by the president and confirmed by the Senate.
Appointments allow presidents to install surrogates who can carry their policy agendas
forward and provide advice back to the president when needed. Presidential appointees
do impact agency performance and seek to carry out the president’s agenda, or risk being
removed.
Second, presidents use science advice. Most presidents, starting with Franklin
Delano Roosevelt, have relied on science advisors to help them make science policy.
Most presidents do not pay much direct attention to science policy, except for the issues
that carry political importance. Examples of science issues that have been politically
important for presidents include the Manhattan Project (Herken, 2000), Apollo Project
(Lambright, 2014; David, 2010; Wells, 1980), Supersonic Transport (Lambright, 2014;
Conway, 2008; Horwitch, 1982), “Project Mohole” (Lambright, 2014), the Strategic
Defense Initiative (David, 2010; Herken, 2000), and commercializing the Internet
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(Abbate, 1999). Presidents’ lack of direct focus on science policy does not mean that they
do not affect science policy.
Third, presidents control agency budgets because science agencies must submit
their budget requests to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), which reviews the
requests until they get presidential approval. Katz (1978) and Lambright (2014) both note
that OMB helps to shape policy by helping agencies form their budget requests to
Congress for the next fiscal year. Agencies may propose activities for which they want to
spend money to OMB and OMB may deny adding these activities to the president’s
budget request to Congress (Lambright, 2014; Robinson, 1993). Without the president’s
support, it is more difficult for agencies to tell Congress what funding they need to fulfill
their missions. Without Congressional appropriations, science agencies simply cannot
carry out their activities.
Lastly, presidents can impact the distribution of funding from the federal
government to the states. Robinson (1993) notes that the distribution of funding from the
federal government to states and regions is a particularly problematic arena for presidents
and their science advisors. What makes the distribution difficult is the fact that there
often is a divergence between where funding can be directed to help the president
politically, versus where funding can be directed to make the best return on investment
for the American taxpayer. My dissertation focuses on how presidents distribute science
funding to specific geographic districts. Presidents develop programs and emphasize
certain criteria for making financial awards to particular geographic areas. I question the
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logic that many scientists and members of the public have—that presidents act
universally in the highest interest of the American electorate.
The president is the only office—other than the vice president, which is elected on
the same ticket as the president—that is elected universally by all American voters.
Scholars of American Government have traditionally argued that the president does not
play an electoral calculus in which he makes policies that favor some voters over others,
based on their importance to his election. Instead, the traditional view of the presidency
holds that presidents value all American voters equally. The importance of presidential
universalism is that presidents make decisions to maximize the welfare of all Americans.
Presidential universalism implies that through distributive policies, presidents do not
target benefits to specific geographical constituencies, and instead they make decisions to
distribute benefits equally across constituencies. Putting presidential universalism in
terms of distributive policy, differences in the geographic distribution of benefits should
not relate to the electoral or political importance of districts to the president; rather, they
should be explained by differences in Congressional appropriations or apolitical factors
such as demographics.
While American voters and some scholars may like to think about the American
president as an office that treats all Americans equally, a small group of scholars has
questioned and empirically shown that presidents do quite the opposite. Douglas Kriner
and Andrew Reeves (2016, 2015a, 2015b, 2015c, 2012)—along with several other
scholars—have demonstrated through a series of empirical studies that presidents favor
some constituents over others—with the only difference being the political importance of

19

the county or state in which the voters live. The behavior of presidents in which they
target federal funding to specific geographic districts based on the districts’ electoral or
political importance is called presidential particularism.
Using presidential particularism as a theory base, I pose the research question,
“Do presidents target funding for scientific research grants to politically and electorally
important counties and states?” My question is important because it sheds light on
whether presidents and their surrogates at science agencies view all scientists equally
when distributing funding for scientific projects. As I illustrated in the fictional—
although based on experiences documented in studies and news stories—vignette at the
beginning of this chapter, allocating research funding to scientists based on the electoral
qualities of the counties and states in which they are located can have a deleterious effect
on the conduct of science. If counties’ and states’ electoral importance is a driver of the
distribution of scientific funding, then it means that the best scientists may not be
awarded the funding they deserve, negatively impacting their career and science. At the
societal level, science funding may not be used optimally to create new knowledge and
technology that equally benefits the national constituency of all Americans; instead, the
funding is used to help presidents win reelection and support their co-partisans.
My research question also allows me to investigate if certain institutional
arrangements for peer review can serve as an antidote to particularism. Peer review is
thought to be a process that efficiently allocates resources and limits the effects of
politics, assuming its recommendations are followed. NIH and NSF are governed by
different statutory rules for making scientific awards. NIH is required to treat the
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recommendations of peer review committees as binding, whereas NSF is not. Empirically
testing this hypothesis through the “natural experiment” of two similar agencies sheds a
unique light on this phenomenon.
My argument is that presidents do not support scientists equally and, in fact, they
tend to favor scientists who live in electorally and politically important districts. I support
this argument with empirical evidence by analyzing a data set that consists of 35 years’
worth of observations of the awards made to support scientific research and technology
development by the National Institutes of Health, the National Science Foundation, and
the Small Business Innovation Research program, and county-level electoral,
demographic, and educational data for all 3,007 counties in the United States. In total, my
data set consists of 22,115 county-year observations across 81 variables, and in sum 1.2
million data points. I also find that there are differences in just how much more funding
than normal agencies may award at the county-level based on the counties’ electoral
importance to the president. Counties in swing states1, states that reliably vote for
Democrats, and states that are represented by a Member of Congress who is a co-partisan
of the president all have an advantage over other counties in the amount of funding they
can expect to receive. But this is not the whole story.
I also identify a potential antidote to such targeting behavior: binding peer review.
The National Institutes of Health (NIH) is bound by statue to accept peer review panels’
recommendations for which proposals should and shouldn’t be funded. My quantitative

1

I also refer to these states as electorally competitive states.
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analysis finds evidence that NIH does not participate in the targeting of funds to
electorally important—for the president—states and counties.
Over the next five chapters, I will explore answers to my research question from
existing scholarly literature; adapt the theory of presidential particularism to science,
analyze empirical data; and discuss the implications of my analysis for scholarship,
science policy, and the American Republic.
In Chapter 2, I explore the existing literature about science policy and distributive
politics. First, I provide a brief review of scholarship on science policy and agencies such
as NIH, NSF, and the SBIR program. In exploring the existing literature, I also look at
how scholars explain the allocation of federal funding to the states. I round out the
chapter by tracing the evolution of how scholars have studied distributive politics.
In Chapter 3, I adapt the theory of presidential particularism, which was
developed by Kriner and Reeves (2015a, 2015b, 2015c) and Berry and colleagues (2010),
to the science funding domain. In this chapter, I explain how presidential particularism
developed from distributive politics. Then I look at what modifications I need to make to
the standard theoretical models of presidential particularism to adapt it for understanding
science policy. Lastly, I propose and explain the hypotheses I test in my study.
In Chapter 4, I develop my research approach for testing the theory of presidential
particularism in science including operationalizing my variables and collecting my data.
In Chapter 5, I use statistical analysis of the data set to test the theory of
presidential particularism in the three agencies, and subsetting for years in which
presidents of different parties served.
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In Chapter 6, I discuss the implications for scholarship and American public
policy of the finding that science agencies target funding to counties and states that are
important to the president’s election, and that agencies that are bound to accept peer
review recommendations do not exhibit this behavior. My study opens the door for
exploring the role of politics in science because it demonstrates that electoral
considerations have a tangible impact on who gets what funding and where.
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CHAPTER TWO
LITERATURE REVIEW
To answer the question of whether some scientists have an advantage over other
scientists based on the electoral importance of the political districts where they live, I turn
to exploring how other scholars have studied this and similar phenomena. Answering this
question requires understanding about the interrelationships among government, politics,
and science. I am fortunate that many scholars have also been interested in these topics,
providing me a solid foundation on which to build my research. Of course, scholars like
myself bear an intense personal interest in this subject because governmental decisions
affect the research and higher education institutions upon which most scholars depend.
However, I found a gap in the literature: scholars have not empirically analyzed
the effect of presidential politics, and elections specifically, on the geographic
distribution of science funding. I found this gap by reviewing scholarly works about
science policy from across several different disciplines. My first step is to offer a
working, conceptual definition of science policy. Using this definition, I identify several
subfields that comprise the multidisciplinary field of science policy. Each subfield has its
own unique shared orientation for studying government’s role in science. Across the
subfields, there is one factor that scholars consider to be crucially important: the
distribution of funding for scientific research. Since my broad thesis is that politics
affects science, I then turn to scholarship on how politics affects the distribution of
governmental funding.
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Next, I follow the money to political science scholarship that observes how
elected politicians direct funding to the geographic districts that are important for them
electorally, rather than to the geographic districts that need it most. This behavior is
known as distributive politics and it takes place in policy domains such as disaster relief,
federal grants to counties, and defense spending. Scholars of distributive politics argue
that science funding would be an impenetrable fortress to distributive politics because of
peer review. Then, I examine the literature about peer review’s role in the crafting of
science policies. While scholars have studied peer review in the context of journal
publications, only a small subset of this literature examines peer review for funding
decisions. Science policy scholars have not considered the role of distributive politics in
the allocation of federal science funding. The distributive politics scholars have
hypothesized that science funding would not be affected by electoral concern, yet they
have not tested this theory. This lack of empirical research into how political and
electoral considerations affect the distribution of science funding is the gap in the
literature that I intend to fill. The starting point for my journey is to define science policy.

Science Policy
It is important to define science policy so that other people can understand the
focus of my research’s contribution and can correctly categorize my work. Many people
do science policy, yet few have defined it. My starting point for defining this term is to
turn to one of the leading science policy textbooks (as of 2020). Neal and colleagues
(2008), in Beyond Sputnik: U.S. Science Policy in the 21st Century, define it as the
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“federal rules, regulations, and guidelines under which scientific research is conducted”
(p.9). I refer to this definition as the textbook definition (it was, after all, offered in a
textbook!). This definition emphasizes some of the instruments by which the federal
government influences the conduct of science.
Federal agencies make rules through a formal process in order to communicate
transparently how they will operate. In the science policy domain, rules affect everything
from how scientific funding is distributed to the actual organizational structures of
agencies such as the National Science Foundation and National Institutes of Health.
Regulations and “guidelines” (which Neal and colleagues (2008) do not define and is not
a technical policymaking term) also are important because they are the means by which
the federal government employs its vast resources and coercive powers to shape the way
the scientific community behaves. Regulations affect the conduct of science by
determining what makes research safe, what information gleaned from research can be
shared, and so forth. There are also other instruments of governmental policy that the
definition does not include such as grants, contracts, and other forms of acquisition.
Focusing on the instruments of governmental policy emphasizes that the government
affects science. But what about the dynamic processes involved in formulating or making
these instruments? What about the roles of different stakeholders? I look to other scholars
for ideas on improving the textbook definition.
The textbook definition can be improved by including elements that make it better
align with commonly accepted definitions of public policy. The textbook definition does
not include elements that are fundamental to generally accepted definitions for public
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policy. For instance, Neal and colleagues’ definition does not emphasize science policy as
being the process or product of governmental decisions. Many definitions of public
policy (see Dye (2017), Cochran (2016), Wilson and colleagues (2016), and Eyestone
(1971)) focus on the fact that governments make decisions. Governments face a problem
or opportunity about which they must make the decision regarding how they use their
resources to solve or capitalize on it. The reason why decisions matter so much in the
study of public policy is that governments must choose how to use scarce resources to
solve societal problems and seize societal opportunities.
Recognizing that policies are formed as a response to a problem or opportunity
can also improve the textbook definition. Several definitions of public policy recognize
that it is a response to a problem (Anderson, 2015; Birkland, 2016). In the textbook
definition, there is not a notion that the government and its stakeholders make decisions
about problems—or even opportunities. Instead, including the notion that science policies
are responses to problems or opportunities emphasizes that science policies involve
governments’ making choices about how best to use scarce resources.
The lens of resource allocation is a useful approach to science policy because it
captures both the policy instrument and the outputs, which can be analyzed to understand
patterns in governmental decision-making. Stine (2009) distinguishes science policy as
“the allocation of resources for and encouragement of scientific and engineering research
and development, the use of scientific and technical knowledge to enhance the nation’s
response to societal challenges, and the education of Americans in science, technology,
engineering, and mathematics” (p. 1 ). Stine’s definition is very similar to the one that
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several governmental institutions including the Organisation for Economic Cooperation
and Development (OECD, 2015) use. The strength of this definition is that it emphasizes
that science policy involves governments’ making decisions about challenges and
opportunities. It also highlights one of the specific domains in which governments make
decisions about science. But this definition does not capture the degree to which there is a
process by which the government’s decisions about science are made.
A starting point for capturing the process by which science policy is made is to
view science policy through the lens of policy inputs and policy outputs. The tradition of
looking at policy inputs and outputs extends back to David Easton’s (1953) “Systems
Model” of Politics and Policy. In Easton’s model, there are three stages to policymaking:
inputs, a “black box” process that converts inputs into outputs, and outputs. Science
policy is both an input and output to policy making (Stine, 2009). To understand how
input-output models are important for defining the term science policy, it is important to
briefly discuss the ways that science is both an input and output of policymaking.
Stine (2009) argues that there are four components of science policy: policy for
science, policy for technology, science for policy, and technology for policy. Stine (2009)
distinguishes between science and technology; however, for the sake of my argument I
will treat the two interchangeably. Policy for science describes situations when
policymakers take actions, such as deciding how much to spend on research or what
technologies agencies should research, that influence the science and technology
communities (Stine, 2009.) When policy is used to shape science, science can be seen as
a policy output that emerges from the “black box.”
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Science for policy focuses on when scientists and engineers share their expertise
with policymakers to help inform their ability to make policy (Stine, 2009). In this case,
science is an input to the policymaking process. An example of the government’s
drawing on scientific expertise is science advising through agencies such as the Office of
Science and Technology Policy. The textbook definition does not capture science for
policy, which is a major limitation of that definition because science advising plays a
major role in many federal agencies’ decisions. There were 216 scientific advisory and 91
grant review committees operating under the auspices of the Federal Advisory
Committee Act (FACA) in 2019 (General Services Administration, 2019). FACA
governs the “establishment, operation, and termination of advisory committees within the
executive branch” (41 CFR § 102-3.10). The number reported by the General Services
Administration does not include advisory panels that operate under other legislation,
panels convened by independent regulatory agencies, or panels convened by Congress. In
other words, there is the potential for many more formal mechanisms for the government
to collect the advice of technical experts. Science advising is a huge policy activity!
Science’s being both an input and output to science policy makes it difficult to
develop a singular definition of science policy. The elements that I find consistent
between policy for science and science for policy are that both involve governmental
decisions: the decision by government involving the creation or use of scientific
knowledge, and that the government is making the decision on behalf of the public (in
contrast to making the decision for any one individual’s personal gain). I include these
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elements in a more comprehensive definition of science that I develop in the next
paragraph.
I develop a conceptual definition for science policy that improves on the textbook
definition of science policy because it recognizes the term as a multidimensional concept.
A useful way to define a multidimensional concept is to list the commonalities between
the different definitions. This strategy is the one that Birkland (2016) uses to define
public policy, which itself is a multidimensional concept. Admittedly, I am working from
the assumption that it is a good thing to link the definitions of science policy and public
policy. My assumption is that science is a very important modifier to (public) policy.
Therefore, I define science policy as a multidimensional concept that includes (but is not
limited to):
•

Decisions of government and its stakeholders about science,

•

Decisions made by government on behalf of the public about the conduct of
science,

•

Decisions made by government on behalf of the public that are informed by
science,

•

Both what governments choose to do and not to do about science; it is also the
degree to which governments choose to use or ignore scientific advice,

•

Decisions about how to invest government resources in science,

•

A multidisciplinary academic study of how governments and their stakeholders
make decisions about science or are informed by science.
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Defining science policy is important for my dissertation because it allows me to
clearly articulate why my research question matters to the scientific community, the
government, and the public. It also allows me to contribute to the field because many
scholars write about science policy, but few scholars actually define what it is. The lack
of a clear definition does not keep scholars from spilling ink to discuss important issues
within science policy. My next step in reviewing the literature is to review how scholars
have studied science policy in the past.

How Scholars Have Studied Science Policy
There are many different scholarly approaches to studying science policy. One of
the challenges to reviewing the academic discipline of science policy is that scholars use
vague terminology, which makes it hard to analyze the approaches that scholars take
(Trousset, 2014; Bozeman, 2000). Fortunately, there is a cottage industry of scholars who
try to define science policy as an academic discipline, including Trousset (2014), Jasanoff
(2017), Martin (2012), and Van Den Besselaar (2001), and I rely on these studies as a
foundation for my review of literature. My goal in this section is to provide an overview
of the different categories of science policy scholarship. It is important to identify an
inclusive—but not exhaustive—list of categories for science policy scholarship so that I
provide an effective overview of the landscape for the field in which I write.
There are many subfields in the scholarly study of science policy, and it is easy to
mistake any one of the subfields for the broader body of scholarly enterprise if that is
what one encounters first. Understanding the scholarly study of science policy is made
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even more difficult by the fact that many scholars only work within a single subfield and
do not cite authors from other subfields (Trousset, 2014; Van den Besselaar, 2001;
Leydesdorff, 1989). Trousset (2014) identifies three approaches: science and technology
studies (STS), science and innovation studies, and domain studies. I add a category that
focuses on the administration of science policy to Trousset’s three categories, to make a
total of four dominant subfields in the science policy literature. In the next few
paragraphs, I elaborate on Trousset’s (2014) categories and how they help me to define
science policy.
Domain studies in science and technology policy focus on studying a broad array
of problems, including policies to regulate scientific research, funding, expertise, public
engagement, and ethics in particular areas of science policy such as bioengineering, the
environment, defense and so forth. This subfield is important because it provides a lot of
domain-based evidence, but the literature is often disconnected from the broader science
policy discourse. Examples of this type of scholarship include analyses of the federal
government’s policy about genetics research (see Cook-Deegan (1994), Lackey (2007),
and Murugan (2009)), analyses of innovation mechanisms for energy research (see
Bonvillian (2011)), and advocacy for environmental policies (see Hoppe (2018) and de
Jong (2016)). These articles are so numerous, it would be nearly impossible to track them
all down. The purpose of these articles’ scholarship is to help the authors’ fellow scholars
to understand and advocate for specific decisions by governments and their stakeholders
about science. This literature, while written by scholars, is generally focused on the
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specific policy problems of a scientific domain rather than on understanding the broader
of picture of science in the context of society.
The STS field focuses on understanding science’s and technology’s role in
society, not just the decisions that government and its stakeholders make about science.
Jasanoff (2010) argues that the field is a merging of research that investigates the nature
and practice of science with research that investigates the impacts and control of science
with regard to science’s risks to society. Scholars who practice in the STS field come
from a diverse set of disciplines, including anthropology, economics, history, law,
philosophy, psychology, sociology, and political science (Trousset, 2014). STS includes
scholarship about topics such as the history of science and technology (Bijker, Hughes,
and Pinch, 2012; Cardwell, 2001, 1991), the sociology of science (Merton, 1973), and the
philosophy of science (Douglas, 2015, 2009; Jasanoff, 1990). STS scholarship
contributes to science policy by providing insights into humanity’s relationship with
science and technology. It provides descriptive insights into the qualities of the
government’s relationship with science and normative arguments about how the
relationship between science and government ought to work. Notably, STS excludes an
economic approach to understanding science policy, which is captured in another subfield
known as science policy and innovation studies.
The field of science and innovation studies, also sometimes known as science
policy and innovation studies (SPIS), focuses on the management and organization of
science, specifically with the goal of forming national- and regional-level policies to
increase innovation (Martin, 2012). This field primarily explores how innovation affects
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the economy, using economics, management, and entrepreneurial theory. I identify that
seminal thinkers in this field include Arrow (1962), growth economists such as Romer
(1990), evolutionary economists such as Nelson (1959) and Nelson and Romer (2004),
entrepreneurship researchers such as Siegel and colleagues (2004) and Carayannis
(2012), and technology transfer researchers such as Siegel and colleagues (2004), Link
(1995), and Link and colleagues (2007). This field is important to the scholarly study of
science policy because it provides theory and methods for determining the return that
taxpayers and governments get for their investments in science and technology. Another
way to think of this subfield is that it provides the scholarly community with the
foundation for showing that science is important to society. This subfield is itself the
jumping-off point for another independent subfield called the science of science policy.
The science of science policy subfield focuses on using quantitative and metrics
driven analyses to evaluate the impact of science policies. At the American Association
for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) Science and Technology (S&T) Policy Forum
in 2005, John Marburger, who was serving as Director of OSTP under President George
W. Bush, argued, “What science policy needs is the kind of quantitative tools economic
policymakers have available, including a rich variety of econometric models and a base
of academic research” (Marburger, 2015). One of the reasons that a science of science
policy is important is that people from the natural sciences produce literature about
science policy but are not aware of the “relevant social science disciplines needed to
define appropriate data elements and create econometric models that can be useful to
policy experts” (Marburger, 2015). Other scholars and agencies accepted Marburger’s
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vision and made it their own. For example, the National Science Foundation (NSF)
created the Science of Science Policy and Innovation Program (SciSIP) in 2006 and the
National Academy convened a SciSIP Principal Investigators’ Conference in 2012
(“Science of Science and Innovation Policy”, 2014). Scholars began publishing about the
science of science policy, too.
Husbands Fealing and colleagues (2011) argue in their seminal handbook The
Science of Science Policy that a scholarly field needs to develop a “systems-level
construct” of how government and science relate and that the field is multidisciplinary.
Feller (2011) builds on Fealing and colleagues’ (2011) definition by articulating that the
science of science policy should move beyond researching the effectiveness of scientific
funding, and toward examining how science policies are made and what their impact is—
not just economically but societally. The science of science policy emphasizes
quantitative methods, data analytics, data science, and data-driven qualitative research
approaches to studying research questions around the impact of policies made for and
about science (“Science of Science and Innovation Policy”, 2014; Lane and Bertuzzi,
2011; Reedy et al., 2011; Jaffe, 2008). One of the ways that SciSIP advances the study of
science policy is that it also includes a notion of the role that politics plays in science.
Husbands Fealing and colleagues (2011) included a chapter by Sapolsky and Taylor
(2011) about the role of politics in science.
From my brief survey of the academic study of science policy, I observe that the
scholarly field is diverse and fragmented. These subfields are united by the fact they
study science’s relationship to government, to greater or lesser extents. STS addresses the
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role of science—as a form of knowledge. Science policy and innovation studies focus on
the impact of science policies. They help governments to evaluate which policies ought to
be enacted, and to understand the impact of the ones that were. But it does not address the
role of politics—the processes by which power is allocated in society—in science.

The Role of Politics in Science
To understand the role of politics in science, it is important to understand what
politics is. My working definition of politics is, “politics are the process of deciding how
to allocate the power to make decisions that affect the public to different people and
organizations in society.” I based this definition on the basic notion that politics is the
process of deciding “who gets what, when, and how” (Lasswell, 1936). Since Antiquity,
scholars such as Plato (1991) and Aristotle (1985) have recognized that people live in
communities and must make decisions about the common good. One of the most
contentious aspects of the “process of deciding who gets what, when, and how” is in
whom the power to make these decisions is vested.
Modern liberal democracies such as the United States divide this power into
different components and vest this power in different branches of government. In the
Congress—the Legislative branch—and the Executive Branch, representatives of
different size and defined constituencies are elected to make decisions on the public’s
behalf. The process of electing representatives is an important and vital component of
politics because it is the process by which power is allocated in society to make
decisions. The underlying assumption of democratic systems is that voters choose to elect
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the representatives whom they believe best represent their interests (Shepsle, 2010).
Elected leaders may sometimes try to lead public opinion (Canes-Wrone, 2006; Riker,
1956); however, elected leaders still recognize that elections may be an ultimate check or
balance on their ability to exercise power. Studies of politics tend to examine how
elections, or the political behavior of voters, affects different governmental behaviors.
Studying politics is different from studying policy because policy focuses on the
decisions and process of decision-making that governments and their stakeholders use.
Understanding the role of politics in science is a requirement for practitioners of science
policy to do but is a topic that few scholars have studied in detail.
The role of politics in science has been of interest to scholars since the end of the
Second World War. Scholars became more interested in studying science policy in
response to the way that scholars were involved in making policy during the 1930s and
1940s. It is doubtless that scholars such as Frank Jewett, Vannevar Bush, John Steelman,
and James Conant played a major role in shaping the government’s decisions about
science, but they were practitioners who themselves were advocating for their own policy
positions. Reports written by these scholars such as Science: Endless Frontier (Bush,
1945) and Public Policy and Science: A Report to the President (Steelman, 1947) answer
questions such as, “What should the relationship between science and government be?”
and “Why should government support science?” Because these reports were written for
the government, their authors could not address the role of partisanship or politics; they
wanted to present science as nonpartisan. Therefore, I turn for my starting point to a
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scholar of political science who was keenly interested during the late 1940s and early
1950s in the relationship between government and science: Harold Lasswell.
The first work, to my best knowledge, that directly takes on the issues I address is
Lerner and Lasswell's (1951) edited volume The Policy Sciences. This volume is also one
of the founding documents of the scholarly field of policy studies (Smith and Larimer,
2017). The purpose of this volume is to outline the vision for a “policy science”
(Lasswell, 1951) that helps to solve the problems that society faces by bringing together
social and natural scientists. Lasswell (1951) also argues that natural and physical
scientists would benefit from adopting a "policy science" approach in crafting policies to
support their research enterprise. I find this work to be extremely significant to my
overall project for two reasons.
First, Lasswell’s vision for the policy sciences departs from Vannevar Bush’s
vision outlined in the Endless Frontier that sought to insulate science from politics so that
scientists could pursue research that had no immediate political or commercial
application. The post-World War II vision for science was largely crafted to free science
from its societal responsibilities. Scholars such as Polanyi (1944) had argued that when
the war was over, science should no longer be commandeered by governments to pursue
political purposes. The argument that science should be insulated from politics assumes
that politics should play no role in science. It asserts that science should be a republic
unto itself in which scientists decide among themselves how to make important decisions
for the scientific community (Polanyi, 1962). It is a normative argument that ignores the
potential for positive, empirical research to document the role that politics does play.
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Second, by tracing the posing of this question to Lasswell’s The Policy Sciences, I
note that there is an inextricable link between understanding the role of politics in science
and the roots of policy studies as an academic field. Lasswell also lays out his vision for
the policy sciences as being (1) problem oriented, (2) multidisciplinary, (3)
methodologically sophisticated, (4) theoretically sophisticated, and (5) supporting of
democratic values. These five values became the guidepost for the field of policy studies
(Smith and Larimer, 2017). I find the link between the birth of policy studies and
researching the politics of science cycle more than just ironic. It points to the fact that
scholars of science policy should also be considering how politics shapes science.
Further, researching a topic such as science policy is an important aspect of policy
studies.
Other scholars who were contemporaries of Lasswell were also thinking about the
role of politics in science—most notably, Don K. Price. Price was the founding dean of
the John F. Kennedy School of Government and “preached about the unity of government
and science” (Binder, 1995). Price (1964, 1954) argued that government and science
share a complex relationship on which both deeply depend: science for funding and the
government for new knowledge and technology that improves society. Price’s position
was unique during his time. Other scholars—many of them natural scientists such as
Jewett (1944), Conant (1983, originally published 1952), and Steelman (1947), who had
led the scientific community during World War II—were focused on gaining science’s
independence from the government in terms of its research agenda while still receiving
government subsidization. Price’s argument is that the “scientific estate” is inherently
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political because it is another realm in which political actors allocate power. Therefore,
scientists should think not only about the political charge to their work but also how
political necessities from the other “estates” of politics could expand or limit the
possibilities for science. This argument presages an argument that Jasanoff (1990) makes
much later, asserting that science advising is a “fifth branch” of government.
Between the earliest writings on this topic and 2020—when I wrote this
dissertation—other scholars have echoed the refrain that the relationship between politics
and science matters. Sapolsky and Taylor (2011) argue that governments support science
and that “it is the politics of these missions…that determines the rate and direction” of
research and development. Other scholars such as Lambright (2014, 1976), Bozeman
(2007), Sarewitz (2018), Pielke (2007), Guston and Sarewitz (2006) and Guston (2004,
2000) have all identified investigated aspects of the relationship between science and
politics. I find three major thematic categories in the literature about science and politics:
science advising, science advocacy, and science bureaucracy.
My working definition of science advising is the process by which scientists use
their expertise to advise the government about a course of action. This body of literature
focuses on analyzing the ethics of science advising, the effectiveness of specific
presidential science advisors, advice to future science advisors, and the reasons why
science advice is ignored with regard to climate change and vaccines. It is important to
understand the ethics of science advising because scientists who are entrusted to advise
political leaders may have an outsized impact on the public (Pielke, 2007). Pielke (2007)
argues that a science advisor should be an "honest broker of policy alternatives" (p. 2)
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who articulates the relevant options and provides unbiased information about them, but
who lets the principal make the final decision. Pielke contrasts the "honest broker" role to
other roles, such as the "pure scientist," "the science arbiter," and the "issue advocate."
The pure scientist focuses on science for its own sake and ignores politics. The science
arbiter seeks to identify the best scientific alternative. And the issue advocate uses
science to advocate for a specific political position. Pielke's work is the latest in a series
of works about scientific policy advice. Other scholars (see Sarewitz (2018, 2016, 2007,
1996) and Douglas (2015, 2009)) argue that science needs to recognize its political
charge—and the fact that scientists are not just advising politics but are part of the
political process itself. These positions comprise one side of the science advice debate.
The other side of the science advice debate argues that scientists provide advice in
a responsible manner that is consistent with democratic norms. Sheila Jasanoff's (1990)
seminal book The Fifth Branch examines the role of science advisory committees in
setting regulatory policies. She argues that science forms a fifth branch of government
that is independent. Jasanoff argues that advisory committees at the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) and Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) play the important
role of "negotiating scientific differences that carry political weight" (p.249). She argues
that scholars' concerns about scientists’ using science to wrest decision-making power
away from policymakers is "overdrawn" (p. 250). Other scholars go further than Jasanoff
and argue that policymakers should turn more decisions over to scientists. The argument
is that scientists understand scientific facts better than policymakers and therefore have
more authority to make these decisions (Brown and Guston, 2009; Cook-Deegan, 1994;
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Primack and Von Hippel, 1974). This argument is also made by science advocates such
as Weinberg (2017), who co-organized the March for Science. Brown and Guston (2009)
take the argument even further to assert that scientists who serve on advisory committees
have a duty to represent the non-scientifically trained person when considering issues that
will affect the lay person. The debate over what role science advice should play is only
one aspect of the discussion about science advice.
Science advising scholarship also focuses on proposing better ways for science
advisors to work with their governmental customers. Scholars also reflect on or evaluate
past presidential science advisors and identify lessons they want future science advisors
to incorporate into their practice. This body of scholarship developed early in the postWorld War II period. Price (1954) provides a descriptive account of science advice in the
post-World War II period. Price's account captures science advising as the purview of
individuals who developed deep relationships with the agencies to whom they are
providing advice and a thorough understanding of politics. Price argues effective science
advisors will understand politics and the external context of their science advice—science
advisors need additional training in the humanities and social sciences. The effectiveness
of science advising became even more important to scholars in the United States after the
Soviet Union's launching of Sputnik (Pielke and Klein, 2010; Wang, 2008, Herken, 2000;
Wells, 1980).
One of the concerns in science advising is the legitimacy of science advisors’
advice. Wood (1964) argues that scientists are an "apolitical elite" who help craft policy.
They are apolitical in that they do not have training in politics, the humanities, or social
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sciences, so they are arbiters of nature. Brooks (1964) argues that science advisors are
consistently better than other technical experts and provide unbiased advice. However,
Brooks identifies that one of the major challenges facing science advisors in the future is
public perception about the legitimacy of science. Arguably, the 1950s and 1960s
represent a golden age of science advising because some of the preeminent political
problems required technical advice, and science advisors such as Isadore Rabi, James
Killian, George Kistiakowsky, and Donald Hornig were trusted by the presidents they
served (Smith, 1992).
Science advising has not always had a smooth relationship with politics in the
United States. President Nixon, after the resignations of Lee DuBridge and Edward
David, did not name a new science advisor and instead opted to add the position into the
responsibilities of the director of the National Science Foundation. Nixon abolished the
President's Science Advisory Committee and the staff positions that supported the science
advisor. This event drove the scientific community to recognize the fragility of its
relationship with the presidency and Congress, and to focus on mending the rift by
advising future science advisors.
Since the Nixon Administration, there has been a cottage industry of scholars
providing guidance to future advisors, with the goal of protecting science's access to the
political system. William T. Golden's edited volumes Science and Technology Advice to
the President, Congress, and Judiciary (1995) and Science Advice to the President (1993)
are the gold standard of this genre in terms of breadth and depth. It is important to
highlight several of the authors’ arguments to fully illustrate the maturity of the science
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advising literature. Summarizing all of the essays is a monumental task that does not
serve the purpose of my dissertation; however, I touch on some highlights.
Science and Technology Advice to the President, Congress, and Judiciary
contains 89 essays and interviews written by the most eminent scholars, former science
advisors, politicians, and industry leaders who were living in the 1980s, about the role of
the science advice in the government. Thompson (1995) analyzes interviews with
presidential science advisors collected by the Miller Center at the University of Virginia
and finds that one of the major challenges they face is the external political environment.
He argues that future science advisors need to understand how the president they serve
views the role of science advising. This view is echoed by several science advisors
themselves. George Keyworth II (2010), Reagan's science advisor, argues that science
advisors should see themselves as advisors to the president rather than representing the
constituency of the scientific community. Neal Lane (2010), Clinton's second science
advisor, notes that "The principal focus of the White House is the president, his agenda
and priorities, and anything that seems to be getting in the way" (p.99). Lane also notes,
"The science advisor needs to recognize that science, while fundamentally important to
the future of the nation, is not at the top of anyone's political agenda" (p.102).
Science Advice to the President focuses solely on reflecting about how presidents
from Truman to Clinton employed their science advisors and the lessons future presidents
should learn about employing their science advisors. Golden (1993) emphasizes that the
first job of the President’s Science Advisor is to “serve the president” (p.2) and that he or
she cannot be drawn into advocating for special interests. Golden argues that science and
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technology are important issues for presidents because they are tied to both domestic and
foreign issues including health care, ecology, energy, education, transportation, and
defense. Robinson (1993) argues that science advisors would do best to keep a
“reputation for clear, disinterested technical knowledge” (p. 215) while also
understanding the political process. Other scholars focus on the importance of the
executive branch—and thereby the President’s Science Advisor—to the scientific
community. Piel (1993) argues that the executive branch and president exert the most
influence over science because they decide where funding goes within the programs for
which Congress has appropriated funds.
Scholarship on science advocacy focuses on helping scientists to become an
effective special interest group. This literature is largely an outgrowth of the divide
between the Nixon administration and the scientific community. Bertrand Russell (1960)
argues, in his seminal article "The Social Responsibilities of Scientists," that scientists
should consider both the ethical implications of their work and should take steps to
inform the public about their scientific findings. Russell discusses the "tragic dilemma"
(p. 391) that scientists face, which is that scientists need governmental support for
developing large instrumentation, and therefore are less likely to speak out against the
government. He urges scientists to speak out against governments, especially with regard
to changing the distribution of research funding to promote scientific interests over
political interests.
Other scholars added to Russell's argument. Primack and Von Hippel (1974)
argue that science advising is ineffective unless scientists also advocate for their positions
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through public engagement. They argue that scientists need to develop organizations of
their own, such as the Union of Concerned Scientists, to challenge the government's
scientific factual claims. Science advocacy also extends to understanding why scientists
choose to take part in social movements. Brown's argument follows the tradition
developed by Primack and Von Hippel (1974), who argue that scientists have an ethical
duty not only to the government agencies they advise but also to society. Ross and
colleagues (2018) surveyed the participants in the globe-wide March for Science held
April 22, 2017 and found that the majority of marchers were motivated by environmental
policy, their concern about the Trump administration's science policy, and support for
science funding. Global climate change is one of the issues on which science advocacy
scholarship focuses.
In the case of global climate change, the science advising problem is to persuade
the policymakers whom scientists advise to take the advice. Scholars address this topic
from several different angles. One approach analyzes the way that scientists act as policy
entrepreneurs to set the agenda of what issues are discussed by policymakers (Ingram,
Milward, and Laird, 1992). Other approaches seek to understand what went wrong. Howe
(2014) explores the politics of climate change and argues that science itself—-the
scientific method and its aloofness from politics—limited scientists' ability to advocate
for policies that would mitigate climate change. The politics of climate change is, itself,
its own domain. Some scholars take a third approach and critique science advocacy.
There are scholars who have been critical of science advocacy. Lomborg (2001)
makes one of the most well-known critiques of science advocacy when he argued that
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addressing climate change may ignore issues that are higher priorities such as poverty
and hunger. Instead of advocating for developing policies around climate change,
Lomborg argues that scientists should learn from the experts on social, political, and
economic issues such as sociologists, political scientists, and economists, before
advocating for a problem that has limited impact. Lomborg's argument is quite
controversial and it was the subject of rancor. Other scholars more directly articulate a
name for this problem. Pielke (2004) warns against "scientists politicizing science" (p.
32). Scientists politicize their science when they confuse communicating the alternative
policy options for policymakers with assessing the impact these alternatives have.
Communicating the different alternatives expands the possible options for policymakers,
whereas assessing the impact reduces the number of alternatives available. Pielke (2004,
2007) argues that scientists should refrain from advocating between alternatives and
focus on communicating the available alternatives and their expected outcomes.
The two major lenses on politics' role in science offer perspectives that approach
the question from different assumptions. Creating mechanisms for governments to benefit
from expert scientific knowledge is the problem that scholars who are writing about
science advising try to solve. They primarily focus on the role of science in providing
evidence and support for government decisions. The central tension they uncover is the
degree to which scientists should use their expertise to influence policymakers to decide
for specific options. Scholars typically see science as weighing in on broader issues of
which technical scientific expertise are a part. The major area of discussion in science
advising is about the degree to which scientists overstep their bounds as advisors and
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what the proper bounds are. On the other hand, scholars who focus on science advocacy
work on the problem of improving the scientific community's political clout and ability to
influence decisions through collective action. Science advocacy can be seen as a reaction
to the rift that forms between government and science advising. Scholars who write about
science advocacy largely do so to motivate others to act as advocates or partisans. The
underlying assumption of this worldview is that the elite status of scientists is more
privileged than other professions to make decisions for society. However, not all scholars
agree with this assumption.
Some scholars offer ways to balance these categories. Resnik (2009) proposes a
framework for balancing the needs of science with the needs of society. He conducts case
studies of the role of politics in the content of what scientists research, scientific advising,
and scientific education to support his “plea” (p.16) for scientific autonomy. Resnik
proposes a conceptual scheme that distinguishes between: (1) the autonomy of
individuals versus the autonomy of organizations; (2) restrictions on content versus
restrictions on process; and (3) micromanaging science versus providing oversight for it.
Resnik’s (2009) conceptual scheme provides a mechanism for discussing the tension
between pluralism and elitism; however, it does not use empirical data to show the degree
to which limiting autonomy affects science—his analysis remains primarily qualitative.
Further, it does not address the foremost challenge facing science policy: answering the
question of who governs science.
The literature about the science bureaucracy focuses on understanding the
agencies responsible for carrying out and supporting scientific research. Research that fits
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into this category includes Lambright’s (1976) study of the relationship between science
and government, which finds that science policy is shaped by executive branch decisions.
In Lambright’s (1976) study of science and technology policy in the Johnson
Administration, he argues that studying the science bureaucracy, which he calls the
“subpresidency” (loc: 380), is critically important for understanding presidential
decision-making on science policy.
The science bureaucracy literature also discusses the role of science funding.
Greenberg (1967) examines the relationship between basic research and politics,
especially in relation to science funding. Greenberg argues that one of the prime
motivators for scientists' advocacy and interfacing with politics is to influence the
distribution of funding. He concludes that the scientific community needs to connect its
research—even basic research—to showing how society benefits; conversely, the
government needs to develop a mechanism to support the longitudinal progress of
science. Martino (1992) also argues that the distribution of science funding from
Congress, both to agencies and to geographic constituencies, is influenced by politics,
although he does not support his argument with empirical evidence. Other scholars who
study the allocation of federal grants—in general, not just specific to science—shed some
light on the distributive politics of science cycle funding.

The Effects of Federal Funding in Scientific Research
I classify the distribution of science funding as form of distributive policy,
according to Lowi’s policy typology. Distributive policies consist of many small
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decisions about distributing funding, and ones about which the government does not have
to exercise coercion (Lowi, 1972, 1964). The scholarly understanding of federal funding
has focused on two major areas. First, scholars investigate how federal funding impacts
individual scientists’ careers. Second, they analyze the role of federal funding in
institutional settings such as universities. My starting point is to explain why federal
funding for science is important at face value.
Most obviously, science funding is important to pay for the real expenses incurred
to conduct scientific research. In the 20th century, science became dependent on research
instruments that required a whole-of-society level of investment (Stine and Good, 1986).
Scientists cannot empirically build or test theories without being able to collect data.
Therefore, developing research infrastructure is vital to the scientific enterprise. It is also
equally vital to train people to be proficient scientists who can use these research
instruments, and universities responded to the increase in research infrastructure by
training more scientists (Stephan, 2015, 2012). Increasingly, research funding is
becoming an important aspect of individual scientists’ careers.
Science funding is important for scientists’ career development. Bol and colleagues
(2018) analyze grants made through the Netherlands Organization of Scientific Research
(NOW) and find that grant applicants who fail to win their first research grant are less
likely to apply for grants in the future. This conclusion is significant because it shows the
importance of winning scientific research grants to scientists’ careers. In the United
States, Wang and colleagues (2018) analyze NIH R01 grants, which are available to early
career researchers, and find that an early career setback has significant negative effects on
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a scientist’s career. Scientists who fail to win this award experience a more than 10%
increase in the chance that they will never apply for another grant. However, scientists
who nearly miss out on winning an award stand a better chance to win more NIH awards
in the long run. Additionally, Ayoubi and colleagues (2019) also find that competing for
funding makes scientists more collaborative and enhances long-term career productivity.
Winning grants is an indicator of the scientist’s prestige or status (Rip, 1994; Latour
and Woolgar, 1986). The importance of winning scientific grants extends even to
graduate students, as recipients or honorable mentions of NSF’s Graduate Research
Fellowship program can expect a positive boost in career productivity (Graddy-Reed et
al., 2018). Rosenbloom and Ginther (2017) find a strong positive relationship between
the number of postdoctoral researchers and the number of grants a university receives;
however, they cannot draw a causal relationship. Gaughan and Bozeman (2002) find that
winning grants from the National Science Foundation helps scientists win grants from
other sources as well.
Some scholars such as Wahls (2018, 2016) argue that U.S. federal government
support for science goes to too few scientists. Wahls (2016) analyzes NIH funding and
finds that NIH peer review processes could be biased to make awards on criteria other
than scientific productivity. Aagaard and colleagues (2019) conduct a meta review of
scholarly research about research concentration and find that most research concludes
that studies support the argument for improving the distribution of science funding to
include more researchers and geographies.

51

One of the challenges for the research on this topic is that there are few
generalizable studies. Most studies focus on specific countries or programs, which means
their research populations are not drawn from the whole population of scientific grants.
Notably, the research focused on the United States primarily studies granting programs at
NIH. However, on balance, the takeaway from this vein of scholarship is that winning
scientific grants is important for scientists’ careers because it is a signal of merit. This
body of literature is relatively young because the data required for conducting it only
became available in the last decade.
Other scholars investigate the role of funding in science from the perspective of
universities. Scholarly research in this area focuses on the role of Congressional
earmarks, university lobbyists, and the returns to federal investment in university
research. In the 1980s and 1990s, the role and effect of Congressional earmarks for
directing science funding to universities were major concerns of scholars. A
Congressional earmark is “any Congressionally directed spending, tax benefit, or tariff
benefit that would benefit an entity or a specific state, locality, or Congressional district”
(Lynch, 2019). Savage (2000) argues that legislators use the earmarking of funds to
specific Congressional districts as a way to improve electoral outcomes. Universities
advocate for earmarks because they depend on the money to help expand their growth
(Savage, 2000). Lazarus (2010) provides validating information because he finds in a
study of the 2008 Appropriations Bills that universities tried to influence Congress with
the goal of earning earmarks. De Figueiredo and Silverman (2006) find that universities
that are in states and Congressional districts whose Senator or Member of Congress

52

serves on an appropriations committee receive 10% more science funding and between a
2.8% and 3.5% increase in earmarks.
Universities depend on federal funding because it is a signal of a university’s
research prowess and helps them build their reputation. Lanahan and colleagues (2016)
find a positive relationship between universities receiving federal funding for science and
receiving nonprofit and state and local funding for science. Nonprofits and sub-national
governments use federal funding as a signal that a university is worth funding. BlumeKohout and colleagues (2015) find a similar phenomenon in biomedical research
amongst NIH, universities, and non-governmental funding sources. Delaney (2016) finds
evidence for states piling on funding to complement federal science funding in a dataset
of Congressional appropriations for the period 1990-2003. Hegde (2009) finds similar
evidence in that universities that are represented by Members of Congress or Senators
who serve on Appropriations Committees can expect an increase in funding. Miles
(2016) argues that federal grants are one of the favored strategies for universities seeking
to build prestige. If universities fail to receive federal funding for research, then
ultimately undergraduate students bear the cost of increased institutional research
expenditures through higher student-to-faculty ratios and increased tuition, all other
factors being held equal (Ehrenberg et al., 2003).
In summary, federal funding for science is important to both individual scientists
and universities that conduct scientific research. The funding both pays for the expenses
related to research, furthers the careers of scientists, and helps universities signal their
merit as an institution of higher learning. Now that I have examined why federal funding
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for science is perceived by scientists and universities to be important, it is important to
explore existing explanations for why some scientists and universities earn more funding
than others.

Attempts to Understand the Distribution of Science Funding
Understanding the determinants—or at least factors—involved in the distribution of
science funding has received extensive attention from many scholars. I imagine this could
be the case because research funding is so important for a scientist’s career. Most
attempts to understand the distribution of science funding focus on the individual scientist
or the individual university as the unit of analysis. The unit of analysis is important
because it means that scholars are looking at the phenomenon at a level of granularity
that does not lend itself to understanding what political factors may be involved.
Scholars from across disciplines have made attempts at understanding why some
scientists win funding and others do not. This question is meaningful for scholars because
winning science funding is important for their careers, and they want to understand if
some scientists have an unfair advantage because of biases inherent to the process
(Teplitskiy et al., 2018; Tomkins et al., 2017; Wahls, 2016; Marsh et al., 2008; Chubin
and Hackett, 1990; Over, 1982; Cole et al., 1977, Walsh 1975a, 1975b). Debates around
the biases in peer review have ebbed and flowed since the 1950s (Batagelj et al., 2017).
An entire book could be written to review all of the literature on this topic; however, I
highlight some of the main arguments that are important for understanding my overall
project.
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Peer review may be biased based on the “Matthew Effect,” or the idea that the
scientists who have received funding in the past will receive more funding in the future
(Bol et al., 2018). Social networks may also affect the efficacy of peer review. Peer
reviewers tend to favor the researchers who publish in the same journals in which the
reviewers publish (Teplitskiy et al., 2018). Third, peer review may be biased by
scientists’ having better access to Congress or the president (Mitroff and Chubin, 1979).
Peer review also may be affected by broader social and psychological factors. There is
evidence from the Swiss Science agency that peer review panels may hold unconscious
bias against female investigators (Severin et al., 2019). Lastly, some scientists may just
have better access to the infrastructure they need to carry out research (Rosenbloom and
Ginther, 2017) or be better at research than their peers (Abrams, 1991).
Scholars also advocate for the importance of peer review in making awards.
Atkinson and Blanpied (1985) argue against Congressional earmarks and emphasize the
importance of peer review for the scientific community. Savage (2000) and Chubin and
Hackett (1990) note that the universities that argue against Congressional earmarking are
the ones that traditionally received the most research funds.
Another approach to this vein of research is to propose mechanisms that are
alternatives for peer review. Peer review is a process in which representatives of the
scientific community evaluate the grant proposals or research of other scientists
(Tomkins et al., 2017; Marsh et al., 2008; Chubin and Hackett, 1990; Kuhn, 1962;
Polanyi, 1962; Merton, 1957). Peer-review dates back to England in the 1650s and is a
vital part of scientific epistemology because it helps to establish the validity, integrity,
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and importance of scientific research (Chubin and Hackett, 1990; Shapley and Roy,
1985). Mitroff and Chubin (1979) argue that there are three main models for peer review
to work in government—scientists’ accumulated prestige, scientists’ ability and access to
politics, and the merit of the proposed project.
Over time, there has been a steady but small stream of scholars that have thought
about the distribution of science funding in political terms. Greenberg (2001, 1967)
controversially argues that science funding is a form of pork barrel politics because it
allows Congress to distribute funding to some districts and not others. Greenberg
considers his arguments both in the 1960s and the 2000s to be controversial because they
call the legitimacy of federal support for science into question. Greenberg argues that
federal support for science has become a type of largesse that leads to inefficiency. He
points to the way that special interest groups related to science have captured
Congressional attention and purse strings. There are other scholars who share
Greenberg’s concerns, including Martino (1992).
Some scholars argue that science funding is subject to “pork barrel” politics.
Feller (2011) argues that the effect of distributive politics on the allocation of science
funding needs to be studied in detail. Kleinman (1995) documents that, in the debates in
the late 1940s about the legislation creating NSF, there were extensive concerns by
Senators that allowing peer review would hurt their ability to direct funds back to their
states. Lambright (2014) also notes that Congress continued to be concerned—out of a
mix of self-interest and genuine concern for the country—that the merit-review process
was an “old boys” network that would not spread funding to other geographies. Other
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studies have documented Congress expressing similar concerns about the establishments
of NIH’s centers (Manning et al., 2004) and Congressionally appropriated funds for
specific scientific infrastructures (Savage, 2000, 1991), and university-specific research
funding (de Figueiredo and Silverman, 2006). Other scholars note that Congressional
desires to direct spending to their district affect presidential decision making. Notably,
David Z. Robinson (1993), a staffer in the Johnson Administration, likens science
spending to the Congressional “pork barrel policies” and notes that “the geographic
distribution of support for science has been a perennial problem for the science adviser”
(p.216).
Attempts to understand the distribution of scientific funding focus on the qualities
of individual researchers, the qualities of universities, and the role of Congress.
Scholarship finds mixed evidence about the effectiveness of peer review for choosing the
best proposals. There are different ways in which research proposal evaluation may be
biased. Two ways that are of particular interest to me are: 1) some individual scientists’
ability to exploit their political connections to help influence agency decision-making,
and 2) some universities’ use of lobbying to promote Congressional earmarks. The
distribution of science funding is subject to distributive politics. In the next section I
explore how political scientists have studied this phenomenon.

Understanding the Politics Created by Distributive Policy
Distributive politics theories explain how politicians maximize their own
reelection potential by creating and implementing policies to better direct benefits to their
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constituents. Theories of distributive politics explain variances in the geographic
distribution of distributive policies. Distributive policies are government decisions about
transferring largess from one government to another. Normally, distributive policies are
highly individualized and distributed based on a district by district or case by case basis
(Lowi, 1964). The individualized nature of distributive policies means that the policy
winners who receive the funds and the policy losers who don’t, rarely come into direct
conflict. A conflict consists of losers’ taking collective action to try to block the winners
from receiving the benefits of a policy without compensation. While it is clear who
benefits from these policies; it is not clear who exactly the policy losers are (Lowi, 1964;
Wilson, 1995). The lack of direct confrontation between policy winners and losers makes
distributive policy an attractive tool for politicians to use in garnering electoral support in
their districts. Distributive politics is a tool that is naturally predisposed for use by
politicians who have narrow interests, compared to the distribution of interests
represented in the aggregate of a political system. Most scholarly interest into distributive
politics has been focused on Congress.
Members of Congress serve the particular interests of the electoral district that
they represent. There is a long tradition of scholarship that proposes that reelection is the
primary goal of members of Congress (MCs). One of the strategies that they can use is to
confer benefits by concentrating on their own districts, while distributing the costs across
many other districts (Ferejohn, 1974; Shepsle and Weingast, 1981; Weingast et al., 1981;
Stein and Bickers, 1994; Mayhew, 2004). Empirical scholarship has found evidence that
MCs benefit electorally from distributive politics. Alvarez and colleagues (1997) found
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that pork barrel spending improved electoral outcomes for incumbents, although the
effect was stronger for Democrats than for Republicans. Levitt and Snyder (1997) also
found that increased conferring of benefits within an incumbent’s state—not just to his or
her own district—increased electoral benefits. Bickers and Stein (1996) find that MCs
who fail to maintain or increase the flow of federal funding experience an increased
likelihood of facing a challenger in primary and general elections. Other scholars have
focused on understanding how Congress decides who gets what, when, and how.
The institutional structure of Congress shapes the distribution of awards. One of
the major problems that scholars of distributive politics have sought to solve is why MCs
would not universally confer benefits across Congress. The universalism hypothesis
holds that MCs distribute funds to all parties and districts because MCs in the majority
party want to minimize the risk of getting punished by voters if their party loses the
majority (Weingast, 1981). Empirical work shows that there are variances in the benefits
that are distributed. The institutional structure of Congress is a significant reason why the
bargaining process creates unequal distributions of awards. Baron and Ferejohn (1989)
and Shepsle and Boncheck (1997) use analytical models to show that institutional
structure is important because it leads to decisions that do not universally split funding
between MCs and their districts. Instead, there are other variables that are important such
as committee membership and partisan affiliation.
Distributive politics has been studied in the context of two domain areas pertinent
to my topic: science and defense. Science policy is comprised primarily of distributive
policies such as grants and contracts and Congressional educational earmarks. Savage
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(2000) argues that MCs use earmarking to support academic institutions, including
scientific research funding in their own states, to improve their electoral prospects.
Carsey and Rundquist (1999) and Rundquist and Carsey (2002) find that the geographic
distribution of defense spending is highly influenced by Congressional distributive
politics, even after accounting for differences in defense infrastructure. Their findings are
significant because they demonstrate that, at the margins, politics plays a role in deciding
in which geographic districts defense activities take place. Carsey and Rundquist’s path
breaking work establishes that distributive politics affects even very technical areas of
public policy. To me, their results highlight the importance of studying the distributive
politics of science funding.
In conclusion, the distributive politics literature primarily focuses on explaining
the variance of federal funding between electoral districts, using the lens of politics.
Scholars have found that there are electoral benefits for MCs to use distributive policies
to enhance their electoral fortunes. Scholars have found it beneficial to study specific
programs and policy domains. There is anecdotal and case study evidence that MCs may
be better positioned to direct funding to their districts, based on their committee
assignment and partisan affiliation. The distributive politics literature focuses on
Congress and does not address another institution, which may be better positioned for
participation in distributive politics—the presidency.
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Importance of the Presidency in Science Policy
Science’s relationship with government is largely defined by its interactions with
the executive branch. While Congress is responsible for the appropriation of funding, the
agencies that spend the money and implement policies are executive branch agencies
such as the National Institutes of Health and National Science Foundation. There are,
unfortunately, a paucity of studies that extensively explore the presidency’s role in
science, with the exception of Katz (1978), Lambright (2014), Pielke (2007), Pielke and
Klein (2010), Wang (2008), and Golden (1993). While this body of literature is niche, it
underlines some important facts to keep in mind.
The president holds considerable influence over science. Lambright (2014,
originally published in 1985) explained that it is important to study the presidency’s role
in science because the president sets the agenda for how the federal government should
support science, adopts and implements new programs, administers existing programs,
and terminates programs for which he deems there is no longer a need. Lambright points
out that at the time of his writing there was little literature by scholars of the presidency
about the president’s role in science, and most of the literature from science policy
focused exclusively on the president’s science advisor. Studies of presidential science
advising (see Pielke and Klein (2010), Pielke (2007), Wang (2008), Thompson (1995),
and Golden (1993)) focus on the president’s ability to direct attention to certain issues
and the ability to decide which people from the scientific community become leaders of
science agencies. Katz (1978) argues—using case studies from the Kennedy, Johnson,
and Nixon administrations—that the executive branch and president exercise a major role
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in making science policy. Katz focuses his argument around two presidential capabilities:
the president’s ability to appoint leaders in and reorganize the federal bureaucracy, and
the president’s leadership in the budgeting process. Other scholars such as Lambright
(2014), Wells (1993, 1980), and Garwin (1993) also highlight that these tools form the
foundations of presidential strategies on science and technology.
One of the ways that the president influences science is through political
appointments. The literature about how presidential appointments shape science policy
primarily focuses on the roles of the president’s science advisor and the director of
OSTP. Pielke and Klein (2010) argue that this role has declined in significance since
Truman’s informal inception of the role when he named William T. Golden as a special
counselor in 1945, to the time of their writing. But other scholars focus more on the
effects of presidential appointments in science agencies in general. Lewis (2008) finds
evidence, in a study that compares the number of presidential appointees per agency in
1960, 2000, and 2004, that presidents use their power of appointment to leadership
positions in federal agencies to politicize the bureaucracy. Lewis (2008) defines
politicization as the “act of increasing the number and penetration of appointees” (p.2) in
a federal agency. Politicization has a negative impact on agency performance and staff
morale (Lewis, 2008). Science agencies are among the least politicized agencies in the
federal government for the years 1960, 2000, and 2004 (Lewis, 2008). Presidents can also
change the shape of the federal bureaucracy.
The president can also reshape science through staffing and reorganizing the
bureaucracy. The most obvious example of presidents’ reorganizing the federal
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bureaucracy required to support science is when President Nixon terminated OSTP
(Lambright, 2014; Pielke and Klein, 2010; Garwin, 1993; Katz, 1993; Press, 1981).
President Nixon terminated OSTP largely because he perceived it as being an
organization that advocated on behalf of universities and other constituencies that he felt
were working against him (Lambright, 2014; Wells, 1993, 1980). Lambright (2014)
outlines that presidents can choose to maintain, reorient, escalate, decelerate, or curtail
existing science and technology programs. Each of these actions requires making
decisions that may involve changing the organizational structure of agencies, including
adding political appointees, moving agencies from an executive department, or
terminating the agency altogether (Lambright, 2014).
Another way that the president influences science is through budgeting. Kushi
(2015) finds that a president’s party affiliation is the most important predictor of R&D
funding by research function. One possible causal mechanism for how presidents can
impact agency budgets is through OMB. The president impacts science agency budgets
through OMB, which has statutory authority to revise agencies’ budget requests (Katz,
1978). Lewis (2008) points to the fact that OMB is one of the most politicized agencies,
outside of the president’s cabinet. OMB has the power to make sure that agency
programs and priorities align with the president’s policy priorities (Tomkin, 1998). The
president’s ability to influence science policy is often carried out by OMB rather than the
president’s science advisor (Robinson, 1993). While Congress may end up appropriating
an amount of funding that is different from the president’s budget request, the president’s
budget request indicates the degree to which he prioritizes certain policies (Hourihan and
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Parkes, 2018). Once funding is appropriated, presidents and executive branch agencies
can decide in what districts, and to what degree, the appropriated funds are used for their
intended purpose.
There are some areas for further research to understand better the president’s role
in science policy. Nearly all of the studies of the president in science have used a case
study methodology. Most studies of the presidency, in general, face the challenge of
small research populations, or having a low-N, because there have only been 45
presidents in the United States’ history (Edwards, et al., 2018). Case study is one way of
overcoming the challenge that studies of the presidency face small research populations
(Creswell, 2014; Johnson et al., 2008). One of the limitations of the case study method is
that scholars cannot draw generalizations about the institution of the presidency.
Increasingly, scholars of the presidency have developed ways to overcome the relatively
small research population, such as studying budgets. For example, Cameron (2000)
conducts a quantitative analysis of 434 public bills cast between 1945 and 1992 to
understand the role of veto bargaining in the relationship between the presidency and
Congress. Kriner and Reeves (2015a, 2015b) study the way that presidents impact the
allocation of federal funding. Lewis (2008) studies the relationship between presidential
appointments and agency performance. While scholarship on the presidency has moved
beyond case study and description to generalizable research (Moe, 2009), scholarship on
the president’s role in science has yet to implement many of these quantitative methods
that move beyond case study. Scholarship on the presidency’s role in science can also
expand its subject of study.
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Another way that studies of the presidency’s role in science policy can expand is
to examine specifically how presidents’ electoral and political ambitions affect science. A
president’s primary goal is to win election and reelection (Wood, 2009). Literature about
the president’s role in science policy does not directly address this point. Instead, it
typically focuses on the president’s role within the bureaucracy or the role of the
presidential science advisor. But as Robinson (1993) and Piel (1993) note, the
distribution of funding to states is one of the most significant forms of science policy.
Could presidents be shaping how this funding is distributed, based on which geographies
are electorally and politically important?
In summary, the president plays a major role in shaping science policy because
the agencies that carry out policy are in the executive branch. Presidents shape science
policy through presidential appointments and staffing. Most studies of the presidency’s
role in science policy focus on the Presidential Science Advisor. There is a niche
literature that directly addresses the role of the presidency in science. Studies of the
presidency’s role in science policy typically use case study research methodologies,
which limits the ability to generalize the results to broader populations and to make
inferences about the magnitude of any effects. Scholars of the presidency have
increasingly found ways to conduct quantitative studies that are generalizable; however,
most studies of the presidency in science have yet to employ these methods.
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Summary and Gap in the Literature
In this chapter, I explored how scholars have approached the question of why
some scientists have an advantage over other scientists based on the importance of the
political districts where they live. First, I contextualized my search in the context of
science policy. The challenge with contextualizing my research in science policy is that
the field is diverse, siloed, and lacks a clear definition. I developed a conceptual
definition of science policy that captures elements such as science policy as being
governmental decisions about science. Using this definition, I identify several categories
of science policy literature, including the science of science policy, which seeks to
provide systems-level explanations for the relationship between science and government.
Exploring the role of politics in science reveals three major topics of inquiry: science
advising, science advocacy and the science bureaucracy. The science bureaucracy
literature emphasizes the importance of studying government funding for science.
Studying government funding for science is important because government
funding for science positively impacts both individual scientists and universities.
Government funding for science is important for scientists’ careers as it increases their
ability to conduct their research, to earn more funding from both government and other
sources, and their prestige. Government funding is important for universities because it
helps fund their operating expenses and increases their prestige, which is important for
both earning more research funding and recruiting students. One of the questions that
scholars have explored is why some scientists and universities earn science funding and
others do not.
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Explanations for why some scientists earn more science funding than others focus
on the effectiveness of peer review. Peer review may not be an effective mechanism
because it rewards the scientists who have already been successful, it rewards scholars
who are in the same networks as the reviewers, and because some scientists exploit their
political connections. Explanations at the university level identify research infrastructure
as one of the variables, but they also find that universities engage in efforts to lobby
Congress. The distribution of science funding is largely subject to distributive politics.
Distributive politics explains that elected politicians maximize their own
reelection potential by directing benefits to their constituents. Scholars who have studied
distributive politics found that Members of Congress engage in distributive politics by
making earmarks during the Congressional Appropriations process that would allocate
funding for some districts. Distributive politics seems to be a potential explanation for
why some scientists receive more funding than others. But there are a couple of elements
that the distributive politics literature does not explain. One such element is that
Congressional earmarking would not affect the distribution of scientific grants after
Congress appropriates funding; however, the presidency could affect this distribution.
The presidency exerts a tremendous influence on science policy and science
funding. Most literature about the presidency’s role in science focuses on the Presidential
Science Advisor; however, there is a small niche literature that addresses the role of the
presidency in science policy. Presidents affect science policy through appointments,
organization of the bureaucracy, and budgeting. Presidential appointments can give
presidents control over the science bureaucracy, while reorganizing the bureaucracy can
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change agencies’ ability to fulfill their missions and their relationships with Congress.
Presidents can affect budgeting, in terms of what appropriations agencies request from
Congress, and regarding to what agencies funds are allocated after appropriations are
made. Most of the literature on the presidency’s role uses qualitative methods of inquiry
that do not provide insight into the generalizability of their conclusions, nor do they focus
on subjects such as how presidents’ electoral motivations may drive their decisions.
The gap in the literature that I find is that scholars have not empirically analyzed
the effect of presidential politics, and elections specifically, on science policy. It is
important to understand how science funding is distributed because of its potential to
impact scientists’ careers and universities’ futures. Based on the distributive politics
literature, it is not beyond the realm of possibility that elected politicians could direct
funding to improve their electoral outlooks. The president’s primarily objective is to win
election and reelection. Therefore, could presidential politics be affecting the distribution
of science funding? Could some scientists earn more funding than others because they
live in counties or states that are electorally important to the president? These questions
highlight the gap in the literature that my dissertation fills. Studying this gap in the
literature contributes to science policy and the science of science policy by advancing the
scholarly body of knowledge to provide a systems-level understanding of the role of
presidential politics in the distribution of science funding. In the next chapter, I explore
how presidents engage in distributive politics in other domains, which is called
presidential particularism, and adapt a theory of presidential particularism to the science
policy domain.
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CHAPTER THREE
THEORY
I use the theory of presidential particularism to investigate whether presidents and
their surrogates target the geographic distribution of funding for scientific research and
development to electorally important districts, rather than to the districts where the
funding can be best used. Presidential particularism is a new approach to study this
question and this approach challenges traditional inquiry. Presidents, unlike Congress, are
elected by a national constituency of voters and the institutional structure of their office is
focused on national problems. Moe and Wilson (1994) argue that presidents think in
“grander” terms about social problems and public policy than Congress does (p.11).
Presidents focus on the national, rather than the local, implications of their decisions
(Howell et al., 2013; Moe and Wilson, 1994). Therefore, the president plays an important
role in distributive politics.
Presidents are motivated by reelection and by supporting the elections of their copartisans, which means that presidents value the constituents who are in important
electoral districts more than other constituents. Wood (2009) argues that presidents do
not universally serve the national constituency of voters who elect them. Targeting the
distribution of federal funding to electorally important districts is one way that presidents
carry out their particularism (Kriner and Reeves, 2015a; Kriner and Reeves, 2012;
Hudak, 2012; Wood, 2009). Particularism is the geographic targeting of funds to some
districts for political gain rather than being in accordance with what is an efficient policy
decision. By geographically targeting funding to electorally-important districts,
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presidents may not be using resources efficiently to benefit all Americans. Instead of
using resources to benefit all Americans, presidents target resources to the Americans
that are most important to the presidents’ electoral chances. Voters act as self-interested
actors who value resources coming to their districts over the good of the nation in
general. Therefore, voters respond to receiving more resources than other peer districts
get.
Presidents’ positions at the top of the executive branch hierarchy allow them to
influence policies at executive branch agencies, which affects the distribution of federal
funding. I interpret presidential power through the adage that “presidential power is the
power of persuasion” (Neustadt, 1991, p.28). In other words, presidents use tools and
their vast resources of reputation to influence the leaders of their administrations to carry
out their policies. Presidents persuade others to carry out their policies through
appointments and communication. Hudak (2012) reports on evidence from interviews
with 1,678 former and current federal executives, indicating that presidents control
distributive policies through appointments and a “hierarchical network of
communication” (p.164). Presidents appoint the leaders of most executive branch
agencies with the advice and consent of the Senate. Presidential appointments allow
presidents to put people whom they trust to carry out their policies in policymaking
positions of executive branch agencies (Lewis, 2008). Then, presidents communicate
their priorities to their appointees through a series of formal and informal mechanisms
(Walcott and Hult, 1995). The presidents’ highest goals are to secure political advantage
and enact their most desired policies (Wood, 2009; Mayhew, 2004; Kingdon, 2011). One
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of the ways that presidents secure political advantage is through winning re-election and
the election of co-partisans (Downs, 1957). It stands to reason that presidential appointees
also recognize that this presidential goal is their personal goal.
Empirical testing provides support for the theory of presidential particularism.
Scholars have tested the geographic distribution of funding. Larcinese and colleagues
(2006) find that counties that support presidential incumbents tend to receive more
funding than other counties. Scholars have also validated that presidents do electorally
benefit. Other scholars such as Berry and colleagues (2010) and Taylor (2008) follow this
vein of research, finding that presidents favor some districts over others. Voters are
influenced by presidential particularism. Kriner and Reeves (2012) find that increases in
federal grants lead to increased voter participation for the incumbent. Further, voters who
believe their districts have been targeted to receive more funding have more positive
opinions of the president than voters who do not believe their districts have been targeted
to receive funding (Kriner and Reeves, 2015b).
Presidential particularism scholars such as Kriner and Reeves (2015a) and Berry
and colleagues (2010) have identified science funding as being important to study,
although for different reasons. Kriner and Reeves argue that it needs to be studied
because there is reason to believe that science funding will follow the same particularistic
patterns as other types of distributive politics. This assertion is based on the assumption
that, since the executive branch controls the distribution of science funding, science
funding will work similarly to other forms of funding (Kriner and Reeves, 2015a).
Alternatively, Berry and colleagues (2010) argue that science funding should be studied
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precisely because it may not follow the particularistic pattern. Agencies that distribute
science funding typically use a process called merit review. Merit review involves using
specific, pre-determined criteria to evaluate how proposals for using scientific research
funding contribute to both science and broader society. One of the most common forms
of merit review is peer review, which asks people who have similar skills and knowledge
as the people who are proposing projects to review proposals for their scientific and
technical merit. Merit review may reduce the executive branch’s ability to direct funding
to more electorally-important districts because it assures that funds are sent to the areas of
their highest use. The fact that the reasons for studying science funding conflict makes it
even more important to apply this theory to the dependent variable of science funding.
Presidential particularism theory makes several hypotheses about the distribution
of federal funding to states and counties. First, presidential particularism holds that
presidents and their surrogates distribute more federal funding to states that are
electorally competitive, and to states that typically voted for the president’s party in the
last three elections. Presidents distribute funding to electorally competitive states for the
same reason that presidents pay more attention to competitive states during presidential
elections. Electorally competitive states are critical for presidents to win because their
electoral votes often decide who wins and who loses a presidential election (Hecht and
Schultz, 2015). Assuming that the presidents’ highest priorities are their own re-election
or the election of their co-partisans, it then stands to reason that presidents will direct
funding to these states.
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Presidents have the incentive to distribute funding to electorally-competitive
states—which are states in which the loser of the two-party vote-share over the last three
presidential elections won an average of 45% or more of the two-party vote—because
marginal increases in funding can increase the amount of vote share the president wins.
Presidential particularism theory holds that these effects will be strongest in the year
leading up to an election, as presidents need to demonstrate to swing district voters that
they and their co-partisans have more to offer than the competitors. Presidents also have
an incentive to reward voters who are loyal to their party.
Kriner and Reeves (2016, 2015a) present evidence that supports this hypothesis
by analyzing a dataset of all federal grants at the county-year unit of analysis that
spanned the years 1984-2008. In Kriner and Reeve’s analysis, counties in swing states
can expect to receive 3.9% more funding than counties in non-swing states, all else being
held equal. The effect held in both election years and years in which the president is up
for re-election.
Second, presidents also distribute funding to states that are squarely in their
party’s electoral tally. Kriner and Reeves (2015a) use the term “core state” and define it
as states in which the president’s party averages 55% or more of the two-party vote share
over the last three elections. Presidents target funds to reward voters in these states for
several reasons. First, presidents target core states to improve their electoral chances. The
mechanism behind this type of targeting is that presidents seek to mobilize their
supporters. Since presidents are risk-averse, they may seek to maximize their electoral
chances by using the scarce resource of federal funds to target voters who are more likely
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to respond to such a stimulus (Larcinese et al., 2006). While swing states may be more
important to win from an electoral college standpoint, presidents may feel that other
mechanisms such as campaign effects can be used to mobilize voters in those states,
whereas federal funding is best used in states that support their party. Scholars can test if
presidents use the distribution of funding to core states to support the presidents’ electoral
ambitions by analyzing if the year before an election year experienced an increased
magnitude of particularism compared to other years.
Presidents also target specific, loyal counties within core states (Gimpel, Lee and
Thorpe, 2012; Bertelli and Grose, 2009). The specific mechanism for why presidents
target specific counties is unknown. One explanation is that presidents feel that it is a
safer investment to distribute money to specific counties that are filled with supporters of
the president’s party, rather than to a state that may have both supporters and nonsupporters. Another explanation is that specific counties are more programmatically able
to receive federal funds because they meet the requirements of specific federal programs.
Second, presidents may also target funding to core states because these states are
more programmatically aligned with the president’s agenda. For example, a Democratic
president may target funding for urban renewal that results in funds being concentrated in
urban areas, which tend to heavily favor Democratic presidential candidates in the
general election. Another example is that Republicans may favor rural economic
development projects that will concentrate in rural states, which already tend to favor
Republican presidential candidates in the general election. While the programmatic
explanation for core state targeting seems reasonable, there is not yet empirical evidence
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to support this explanation and rule out election effects. One way to test this hypothesis is
to study policy domains that typically align to the partisan agenda of specific parties. If
presidents are targeting policies based on programmatic alignment, then we can expect to
see an increased effect in states that just have more capacity to do something with the
federal funding they receive.
Kriner and Reeves (2015a, 2015b) tested the core state hypothesis, finding that
core states receive 6.4% more federal funding, with all else being equal, than non-core
states. This effect increases slightly in an election year to 6.5%. Within a state, core
counties receive 3.6% more funding than non-core counties.
Third, presidents also target federal funding to the counties represented by
members of Congress who are of the same party as the president. This behavior is called
coalitional particularism (Kriner and Reeves, 2015a). There are several reasons that
presidents may target funding to districts of Congressional co-partisans. First, presidents
may distribute funding to these districts because it helps them satisfy the demands of their
parties. Presidents rely on their political parties as platforms to promote their policies on
Capitol Hill and throughout the states. Satisfying partisan demands is a crucial part of
what presidents do. Second, presidents direct funding to certain Congressional copartisans with the goal of asking a favor in return. Members of Congress value being able
to direct funding for certain programs to their districts (Bickers and Stein, 1996; Shepsle
and Weingast, 1981; Ferejohn, 1974). Presidents must build effective legislative
coalitions to make laws that support the presidents’ policies. Third, presidents may target
funding to their Congressional co-partisans with the goal of maintaining or creating
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partisan majorities in Congress. For presidents to be effective, it is vital to win or
maintain their party’s majority in Congress so that the president is met with limited
resistance on policies.
In summary, presidential particularism is a mature theory that explains why
presidents distribute funding to some districts and not others. The thesis of presidential
particularism is that presidents favor some districts more than others because the districts
are politically important to them. Presidents are especially interested in swing districts,
core districts, and districts in which they have Congressional co-partisans. These districts
are important because they help presidents’ political and electoral goals. While
Americans like to think that the president treats all Americans with the same importance;
presidential particularism holds that, in the presidents’ eyes, some Americans are more
important than others. There is evidence that presidents do not act universally on behalf
of all voters, but instead focus on the voters who are most important to them.

Applying Presidential Particularism to Science
The theory of presidential particularism is particularly applicable to studying
science funding because the executive branch controls the distribution of where funds for
scientific research and development go, once Congress appropriates the funds
(Robinson, 1993). One of the key assumptions of presidential particularism theory is that
the executive branch controls the distribution of funding to states and counties. Science
funding offers two unique twists because the executive branch gives up some of its
discretion by employing merit review to decide where to distribute funding, and also
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because the distribution of science funding requires the existence of scientific
infrastructure in the receiving state or county.
The federal government spends, on average, more than $150 billion for scientific
research and development every year, of which nearly half is for nondefense research and
development. A large percentage of the nondefense scientific research and development
funding is used for extramural research, which are research funds that are spent to fund
research by organizations outside of the federal government, such as universities.
Funding for scientific research and development includes activities ranging from shortterm grants, fellowships, cooperative agreements, long-term continuing grants, and
technology transfer grants. Congress decides how much the government spends on
scientific research and development. The executive branch decides who carries out what
research, when it is done, and how. Because the executive branch controls how funds are
used, presidential particularism is a useful theory for explaining and predicting how the
funds are geographically distributed.
According to presidential particularism, presidents will not fund all districts
equally. Instead, presidents will target funding to electorally and politically important
districts. I identify four different categories in which presidential particularism in science
allows me to explain and predict the behavior of federal science agencies for distributing
science funding. These categories are electoral particularism, programmatic
particularism, coalitional particularism, and particularism antidote.
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Electoral Particularism
First, presidents will use particularism in science funding to improve their
electoral outcomes in swing states. From an electoral perspective, the executive branch
has incentives to send scientific research and development funding to the counties and
states that are most important. Just like with presidential particularism in the broader
context, I expect that presidents will target swing states and that the magnitude of this
effect will increase in election years. Presidents will not specifically choose science
funding as their best means for swaying voters. Science funding touches comparatively
few voters compared with other forms of federal disbursements, such as social welfare
programs or infrastructure programs. However, science funding, because of its relatively
low priority on the public radar, is a strong candidate for political targeting since there
will be few groups watching the bigger picture who can identify what presidents are
doing and raise objections. Lowi (1964) observes that distributive politics are effective
because there is no clear policy loser. In science policy, the “losers” who did not receive
funding for their grant proposal may even attribute their loss to deficiencies in their own
proposals rather than to the broader political environment.
H1: All else being equal, counties in swing states can expect to
receive more federal funding for scientific research and
development than counties in non-swing states.
Electoral particularism is a core element of presidential particularism theory.
Support for this hypothesis indicates that politics plays a significant part in the
geographic distribution of science funding. This result would provide evidence that
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political processes play a significant role in deciding who gets what funding, when, and
where. Specifically, it would show that swing states have an advantage in competing for
scarce science funds. Since swing states are important because of elections, I also can
make an additional hypothesis:
H2: Counties in swing states should receive an even greater share
of federal scientific research and development funding than in off
years. In years that the president is running for re-election, the
effect will be even stronger.

Programmatic Particularism to Core States and Counties
Second, Democratic presidents will use the distribution of science funding as a
mechanism to reward core states and counties. Presidential particularism theory holds
that all presidents target funding to core states and core counties. The theory holds that
there are two reasons that presidents may do this. First, presidents may target core
counties to make “safe” investments by directing federal funds to partisan bastions that
will respond by turning out to vote. Second, presidents may target core counties because
their policies programmatically align better to the areas in which their partisans cluster. In
the case of science, the latter explanation is very likely because of many of the
infrastructures required for science to take place lead districts that perform science to lean
toward a liberal worldview (Allard, 2019). People with liberal worldviews tend to
identify with the Democratic Party (Sides, 2019).
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Conducting scientific research requires infrastructure and resources such as universities,
an educated populace, and the presence of national laboratories. Universities tend to be
located in urban areas, even within rural states. People who live in urban areas are more
likely to identify as liberals than people who live in rural areas (Sides, 2019). In contrast
to Democratic presidents, Republican presidents are likely to avoid directing science
funding to their core states and counties. Further, scientific research tends to require a
workforce that has advanced professional education, such as a doctorate or master’s
degree. People with more education are significantly more likely to identify as liberals
than people with less education (Chokshi, 2018; Tyson, 2018; Harris, 2017).
I expect that areas that conduct scientific research will more programmatically
align with Democratic presidents’ agendas than Republican agendas. If there is any effect
of presidents’ targeting core states and counties, then I would expect that it would only be
present in the case of Democratic presidents targeting districts because they happen to
hold the infrastructure for science.
H3: All else being held equal, counties in core Democratic states
can expect to receive more federal funding for scientific research
and development than counties in Republican states and counties
in non-core states.
Supporting this hypothesis would show that it is possible that Democratic
presidents use science funding as a mechanism to favor their co-partisans over the
broader population of American voters. However, this hypothesis alone does not provide
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definitive evidence for this case. I need to analyze the relationship between Republican
presidents and their core counties.
If my hypothesis is supported and districts that have scientific infrastructure tend
to lean Democratic, then I expect that states and counties that are core Republican
districts will not exhibit this effect. Core Republican states and counties may not have the
infrastructure required for Republican presidents to target them for additional scientific
research and development funding. Therefore, Republican presidents would not see
directing science funding to their co-partisans in these districts as a “safe bet” in the way
that Democratic presidents see it. Therefore, Republican presidents are likely to promote
the targeting of science funding by other factors including electoral particularism and
coalitional particularism.
H4: All else being held equal, counties in core Republican states
can expect no effect.
Support for both of these hypotheses would provide strong evidence that the
distribution of federal funding for scientific research and development is affected by
programmatic particularism. Specifically, there are some states and counties that are
programmatically aligned to Democratic presidents’ agendas. States and counties that are
in the Republican core may benefit in other policy domains but do not benefit in science
funding. In other words, Democrats may programmatically distribute funding to counties
that are in their tally just because science attracts people who are more liberal. This
finding would provide evidence that science is affected not only by electoral politics, but
also partisan politics.
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Coalitional Particularism
One of the other aspects of presidential particularism is that presidents direct
funding to districts with the goal of improving their relationship with a legislative
coalition (Kriner and Reeves, 2015a, 2015b). Counties are the best unit of analysis
because they are one of the more granular units. This aspect of particularism should work
very similarly in science policy as it does with the broader data set of federal grants.
Presidents seek to distribute funding to satisfy partisan demands, to cultivate a legislative
coalition, or to help their co-partisans’ electoral interests, in the hopes of expanding their
majorities. Therefore, we can expect that presidents will direct funds to counties that are
represented by Members of Congress who are from the same party as the president.
H5: All else being held equal, counties represented by Members of
Congress who are from the same party as the president can expect
to receive more scientific research and development funding than
counties represented by Members of Congress who are not from
the president’s party.
If this hypothesis is supported, then it indicates that presidents use science
funding for political purposes to build coalitions in Congress. This finding would be
significant for demonstrating that politics affects the distribution of science funding.
Some counties can expect to receive more science funding only because of the party of
the Members of Congress who represent them. This effect could have important
implications for several reasons.
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First, this effect would indicate that the president and Members of Congress use
their coalition to direct science funding to some counties and not others. Identifying that
presidents use science funding to support coalitional partisanship indicates that scientists
and universities that are not in counties represented by members of Congress who are
from the same party as the president should develop mechanisms to make themselves
more competitive.
Second, this effect could indicate a pathway for universities in Republican areas
to benefit from Republican presidencies. These counties may not benefit from being core
counties for the president because they do not fit into Republican presidents’
programmatic agendas. Yet, if Members of Congress for these counties are Republican,
we may see them being able to influence the president to direct funding to these counties.
In this case, universities in Republican core counties with Republican Members of
Congress would do well to maintain very effective Congressional affairs relations
because this could improve their ability to attract funding.

Particularism Antidote: Peer Review
Another aspect of studying presidential particularism in the context of science
funding is to investigate whether peer review serves as an effective antidote to
particularism. Peer review, which is a form of merit review, is the process that most
limits the distribution of federal scientific research and development funding to
politically important counties over other counties. Prioritizing funding to the areas that
are most politically important rather than scientifically important shows that presidents
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act particularistically in science funding, in addition to other contexts such as military
base closures, disaster relief, and federal grants.
First, many agencies that participate in distributing science funding use a process
of merit review. The purpose of merit review is to make sure that the scarce resources
that the government invests in scientific research and development are being applied to
their most important use scientifically. There are many ways by which merit review can
be conducted. Many agencies seek the advice of the communities that they serve when
distributing research funding through soliciting peer review.
Peer review is a process in which representatives of the scientific community with
similar expertise to the people who produced the research evaluate proposals. The
strength of peer review is that the people who are reviewing work have the expertise to
evaluate its novelty, authenticity, and contribution to the field, while also knowing that
their work will be evaluated in the future. Agencies use peer review as an advisory
mechanism for informing the distribution of scientific research funding. If agencies were
to use only peer review for distributing federal research and development funding, then
scientific research and development funding would be distributed purely based on
projects’ scientific merit rather than other factors such as politics. The fact that not all
agencies use peer review in the same way in their merit review process presents an
opportunity for studying presidential particularism in science.
Scholars (Kriner and Reeves, 2015a; Berry et al., 2010; Harrison, 2004; Chubin
and Hackett, 1990; Jasanoff, 1990) claim that the process of peer review insulates science
funding from the influence of politics. Peer review assures resources will be spent in the
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places that are most scientifically important. Since a project’s merit must pass the
examination of experts, it assumes that scarce federal funds are used on the projects that
are most important for the country. The reviewers are selected from the scientific
community and will treat federal funding as a scarce resource that needs to be stewarded
carefully. It is unlikely that the reviewers will award money based on political
considerations. In other words, these scholars argue that because there is peer review of
how agencies award the funding for projects, the agencies will not just use money to
support the electoral ambitions or prospects of the president or his co-partisans. After all,
agencies may have the incentive to support the electoral ambitions of the president or his
co-partisans because many agency heads are political appointees. While as a scientist, I
would like to think that the distribution of federal funding for scientific research and
development is independent of political considerations to target funding to electorally
important districts, as a political science scholar I cannot help but question the
assumptions underlying the argument that peer review insulates federal science agencies
from participating in political particularism. Agencies are not required to use peer review
for all scientific research and development awards.
Agencies differ significantly in the processes they use for making awards and the
degree to which those processes employ peer review. I compare and contrast NIH and
NSF as an example. The grantmaking process of the National Institutes of Health (NIH)
is governed by several statutes, including Section 492 of the Public Health Service Act
(42 CFR § 289a), which requires the director to approve only proposals that have
undergone peer review and that a majority of the members have recommended for
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approval (42 CFR § 289a). While the evaluations by the merit review boards are
considered recommendations, only proposals that are recommended for approval by two
merit review boards may be considered for funding (“Peer Review”, NIH, 2018.
However, there are still opportunities in which particularism may play out. First, institute
directors may have more projects receive recommendation for funding by peer review
than can be funded. Then institute directors must decide which proposals to fund using
criteria other than what is outlined in the statutes. Second, the development of programs
themselves may lead to developing peer review criteria that favor recipients that live in
specific geographies. An example is if a program requires the usage of specific scientific
infrastructure that is only located in a certain state.
NSF treats peer review as a non-binding recommendation within the merit review
process. NSF’s rules for making awards are outlined in the Proposal and Award Policies
and Procedures Guide (PPAG) document. NSF derives its authority to commit federal
funds through 2 CFR § 200, Uniform Administrative Requirements, Cost Principles, and
Audit Requirements for Federal Awards (PPAG, 2019). However, there is not a statute in
the Code of Federal Regulations that outlines NSF’s granting process. According to
PPAG (2019), NSF distributes funding for scientific research and development from its
divisions, which are thematically based depending on discipline. When a proposal is
submitted to NSF, the proposal first undergoes a scientific and technical peer review. The
goal of this review is to evaluate proposals based on their Intellectual Merit and Broader
Impacts. An NSF program officer takes the peer review evaluations and uses them to
form a recommendation to the NSF Division Director as to whether the proposal should
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be declined or recommended for an award. The Division Director then conducts his or
her own review of the proposal. Then the proposal goes to the Division of Grants and
Agreements (DGA) to review the proposal, which has been recommended for an award,
for business, financial, and policy implications. DGA’s approval is the final step in the
process.
Peer review is a type of merit review in which federal agencies solicit the advice
of people who have the same skills and knowledge as the people who proposed to do the
research. The goal of peer review is to evaluate research for its scientific merit and its
potential to contribute to society. Agencies use peer review differently in their processes
of making awards. For example, NIH uses peer review to make binding recommendations
as to which projects should be funded. On the other hand, NSF uses peer review as an
advisory mechanism for program officers and division directors but does not treat
recommendations as binding. NIH has much stricter peer review policies than NSF. Peer
review is important because it is seen as a potential antidote to presidential particularism.
Because there are differences in the degree to which agencies use peer review as a
deciding factor for making awards, I study whether agencies that more strongly abide by
peer review recommendations make awards less particularistically than agencies that
have less binding peer review regimes.
H6: All else being held equal, agencies with binding peer-review
processes show less particularism than agencies without binding
peer-review.
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If this hypothesis is supported, then it indicates that binding peer review of awards
can serve as an antidote to particularism. Peer review is primarily used in the science
communities but can be used in almost any area of policy that distributes federal funding.
Peer review could provide an administrative process that encourages presidents to make
policy in a way that values the broad, universal constituency of American voters, rather
than the narrow particular constituency of their co-partisans.
It also indicates that the scientific community and science policy scholars should
be more cautious when assuming that employing peer review is enough to counteract the
effect of politics on science. Rather, the scientific community and science policy scholars
should think about whether or not peer review is treated as a binding recommendation.
Agencies can conduct peer review but if their recommendations are not followed, then
peer review may not fulfill its intended purpose.

Summary
I use presidential particularism as my theory for studying the geographic
distribution of science funding because it can be used to explain and predict why some
districts receive more funding than others. Presidential particularism holds that presidents
do not equally value all of their constituents. Instead, presidents favor constituents that
are politically and electorally important to them. While scholars have extensively studied
presidential particularism, they have not studied it in the context of science. Presidential
particularism scholars have argued that science should be studied because its use of merit
review makes it different from most other federal grant programs. Funding awards made
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for scientific research and development are supposed to be made according to how the
scientific community values projects’ merit and benefit to society. I adapted presidential
particularism to study it in the context of science.
Electoral particularism and coalitional particularism should both behave similarly
to other policy domains in which presidential particularism has been studied. Based on
presidential particularism, I expect that counties in swing states can expect to receive
more federal funding for scientific research and development than counties in non-swing
states. I expect that this effect will become even stronger in election years. Further,
presidents are also likely to direct funding to counties that are in Congressional districts
represented by members of Congress who are important for the president’s coalition.
Core state partisan particularism will work substantially differently from
presidential particularism in other contexts. The infrastructure that supports science
predisposes science to be conducted in counties and states that typically lean Democrat.
Therefore, I expect that Democratic presidents will be able to direct funding to their core
partisans because of programmatic alignment, whereas Republican presidents will not be
able to direct funding in the same way. In other words, Democratic presidents may use
the distribution of science funding as a mechanism for carrying out their policy agenda,
while Republican presidents may not.
Overall, science presents an opportunity to study an awarding mechanism that
could act as an antidote to presidential particularism: peer review. Peer review is a
process that, theoretically, can counteract presidential particularism because it distributes
awards based on scientific merit and greater impact, rather than on the electoral or
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political importance of the recipients. While nearly all agencies that award scientific
funding claim to use some type of peer review, the degree to which they treat peer review
as a binding recommendation varies. I expect that agencies that treat peer review’s
recommendations as binding will not be affected by particularism. In other words,
counties in swing states, with Members of Congress who are the same party as the
president, or in Core states will not experience increases in funding compared to other
counties.
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CHAPTER FOUR
RESEARCH APPROACH
My study of presidential particularism in science builds on existing work about
presidential particularism. My contribution is to extend understanding by using new
response variables with an existing model. By using an existing model of presidential
particularism, I am using existing theory to study the relationship between science
funding and the established explanatory variables. Since I am studying a question of
magnitude, I use a quantitative approach. I chose a quantitative approach for testing the
theory of presidential particularism because I am studying the changes in the relationship
between two variables. I analyze how the political and electoral variables affect the
response variable of science funding. There are two components of the relationship in
which I am most interested: magnitude and precision. Magnitude is important because it
sheds light on the scale to which presidential particularism affects the distribution of
science funding. In linear regression, magnitude is represented by the beta-coefficient.
Precision is the degree of certainty with which we know the magnitude. Precision is often
called “statistical significance”. To know the magnitude of the relationship precisely is
important because then I can better understand if the relationship between the variables is
conceptually significant. However, if there is little precision in my estimation of the
coefficient, I am at least able to know whether there is a positive, negative, or no
relationship between the variables.
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My quantitative approach is informed by data science. There were no preexisting
sufficient, reliable and well-formed data sets from which to work. Instead, I had to collect
data, bind or join it, and continually assess data integrity. I invested effort in data
collection and preparation to improve existing data and create new data for the input data
to my quantitative analyses. Tools I used to achieve this included: (1) the statistical
programming language R for collecting, preparing, and analyzing my data; and (2) the
Python programming language for some specific tasks such as scraping data from the
web.
I used a data science mindset when working with my data. Data science is an
emerging field that emphasizes the use of rigorous procedures for the entire research
process from data collection through the publication of results. The data science mindset
emphasizes collecting large data sets (commonly called “big data”). In my research I
identified a research population and then set out to collect the entire population for my
research study.
My research population is federal funds awarded to universities, private
companies, individuals, and other organizations for non-defense, scientific research by
the National Science Foundation (NSF), the National Institutes of Health (NIH), and the
Small Business Innovation Research Program (SBIR). This research population is
broadly representative of the population of all federal funding for non-defense scientific
research. Together, NSF and NIH comprise nearly two-thirds (63.7%) of U.S. federal
spending on basic research for the period 1984-2018. I also chose NIH and NSF because
they made their data available online, albeit not always in a form that can be used, thus
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requiring additional processing. Unfortunately, other agencies such as DOE and NASA
do not make their data publicly available. I included data about the agencies that do
participate in the SBIR Program in my analysis so that I can compare across agencies.
While I may not be able to analyze the agencies’ extramural grant programs, ten science
agencies participate in the SBIR program and, by law, the data related to this program are
publicly accessible.
The SBIR program is a Congressionally designed program that requires agencies
that conduct annual scientific research at a level of over $100 million per year to set-aside
a fixed percentage of their overall research budget to fund small businesses to
commercialize the technologies that their agencies develop. Ten different agencies
participate in the SBIR program, although the program’s reporting is centrally
administered by the Small Business Administration (SBA). Each participating agency
maintains the autonomy to decide how to solicit and evaluate proposals; however, the
agencies must report information about who receives their awards to the SBA. In turn, the
SBA publishes the information on the SBIR Program website
(https://www.sbir.gov/api/awards)2. While the SBIR program only represents how these
agencies use a small percentage of their extramural research budgets, it provides a lens
into this process and allows me to compare across agencies.
My unit of analysis is the county-year. Each county-year represents an
observation of my variables for each county in each year. This unit of analysis combines
a geographical region with a particular point in time. I chose the interval of a year

2

See Allard (2018) for complete documentation of the SBIR dataset.
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because most of my variables change only about once per year at a minimum. For
example, a county’s population is only estimated by the Census once per year. Other
qualities of a county, such as for which candidate the county voted in the last presidential
election, may change even less frequently.
I chose the county as my geographic unit of analysis for several reasons. First, I
chose the county because counties are smaller than states, so they provide a more detailed
look at the effects of targeting. It would be no surprise that presidents target states. The
problem with studying this phenomenon at the state level is that presidents could be
targeting only one part of the state but not others. By looking at presidential particularism
at the county level, we are able to control for these effects. Second, there are more
counties than states, so looking at this phenomenon at the county level allows me to draw
from a larger statistical population and to increase my sample size. The impact of sample
size is that I would expect my study to approach statistical normality, which allows me to
make inferences about the broader population of NIH, NSF, and SBIR awards—and
potentially about science funding in general. Third, the county-level is the smallest
geographic unit of analysis that I could find for presidential election results. Once I
decided what my unit of analysis would be, I then operationalized the conceptualized
variables of presidential particularism theory into variables for which I could collect data.
Operationalizing the theory of presidential particularism requires translating the
concepts I outline into variables for which I could collect empirical data. My concepts
can be divided into three broad categories of variables: response, explanatory, and
control. I produced a data set of county-level observations spanning 35 years, 1,470
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counties, and 70 variables. My data comes from over ten different sources, including raw
XML files downloaded from the National Science Foundation and the National Institutes
of Health, to comma separated values (CSV) data sets purchased from David Leip’s
Election Atlas. Developing this data set is a major outcome of the overall project of my
dissertation. Aligning with best practices in data science and open science, my goal in
sharing my data collection procedures is to be completely transparent about how I
conducted my research. Transparency allows other researchers to replicate my study and
to monitor these dynamics in the future. I also want to motivate more researchers in the
future to share their workflows and recognize the importance of data collection, cleaning,
management, and usage.
One of the major outcomes of my dissertation is that I collected data on several
variables that previously were not available in a machine-readable and ready-for-analysis
format. My process for building an analysis data set involved creating a skeleton data set
of county-year observations and then sequentially adding my response variables,
explanatory variables, and control variables.

Response Variables
The first category of variable is the response variable, sometimes called the
dependent variable. I ran my analysis to test the degree to which the response variable’s
value changes, based on the value of the explanatory variable. In my study, the response
variable is the amount of scientific funding per county-year divided out by agency and
program. Depending on the hypothesis I tested, the specific scientific funding variable
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may be for a different agency or program. Lastly, I included control variables to account
for variables that have an impact on the relationship between the response and
explanatory variables, but that I am not specifically studying.
I collected data about the amount of scientific funding per county year for NIH,
NSF, and SBIR. Starting out, I checked the Department of the Treasury’s
USAspending.gov tool to see if I could collect all the data from a single location using an
application programming interface (API) or download. The advantage to collecting data
from a single source is that it would be formatted in a uniform way, which would speed
the data preparation for my analysis. When I searched for the data that I needed from
USAspending.gov, I found that it did not provide county-year data for the two agencies
and one program for the full number of years that I needed. I needed to find other data
sources. NIH, NSF, and the SBIR program all publish grant-level information on their
website.
NIH and NSF both publish their data in similar formats, and I used very similar
strategies for working with their data. While I worked to collect and wrangle NSF’s data
and then repeated the process for NIH, I will discuss the process for both. These agencies
publish databases that use individual awards as their unit of analysis and are formatted in
XML. I downloaded their databases. The databases were separated by year into different
folders. I extracted the information in each folder and made a data set for each year. I
added a column for the year because it was not already on there. This data also did not
include information for counties or county-level FIPS codes; however, it did provide an
address for the recipient of each grant. The recipient is important because that is the
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organization to whom the agency is making the award. In other words, presidents and
their surrogates may not care as much about where the research will be performed as
much as to which geographic location funding will be distributed. Geocoding the
addresses was my next step to translate the addresses into a format that could be used in
my analysis.
I geocoded the recipients’ addresses using the Google Maps API, which returned
FIPS codes for both the state and county. Geocoding takes a significant amount of
computer time because it requires reaching out to an API and then running relatively
time-consuming algorithms. To conduct this process efficiently, I used an Amazon
Elastic Cloud Computing (EC2) Instance that could run this job while I still maintained
use of my local computer. Using an EC2 instance also allowed access to a faster internet
connection, which sped up the API pull. Once I collected this information and matched
the geocoded counties back to the addresses to which they belonged, I then created the
data set.
Then I binded the data sets for each individual year together to form one data set
with the unit of analysis being a grant-year. Next, I reshaped the data to the county-year
unit of analysis by summing the award amount for each county in each year. I broke out
the award amount by agency (NIH or NSF). For the NSF awards, I broke it out further by
creating columns for Award Instrument type.
The SBIR programs required an even more involved data collection process. I
collected a list of all of the awards for each year 2008-2018 using the year endpoint API
on sbir.gov. This process returned a data set that contained project-level information
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including the title, abstract, agency, year, company, and link to the project’s web profile.
Unfortunately, this endpoint does not contain information about the amount that was
awarded to each project. However, this information is available in the online web profile
for each project. To collect this data, I built a web scraper that used the link in each
observation to go to the web profile and collect the award amount. I added this data into
the project-level data frame. While I had the address for each company, the data I pulled
and scraped did not provide information about in what county that address exists. I
geocoded the address for each company to a county. Next, I aggregated the data by
awarding agency up to the county-year unit of analysis. I also created a separate column
that summed the award totals for each agency per county-year together.
My product at this stage of the data collection project consisted of three data
frames—representing NSF, NIH, and the SBIR program. The data frames contained data
measured at the county-year level of analysis. The unique identifier in the data frames
consisted of a county-year key. My next step was to collect the data for my explanatory
variables.

Explanatory Variables
My explanatory concepts are “electorally competitive state,” “core state,” and
“core county.” The explanatory variable, sometimes called the independent variable,
explains changes in another variable. In other words, it is the variable I am testing to see
if changes in it explain the changes in the value of the response variable. Because I tested
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six hypotheses, I have several different explanatory variables, although only one variable
is used for testing each hypothesis.
An electorally competitive state is a state in which the loser of the presidential
election has won 45% or more of the two-party vote share3. The value for this variable is
a 1 if the observation is a swing state and 0 if it is not. This definition is used by Kriner
and Reeves (2015, 2012), Berry and colleagues (2010), and Shaw (2006, 1999). I chose
this measure of competitiveness because it takes into account the competitiveness of a
state over time. By taking into account competitiveness over time, I control for the fact
that presidents make decisions about awarding funding based on past performance—they
do not have a luxury of knowing how a state may vote in the upcoming election. This
measure of competitiveness is similar to how many political campaigns identify a state to
be up-for-grabs (Shaw, 2006). The benefit of using this measure is that it is externally
valid regarding how presidential campaigns may define a competitive state and it is
consistent with prior research. However, there are other alternative measures.
One alternative measure is a narrower definition of how much vote-share is
needed for a state to be competitive. Other scholars (Hecht and Shultz, 2015) and some
journalists define a competitive state as being one in which a candidate’s two-party vote
share is between 47% and 53%. But these measures do not take into account the average
of how a state votes over time. By giving up looking at how states have voted over time,

3

Two-party vote share is calculated by dividing the number of votes the Democratic candidate received by
the sum of the total number of votes cast for the Democrat or Republican candidates. In the U.S., two-party
vote share is the most common way to present this information because the two dominant parties maintain
institutional advantages that keep third parties from playing a meaningful role.
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the way Hecht and Shultz define a competitive state differs from the way that political
campaigns think about electoral competitiveness.
A core state is a state in which the current president’s party won 55% or more of
the two-party vote share in the last three presidential elections. I chose this operational
definition of a core state because it captures the degree to which a state solidly supports
the president’s party over time. This measure captures how many political campaigns
define a base or core state—states that have supported the president’s party over time.
This measure also reflects how other studies have defined it, including Kriner and Reeves
(2015a) and Berry and colleagues (2010). Similarly, a core county is a county in which
the current president’s party won 55% or more of the two-party vote share in the last
three presidential elections.
Since all three of these variables involve presidential elections, I collected data for
them simultaneously. The source data I needed were county-level election returns for the
presidential elections 1968-2016. While my data starts in 1984, the presidential election
variables for 1984 reference back to the 1980 presidential election. The 1968 presidential
election is the third-previous election to the 1980 election. I collected these data from two
sources: MIT Election Lab’s Dataverse Repository and David Leip’s Atlas of Presidential
Elections.
I used data from MIT’s Election Lab’s Repository on Harvard Dataverse (2019)
for the 2000-2016 County Presidential Election Returns. I chose this data source because
it is accurate and cost-effective (no monetary cost). The file’s unit of analysis is countyyear-candidate. It also contained columns including “year,” and several for geographic
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information including a state-county FIPS code, the office, candidate names, party,
candidate votes, and total votes. I needed to convert these data to county-year levels of
observation and calculate two-party vote share for both the Democratic candidate and
Republican candidate in each election. I made this conversion in a four-step process that
involved filtering for observations of Democratic and Republican candidates only,
spreading the party column into three columns with the value of candidate votes, then
calculating two new columns for the Republican and Democratic two-party vote share.
Then I kept only the columns that I needed for forming the base of my data set.
For the presidential elections spanning 1968 to 1996, I used David Leip’s Election
Atlas (2019). David Leip’s Election Atlas is an online resource from which researchers
can purchase data. The data is considered best-of-industry and many researchers and
studies use these data. This source has been cited over 360 times in articles, according to
Google Scholar. It is also used by journalistic researchers, including Nathaniel Silver’s
FiveThirtyEight blog and the Washington Post. Leip collects his data from numerous
primary sources. Purchasing Leip’s data allowed me to save time and money because I
did not have to collect source data from state-level election boards or from the Associated
Press.
Once I purchased the election data, I downloaded data for both state and county
levels of analysis. Each election year comes in its own comma separated values file. Each
file contains geographic information and values for variables such as the “total number of
votes” for the geographic unit and the number of votes for each candidate. I converted
these files to an R format. Then I had to format the data for each individual year. For
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example, the columns representing candidate votes are wide-form and the column names
are for presidential candidates. Because each presidential election features different
candidates, I had to rename the columns for the candidate’s party (Democrat or
Republican) so that I could column-bind the data sets together. I also had to calculate the
two-party vote share. Once the data were in the proper format, I column-binded it to the
other political data to form a single data frame with data spanning 1968 to 2018.
Using a single data frame, I coded the swing state and core state variables. I
needed to create some intermediate variables to be able to code them effectively. First, I
created variables for the average vote-share for the last three elections of the election’s
winner and loser. This variable is important because it is the source from which I code
the swing state (compstate) variable. I also created a last-3-election average vote-share
for both Republican Party candidates and Democratic Party candidates. I used these
variables to code the core state (corestate) variable. I coded the core state variable by
coding observations in which the two-party vote share of the president’s party averaged
55% or better over the last three elections. Once I finished this process, I joined the data
from my response variables to this data set. The reason I did this is that the political and
election variables represent data from nearly all of the county-year observations that there
were for the period 1984-2018. By using these data as the foundation for my analysis
data, I maintained the opportunity of adding other response variables, if nothing else than
for comparison’s sake.
Using a different data frame, I coded the core county variable. I used a countylevel data frame that I put together from David Leip’s data (presidential elections from
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1968 to 1996) and the MIT Election Lab data. Then I calculated the county’s two-party
vote share in each election, the two-party vote share of the winner and loser, and the
average of two-party vote share over the last three elections. I coded the core county
variable by coding observations in which the two-party vote share of the president’s party
averaged 55% or better over the last three elections.
Another explanatory variable addresses whether the counties are represented by a
Member of Congress from the same party as the president (president1). I operationalized
this variable by coding whether the county fit into a Congressional district whose
Member of Congress is from the same party as the president. Because I included several
other variables dealing with Congress, I will discuss how I collected data for these
variables further on in this paper. I coded this variable as whether, in any part of the year,
the county was represented by a member of Congress who was from the same party as the
president. The values for this variable are either a 0 or 1. Once I coded this variable, I
joined it to the data set using the same process as I discuss below for all of my other
Congressional variables.
Lastly, I have explanatory variables that relate to election years (election), reelection year (reelection), and whether a president is trying to help a successor to win an
election (successor). I created my own spreadsheet that contained these data using a year
as the unit of observation. I verified this information from David Leip’s Atlas of U.S.
Presidential Elections. Then I added these data to my analysis data.
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Control Variables
The next category consists of eight variables that I use to control for factors that I
expect to have an impact but are not part of my model. My control variables account for
the role of Congress on distributing funds, the size and economic status of the county,
and the research infrastructure. I added variables about research infrastructure to help
account for some of the variation in the amount of funding that may be due to some
counties just having more infrastructure. Using these control variables is important
because it helps me to build on the work of other scholars and account for explanations
they say are important. They also help me to add validity to my research. If my statistical
models indicate that there is a positive effect on the political and electoral variables after
including these control variables, then it is a strong indication that the political and
electoral variables may be conceptually important.

Congressional Variables
The first set of control variables are ones that represent the impact of Congress on
the distribution of science funding. These variables include whether the county is
represented by a Member who is from the same party as the president, a Member of the
Majority Party, a Member of Congress who is on the Ways and Means Committee, a
member who is a chair of any committee, or a member who is on the House Committee
on Science, Space, and Technology. The temporal unit of analysis for most
Congressional variables is the Congressional session. Congressional sessions are twoyear periods that are bookended by general elections for the House of Representatives.
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Since my study covers the years 1984-2018, I needed to collect data for the 98th to 115th
Congresses.
I collected data for these variables from Garrison Nelson’s (1994) Congressional
Committees, 1947-1994 and Charles Stewart’s and Jonathan Woon’s (2017)
Congressional Committees, Modern Standing Committees, 102nd—115th Congresses.
These data sources are structured similarly in that they provide long-form data with
observations being each individual committee role. Therefore, each member,
Congressional session, and Congressional committee is an observation. I aggregated and
re-shaped the data so that the Congressional member, Congressional session, and
Congressional district became the unit of observation and the committees were spread as
binary variables. If a member served on the committee then the value was a 1 and if the
member did not, the value was 0.
The most challenging aspect of coding these variables was to join them to
counties. Counties and Congressional districts are not in the same geographic unit of
measure hierarchy. Counties are administrative units within states and are drawn up
based on geography, history, and a multitude of other criteria. While county borders from
time to time change, a vast majority of counties stay the same year after year.
Congressional districts are administrative units of a state but are drawn up with the sole
criterion of representing population. On average, each Congressional district represents
700,000 citizens. Counties do not necessarily neatly fit into Congressional districts.
Further, Congressional districts’ geographic boundaries regularly change—sometimes as
often as every election—as state governments keep up with changes in population density
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or partake in (and sometimes abate) gerrymandering. While I could find county to
Congressional district crosswalks for 2018, to my best knowledge, there is no data
crosswalk that provides a table for matching counties to Congressional districts for prior
years.
To match counties to their proper Congressional districts, I created an algorithm
that matched the county to the Congressional district in which it best fit. The algorithm
first subset all the Congressional districts and all the counties for one state. Then it
matched the counties to the Congressional districts. If a county fit within a Congressional
district, I coded which Congressional district it fit into and removed it from the list to be
coded. For all the remaining counties, I then repeated the procedure of subsetting the
counties and Congressional districts for a single state. Then I used a geocoding algorithm
to identify the Congressional districts that are most likely for each county. Then I
identified the intersection where the county and Congressional district overlap and
measured the intersection’s area in square meters. I coded the county’s Congressional
district based on the one with which it had the greatest overlap.
One aspect of this methodology is worthy of note. While my procedure for
matching the Congressional district was able to provide a reasonable way to code
counties to the Congressional districts to which they belonged in the past, I can improve
the procedure in the future. Congressional districts measure population and their area is
largely contingent on population density. My algorithm matched counties and
Congressional districts by land area rather than population density. There are cases where
I may have coded a county that has a lot of land mass in one Congressional district but
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most of its population density in another. Therefore, in the future I want to improve my
procedure by taking population density into account.
Once I coded each county to the Congressional district that was the best fit, I then
added the state-county FIPS code to each observation in the Congressional committee
membership data. These data are still measured at the committee position –
Congressional session unit of analysis. The data used the committee seat as its unit of
analysis, which meant that most Members of Congress were observed multiple times,
since most Members of Congress serve on multiple committees. I needed to aggregate the
data into a county-year unit of analysis and then spread the “committee” column to
represent multiple columns. If the county’s Member of Congress served on the
committee, then the county showed a value of 1. Otherwise, the county showed an “NA”,
which stands for “Not Available.” In this context, the data is not available because if
there are no observations for these variables it means that the Member of Congress for
that county-year observation did not serve on those committees. Therefore, I converted
all the NAs to the value of 0 to represent the fact that they did not serve on these
committees. Then I selected only the committees that I needed for my analysis such as
the Appropriations, Ways and Means, and Science Committees. Then I added these
variables to my analysis data frame.
Next I coded whether the county was represented by a Member of Congress who
is a chair of any committee in Congress. The raw data contained a column about each
committee member’s seniority on the committee. I aggregated this variable from the unit
of observation of one committee member to the county-Congressional session level of
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observation. Then I recoded the variable’s values as a “1” if the Member of Congress
who represented the county in a particular year was a chair of any committee in
Congress, and as “0” if the Member of Congress was not. Then I added this variable to
my data set using a left join.
The final Congressional variable captures whether a county’s Member of
Congress serves on the House Science, Technology, and Space Committee. I used the raw
data contained in the column about each committee member’s seniority on the
committee. Then I aggregated the data from the Member level to the countyCongressional session unit of analysis. After this, I coded “1” for a Member who served
on the committee and “0” for a Member who did not. Lastly, I added this variable to my
analysis data set using a left join.

County Population
One concept that is important for presidential particularism is the county’s
population. I operationalized this variable by logarithmically-scaling each county-year’s
population. I used the Census Bureau’s County Intercensal yearly population estimates
for the period 1980-2018. Using the yearly population estimates for each county-year
observation is an improvement on the way that Kriner and Reeves (2015a) and Berry and
colleagues (2010) collected data for this variable. Both sets of scholars used less frequent
observations of county population, which lessens the accuracy of this measure.
There is no single table that exists, to my best knowledge, that contains all of the
county-year observations for this period of time. The Census Bureau provides different
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data sets (in their own unique layouts) for each decade for which it conducted intercensal
population estimates. I collected the data for the period 2000 to 2010 by downloading
state-level data from the Census Bureau’s data warehouse. I selected only the variables I
needed such as county FIPS code, year, and population estimate and combined each state
data set into a combined data set for the period 2000 to 2010.
Next, I downloaded the data for the period 2010-2018. For this period, the Census
Bureau provides a spreadsheet containing all the counties for every year in the time
period. The Census provides this data in a wide layout, in which the county is the unit of
analysis and the population estimate for each year. I gathered the population estimates
that were presented in year columns into a column called “Total Population” that was
observed for each county in each year. Then I added this data to the 2000 to 2010 data
set.
Then I collected data for 1990-2000. I used the Census Bureau’s population data
table available in the Census Bureau’s data warehouse. This file was formatted as a .txt
file, so it required significant reformatting including naming the columns. The data set’s
unit of observation is the county-year; however, the variables represented a breakdown of
the population by race. I summed the variables to create a total population column. Then
I selected only the columns I needed and added this data set to the data from 2000-2018.
Lastly, I collected the data for the 1980 to 1990 period. The Census Bureau makes
this data available in a “.csv” (comma separated values) format, although the layout of
the worksheet created some other challenges. I needed to clean the data of non-machine
readable information such as the worksheet’s title and other information that is useful for
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human beings but not computers. I also had to convert the columns to the correct data
format. The raw data set’s unit of analysis was an observation of each county in each year
for each race and sex. The observations measured the total population in each age
bracket. I needed to use a two-step process to calculate the total population estimate for a
county-year estimate. First, I had to sum the total population for each race and sex that
was measured across age groups. Then I had to spread the data out to county-year
observations of race and sex, then gather the data back together under a total population
column. Then I added these data to the population data for 1990 to 2018.

County Poverty Rate
The county poverty rate is another important variable in presidential particularism
studies because it controls for the fact that counties with more poor people may be more
or less likely than other counties to receive federal funding. I operationalized the poverty
rate by using the Census’ estimation of the number of people in poverty. The Census
Bureau estimates poverty by analyzing a set of money income thresholds, which are
adjusted for inflation, that vary by family size and composition. The Census Bureau
estimates rather than measures poverty because it is difficult to measure this variable at
the county level. However, an estimation technique allows the Census to use the
American Community Survey (U.S. Census Bureau, 2018) to project what the likely
poverty rate is for each county, even counties with small populations. The Census
publishes these data for the years 2007 to 2018 through the Small Area Income and
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Poverty Estimates (SAIPE) program. For the years 1980 to 2006, the Census Bureau
publishes decennial measures of poverty that are calculated from the Census.

Per Capita Income in 2008 Constant Dollars
The concept that I capture with this variable is the idea that counties’ per capita
income may affect the distribution of funding. In science funding, it is important to
control for differences in income between counties. I operationalized this variable by
collecting data from the Census Bureau’s Bureau of Economic Analysis, which publishes
these data for the period 1969 to 2018 in an Excel spreadsheet. The spreadsheet observed
per capita income per county per year, which made it very well set up for my purposes. I
created a new column and adjusted the per capita income to 2008 constant dollars using
the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ Consumer Price Index Research (CPI-U-RS). This process
helped me account for inflation so that I am comparing per capita income for each county
year that have been standardized for the increasing value of the dollar over the period of
time that I am studying. I sourced the index values from the Census Bureau’s website.
Once I made this adjustment, I added the per capita income in 2008 constant dollars to
my data frame.

Number of Universities that Offer a 4-year Degree or Higher
The number of universities per county is one of the concepts that is important for
studying presidential particularism in science. The purpose of this concept is to capture
differences between counties based on the number of universities they contain. Previous
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literature in science policy, such as Feldman (1994), show that the number of universities
in a geographic unit is a strong predictor of that geographic unit’s research intensity. The
data set that would provide an ideal variable to measure this concept is the National
Science Foundation’s Higher Education Research and Development (HERD) Survey. My
measure of research intensity using the HERD data was the amount of dollars spent on
research per capita per county. This measure would capture research density because it
would adjust for differences in the number of people per county. The problem is that the
HERD survey started in 2010, which means that the data are not available for 27 years of
my study. While there is data available for some components of the HERD survey that
span back to 1953, because of predecessor instruments, I needed the data to be available
at a university level. The Institutional-level data was one of the unique components of
developing the HERD survey, and the HERD survey’s predecessor did not make
institutional-level data available for the whole period of my study—1984 to 2018.
Therefore, I had to develop a proxy measure.
I operationalized this variable by counting the number of universities that offer a
four-year degree or higher. My assumption is that research intensive institutions will
offer at least a 4-year bachelor’s degree or higher. I collected the data for this variable
from the Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS) curated by the
National Center for Education Statistics (2018). The IPEDS universe includes institutions
that are eligible for federal student aid. These institutions are required to submit
information about various aspects of their institution by the Higher Education Act of
1965. I needed the institutions’ addresses so I collected information about the basic
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characteristics of the institution. These data can be downloaded from the IPEDS website.
The data comes in separate “.txt” files that each represent a single survey year, and the
unit of analysis is the responding institution.
To prepare this data for my analysis, I converted the “.txt” files into a “.Rdata”
format and combined them into a single data frame. I then selected the variables that I
needed (the year, respondent ID, institutional name, address, zip code, highest degree
level offering, medical school, and Carnegie level) and dropped the rest. This data set
does not contain information about the state-county FIPS code of the institution’s
location. I then filtered the data set to keep only institutions that offer a 4-year bachelor’s
degree or higher as its highest-level degree. Then I extracted the addresses for geocoding.
I geocoded the addresses using the Google Maps API and the procedures previously
described in the response variables.

Change in the Number of People with a College Degree or Higher
I operationalized the measure of the number of college-educated people in a
county by using the Census Bureau’s decadal measure at the county level of education
levels of people over 25. The educational level of people over 25 is a good measure of
educational attainment for my research because it accurately captures the educational
attainment of the adult population. Science is a type of work, which requires workers.
This variable helps me control for the amount of variation in the response variables that
can be explained by the fact some counties are more educated than others. The Census
Bureau collects information about each person’s educational attainment. The Census
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Bureau aggregates this information to the county level in the decadal Census. I sourced
this Census data from the University of Minnesota’s IPUMS National Historical
Geographic Information System (NHGIS) (2019). The data comes in long-format with
the county-year as the unit of analysis. The data set’s variables are the number of people
who are at each level of education. I transformed the data to a logarithmic scale.

Summary
In this chapter, I outlined my research approach including my decision to use a
quantitative approach, the ways in which I operationalized my concepts into variables,
and my data collection procedures. I designed my study to use the county-year as the unit
of analysis because it allows me to gain more fidelity to understand the effects. I
collected data to allow for 35 years of observations from across the United States’ 3,007
counties. One of my study’s major contributions is curating and integrating a research
data set that integrates so many different variables and types of variables. In the next
chapter, I develop statistical models and report my findings.
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CHAPTER FIVE
ANALYSIS AND RESULTS

The overall goal of my analysis is to test whether science agencies such as NSF
and NIH target funds to specific counties that are electorally and politically important for
the president. Now that I have adapted the theory of presidential particularism for the
science policy domain and translated it into falsifiable hypotheses, my next step is to
analyze my data. In analyzing my data, I first describe my data and address any issues
where there are skews. Then I use a statistical model to estimate the relationship between
my explanatory variables on my response variables, controlling for some important
factors. Then I interpret the outputs of my models in light of the six hypotheses that I
made.

Data Description
My first step of my analysis is to explore and describe my data. Data description
is useful because it allows me to identify biases and trends in my observations.
Understanding biases and trends helps me to control for peculiarities in the data so that
the conclusions I make are based on integral data.
My data set consists of 35 years of observations for 3,141 counties (a total of
108,128 county-year observations) spanning 1984 to 2018, across 81 variables. In total,
my data set consists of 8.7 million data points. My data set is so large because I put it
together using a foundation of county-year observations for my explanatory and response
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variables for every year and every county. When I filter my data set to account for only
county-year observations that received research funding from NIH, NSF, or SBIR; my
research data set consists of 22,115 county-year observations (nearly 1.8 million data
points). I will refer to this filtered data set as my research data set. My first analytical step
is to baseline my response variables, which are the total amount of funding per
agency/program per county-year.

National Science Foundation: Award Amount
There are 16,866 county-year observations of the National Science Foundation’s
distribution of funding across the 35 years. For the period covered in the study, the NSF
distributed funds to 1,359 counties The mean size of NSF funds per county per year is
$10.8 million dollars and the median is $876,600 of funding per county. There is a high
degree of variance in this variable because some counties receive a much larger degree of
funding than others. Twenty-five counties in 15 states receive approximately 50% of the
total funding accounted for in the data set (see Figure B-6).. The skew indicates this
variable is not distributed according to statistical normality.
To quickly (and visually) check for the skew in the data, I use a quantile-quantile
(Q-Q) plot. A Q-Q plot is a scatterplot that is created by plotting a theoretical set of
quantiles generated based on the parameters of the data and the actual quantiles of the
data set. Quantiles are the percentiles below which a certain proportion of the data is
distributed. If the data is uniformly distributed, then the percentiles should form a straight
line from left to right. The Q-Q plot for the NSF award amount per county per year shows
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a clear skew (see Figure B-1). It is not unusual when working with budgetary data that it
will be exponentially distributed (Wooldridge, 2016). Therefore, I need to use a
transformation procedure.
The best way to control for this skew is to use a logarithmic transformation. A
logarithmic transformation helps to make the data uniformly distributed. The most
common method for a logarithmic transformation is to apply a logarithm to the Award
Amount’s value. I chose to use this method because it is an accepted transformation to
use for budgetary data and it is fairly efficient in terms of computing resources. Another
and increasingly popular way that approximates a logarithmic transformation and
improves upon log transformations is the Yeo-Johnson method. I tested using the YeoJohnson method and it provided very similar results to a logarithmic transformation but
requires more computing resources and is highly inefficient. Using the log transformation
of the Award Amount drastically improves the data’s distribution, as can be seen in
Figure B-1.

National Institutes of Health: NIH Grants
The National Institutes of Health data consist of 11,365 county-year observations
from 1,138 counties over the 35 years covered in the data set. The average amount per
county per year that NIH distributes is $35.7 million and the median is $3.1 million. Like
with the NSF data, the distribution of funding is highly concentrated into a few counties.
Over 58% of the NIH funding for the entire period is concentrated in 25 counties and 16
states (see Figure B-7). This data is also not distributed normally and requires
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transformation (see Figure B-2). I apply the same logarithmic transformation procedures
to this as I did to the NSF Awards data, and this improves the distribution of the data (see
Figure B-2).

Small Business Innovation Research Program: SBIR Total Grants
I use a sum of the total amount of SBIR research grants per county in this part of
my analysis, rather than individual agency totals. There are 10,906 SBIR grants across
1,068 counties. The average size of the amount of SBIR funds per county is $2.3 million
and the median amount of SBIR funding per county is $590,180. Approximately 49% of
the SBIR funding is concentrated in 25 states and 16 counties (see Figure B-8). These
data experience a skew and require log transformation using the procedures previously
outlined (See Figure B-3).

Science Funding
Lastly, to increase the number of observations and provide better inferences into
the statistical population, I summed the amount of funding per agency for each countyyear observation. For example, New York County, NY received a total of $784 million in
funding, comprised of $40 million in NSF funding, $738 million in NIH funding, and $6
million in SBIR funding in 2018. The data set of all science funding consists of 22,115
observations across 1,779 counties with an average funding level per county of $27.7
million and a median of $1.2 million. The distribution of funds is less concentrated than
looking at each individual agency or program, with 52% of the funding going to 25
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counties across 16 states (see Figure B-5). Figure B-4 illustrates the skew of the
variable’s distribution. I addressed the skew using the same log transformation approach
that I outlined above (see Figure B-4).

Data Set Geography
It is important to understand the geography of my data set because elections and
scientific research both happen in geographically distributed units. My research data set
averages 632 observations per year. The year with the most county-year observations is
2009 (781 observations) and the year with the least is 1990 (371). There are 208 counties
for which I have 35 observations, and 357 counties with only 1 observation. The states
that are most represented in my data set are New York (1,218 observations), Virginia
(1,072 observations), Texas (1,069 observations), and California (1,013 observations).
It is also important to understand the political aspects of my data set. First, my
research data set captures decisions made under six presidents: Reagan (1984-1988),
George H.W. Bush (1989-1992), Bill Clinton (1993-2000), George W. Bush (20012008), Barack Obama (2009-2016), and Donald J. Trump (2017-2018). Four of the
presidents captured in my data set are Republicans and two are Democrats. There are 19
years in which a Republican held the presidency, and 16 years in which a Democrat did.
My data set improves upon previous work on presidential particularism by including a
second Democratic president (Barack Obama) and more years of total data. However,
Republican presidents still represent a slight majority of the years in the data set.
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In terms of the political geography, most of the states represented in my data set
are not electorally competitive by my definition. There are 512 observations of counties
in electorally competitive states, which are states in which the loser of the two-party vote
share received an average of 45% or more of the vote in the last three presidential
elections. The states that appear most frequently as electorally competitive in my data set
are Wisconsin, Pennsylvania, Oregon, Iowa, Minnesota, Missouri, Michigan, and Ohio.
Seeing that these states are the ones that most frequently appear as electorally
competitive adds validity to my measure of electoral competitiveness because it is
consistent with other studies.
My core state variable also performs as expected although interpreting it is a bit
more complicated. Core states are ones in which the president’s party has averaged 55%
or more of the two-party vote share in the last three presidential elections. Examples of
Democratic core states are California, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Maine,
Maryland, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, Rhode Island, Vermont, and
Washington (see Table A.3). Because most of the years covered in my data set represent
years in which Republicans served as president, there are far more states that have at least
one election cycle of being a core state. The top Republican core states are Alaska (19
years), Idaho (19 years), Kansas (19 years), Nebraska (19 years), North Dakota (19
years), Oklahoma (19 years), Utah (19 years), and Wyoming (19 years) (see Table A.3).
There are two important takeaways to keep in mind about the core state variable.
First, there are both more states that are Republican core states and some of these states
are core states for every year of the Republican presidencies represented in the data set.
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Second, there are relatively fewer Democratic core states and no state is a core
Democratic state for the entire period of the Democratic presidencies covered in the data
set.

Party Control of the Presidency
To address the fact that there are more years in the data set in which a Republican
served as president, I needed to take an extra step to address any potential effects. I
subsetted my analysis data set into two independent data sets: one data set for years in
which a Republican served as president and one data set for years in which a Democrat
served as president. The data set for the years in which Republicans served as president
consists of 11,273 observations while the data set for years in which Democrats served
consists of 10,839 observations. By subsetting my data, I also can explore whether
Democratic and Republican presidents exhibit different behavior in targeting science
funding to some counties and not others. There is reason to believe that Democratic and
Republican presidents view science differently (Kushi, 2015; Hegde and Mowery, 2008;
Mooney, 2006). For the period covered in this data set, people who are educated have
typically identified with Democratic presidents and Democratic presidents have viewed
science as part of their policy program. The connection between educated voters and
science is that the people who work in science typically are at least college educated and
potentially have advanced degrees. By subsetting out the data sets, I can investigate an
effect such as if Democratic presidents target core Democratic states whereas Republican
presidents actually penalize their core states.
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Statistical Model Performance
In Chapter 4, I outlined five linear, fixed-effects models for testing my
hypotheses. Before I report the results of testing my hypotheses, it is important to
understand the effectiveness of my models. All five models can be run for the response
variables of Total Science Funding (log) (see Table C-1), NSF Funding (log) (see Table
C-2), NIH Funding (log) (see Table C-3), or Total SBIR Funding (log) (see Table C-4).
For the purposes of evaluating the effectiveness of the model to explain the variation in
the values of my response variable, I will use Total Science Funding as my default
response variable unless otherwise noted. My four models each have a slightly different
purpose.
My first model, or the Base Model, is the foundation for all of my other models. It
consists of ten variables. The response variable is Science Funding, the explanatory
variable is whether the county is in an electorally competitive state, and there are seven
control variables. The variables that I use in this model are the same ones used by Kriner
and Reeves (2015a) and Berry and colleagues (2010). It provides an ability for me to
compare presidential particularism in science funding with other models of presidential
particularism. This model explains approximately 20.1% of the variation in the response
variable and is able to precisely estimate eight of my explanatory and control variables
with 99.99% confidence. Interestingly, this model describes less variation in science
funding than it does as Kriner and Reeves’ (2015a) response variable of all federal grant
distributions to counties, in which it explains about 60% of the variation. I interpret the
decreased model fit in science funding as a sign that while electoral, political, and county
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demographic variables are important, they do not explain the whole story when it comes
to understanding this form of distributive policy. Because the Science Model improves
upon the Base model by adding other control variables that are important for modeling
science funding, I primarily use this Base model to compare the characteristics of science
funding to Kriner and Reeves’ (2015a) analysis and Berry and colleagues (2010).
The second model, which I call the Science Model, adds important control
variables for science policy, such as a county’s education level, number of universities,
and whether the county’s member of Congress serves on relevant oversight committees
such as the House Science Committee or House Small Business Committee (in the case
of SBIR funding). The variables are thought to be important explanations for
understanding the geographic distribution of science funding based on other research. For
total science data, adding these variables increases the model’s ability to explain the
variation in the response variable by over 1% (R-squared = 21.5%), and all twelve
explanatory and control variables are precisely estimated, with eleven holding a
confidence level of 99.99% and one holding a confidence level of 95%. This model
validates that presidential particularism explains an important aspect of the variation in
county-level science funding. This model will be the foundation for the next two models
because it is important to account for science-specific controls.
The third Election Model analyzes the effects of elections and reelections on
science funding by adding variables for whether the count-year observation happens in an
election year. The election model adds a variable for if a year is an election year and then
interaction terms for competitive state and core state variables.
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In the Reelection Model, I add a variable for whether a year is a reelection year
for the president or a year in which a two-term president is supporting his successor. I
also add interaction terms between reelection and successor election, with the competitive
state variable. Both of these models provide moderate increases in model fit, but do not
vastly improve the explanatory power.
The fourth model, which I call the Core County Model, adds variables for testing
whether presidents target specific core counties within core states. Specifically, this
model adds the variable of core county and then interacts it with being in a swing state or
core state. This model explains 22.7% of the variation in the response variable.
I ran these models using several different input data sets and dependent variables.
First, I ran the models using the data set that uses the log of total science funding as the
dependent variable. This operation generated six models. Then, I ran five of the six
models using each of the agencies’ (NIH, NSF, and SBIR) amount of funding per county.
Through this step, I generated 15 analyses. Lastly, I ran models using the subset data sets
for Republican and Democrat presidents for each of the agencies and total science
funding.
Examining the subset data sets for each individual agency, the explanatory and
response variables fit NSF and SBIR funding response variables similarly to the total
science funding data set. SBIR actually demonstrates the best fit of all four dependent
variables, with an R-squared of 26.4% in the core county model.
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Hypothesis 1: Competitive States
My first hypothesis is that all else being equal, counties in swing states can expect
to receive more federal funding for scientific research and development than counties in
non-swing states. The important variable for testing this hypothesis is whether the county
is in a competitive state.
When examining all science funding, the competitive state variable is both
positively related to science funding and estimated very precisely (p<0.01) across all four
models. In the Science Model, counties in competitive states can expect to receive, with
everything being held equal, 12.6% more science funding than like counties in noncompetitive states. In other words, an average county can expect to receive over $152,000
more if it is in an electorally competitive state. As models become more precise, the
magnitude for the competitive state variable decreases slightly, but is never lower than
11.1%.
Being in a competitive state gives counties a greater edge than all but one of the
control variables; the exception is whether the Member of Congress that represents the
county is on the House Committee for Science, Space, and Technology, which is
marginally less in magnitude than the effect of being in a competitive state.
When I break this down by agency, there are some interesting effects. Counties in
electorally competitive states can expect a similar premium from NSF and SBIR. NSF
funding shows that greatest degree of particularism as counties in swing states can expect
16.5% more science funding than like counties, with everything else held equal. In the
SBIR program, counties in competitive states can expect a 13.2% premium compared to

125

other like counties. The premium that counties in competitive states receive is greater in
magnitude than the premium from any other variable in the models.
These effects do not hold for NIH. In fact, NIH funding is negatively related to
the competitive state variable, although there is little precision in estimating the
magnitude. Counties in competitive states do not benefit from the same premium with
NIH funding as they do with NSF and SBIR funding. There are several potential causes
of this effect. First, the researchers who conduct the types of research that NIH funds may
not be concentrated in competitive states. NIH’s research is concentrated into a few
states. For example, six states earn over 50% of total NIH funding distributed during this
period: California (15%), New York (10.8%), Massachusetts (7.8%), Pennsylvania
(6.3%), Maryland (5.9%), and Texas (4.7%). These six states were each an electorally
competitive state in at least one year of the data, and four of the six were electorally
competitive for ten years or more. These six states are also in NSF’s top ten states by
total amount of funding earned. The argument that NIH funding is not concentrated into
electorally competitive states does not seem to explain this effect either.
An alternative explanation is that NIH may use a more binding form of peer
review when making their awards versus the other agencies that allow for politics to
determine where awards are made. Stronger peer review policies could be an explanation
for why NIH is not targeting funds to electorally important counties. I explore this
explanation in more depth in Hypothesis Six, but there is nothing that precludes the
possibility of this hypothesis.
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In conclusion, in at least some agencies, the evidence supports my hypothesis that
counties in electorally competitive states can expect to receive more federal funding than
like counties in states that are not electorally competitive. However, NIH provides a
counter example because it does not target funds to these counties. While the NIH data
does not support my hypothesis, it provides a counter example for what an agency that
does not target funds to electorally important counties may look like.

Hypothesis 2: Competitive States in Election Years
My second hypothesis is that counties in electorally competitive states should
receive an even greater share of federal scientific research and development funding in
election years than in off years. In years when the president is running for re-election, the
effect will be even stronger. I test this hypothesis by looking at the performance of the
competitive state variable in the election and reelection models.
For all science funding, counties in competitive states can expect to receive 11.3%
and 11.9% more than other like counties in models that account for elections and reelection, respectively. However, counties in general can expect to receive 5.3% less
funding in election years and 14.0% less in years when the president is running for
reelection. The population of all counties receive less science funding in an election year
and receive significantly less funding in a year in which the president is running for
reelection. Yet of the funding that is distributed, counties in competitive states can still
expect a premium over like counties in states that are not electorally competitive. This
effect is evidence against the competitive states in election years hypothesis.
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When I break this down by agency, the aspect of a penalty holds, although only
the NSF data provides enough precision to interpret magnitude. Within the NSF data,
counties can expect to receive 7.2% less funding in election years than in non-election
years, and 12.3% less funding in years when the president is running for reelection. There
is a non-statistically significant positive relationship between years when a successor to
the president is running (such as the elections of 1988, 2000, 2008 and 2016) and NSF
funding. But we cannot say anything about the magnitude of this relationship. NIH and
SBIR both have negative, not statistically significant relationships between election or
reelection and science funding.
The evidence does not support Hypothesis Two. However, the fact that there is a
statistically and conceptually significant negative relationship between election years and
reelection years with science funding indicates that there may be a mechanism that is the
opposite of presidential particularism at work.

Hypotheses 3 and 4: Partisan Targeting
My third hypothesis is that counties in core states for Democratic presidents can
expect to receive more federal funding for scientific research and development than
counties in Republican states and counties in non-core states, all else being held equal. I
test this hypothesis by subsetting the data into one data set that comprises years in which
Republicans were president and another data set that comprises years in which Democrats
were president. I use the Election, Reelection, and Core County models to shed light on
this hypothesis.
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In years when the presidency is held by the Democrats, competitive states can
expect a 10.4% increase and core states can expect a 32.8% increase in funding, all else
being held equal. This effect is even more pronounced when considering a Core County
Model, as the magnitude increases to 41.5%. Democratic presidents target core
Democratic counties. In years when there is an election, counties can expect an 18.8%
decrease in funding. However, counties in electorally important states such as
competitive and core states can expect a premium during election years. Democratic
presidents target their core counties but do not necessarily target them in their core states.
Instead, core Democratic counties in core Democratic states receive 71.8% less funding
than like counties in non-core Democratic states.
There is evidence that Democratic presidents target science funding to electorally
important states such as core states and competitive states and core counties. The
evidence that supports my hypothesis is Democratic presidents clearly target electorally
competitive states. They also increase the amount of funding in election years, which
points to the fact that they see science funding as an important electoral tool. Further,
Democratic core states can expect a 32.8% increase in funding in years when there is a
Democratic president. At the county level, Democratic presidents target their core
counties but not necessarily in their own core states. However, I need to caveat my
analysis with the fact that Democratic presidents do not target core counties in core
states, which is one of the hallmarks of presidential particularism in other domains.
My fourth hypothesis is that core Republican counties and counties in core states
will not show an effect of either increased or decreased funding. In years when
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Republicans are president, counties in core states receive 47.3% less funding than like
counties, all else being held equal. There are positive relationships (though not
statistically significant) between election years and science funding, targeting of
competitive states in elections, and targeting of core states in elections. In years when a
Republican president is trying to elect a successor, counties can expect 13.9% increase in
funding over other years. Counties in competitive states can expect an additional 16.8%
increase in funding. In the Core County Model, Republican core counties receive 67.4%
less funding than other counties. There is an interesting dynamic for core Republican
counties under Republican presidents: Republican presidents target core counties in both
swing states and competitive states. Core counties in competitive states can expect a
22.7% increase in funding over other like counties and core counties in core states can
expect a 20.9% increase in funding.
My hypothesis is supported because Republicans do not target science funding to
these politically and electorally important counties. In general, core counties receive a
penalty. Yet, Republicans do target science funds to their core counties in competitive
states and core counties in core states. In other words, Republicans do not target science
funding programmatically in the way that the Democrats do, but Republicans assure that
the science funding that is distributed in electorally important states goes to the core
Republican counties in those states.
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Hypothesis 5: Presidents Target Counties in Districts Represented in Congress by CoPartisans
The relationship between Members of Congress and the amount of science
funding counties can expect plays a significant role in the distribution of funding. My
fifth hypothesis is that, all else being held equal, counties represented by Members of
Congress who are from the same party as the president can expect to receive more
scientific research and development funding than counties represented by Members of
Congress who are not from the president’s party. I test this hypothesis using the Election,
Reelection, and Core County Models.
Presidents do target counties that are represented by a Member of Congress who
is in the same party as the president. On average, counties who are represented by a
Member of Congress who is a co-partisan with the president can expect a 4.88%
premium in terms of science funding, compared to like counties that are not represented
by a presidential co-partisan in election years. While the effect is marginal, it indicates
that presidents do target funds to their Congressional partisans. This effect is increased in
years when the president is running for reelection or is seeking to help his successor win
election. On average, counties represented by Congressional co-partisans of the president
can expect 5.16% more funding. This effect increases when using the Core State Model
to 9.5%. At an agency level, these effects are strongest for NSF (6.9% in election years,
7.0% in reelection, and 10.5% when controlling for elections and core counties) and
SBIR (4.8% in both election and reelection years).
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There are not statistically significant effects for the same party as president
variable in the SBIR data, in the core county data for the SBIR program, or in any of the
models for the NIH data. While the magnitude is positive, I cannot establish the
magnitude of the effect. There is a lack of evidence that presidents target funds in these
cases.
In contrast to other studies of presidential particularism and my own hypothesis,
other Congressional factors play a significant role, too. The Congressional variables with
the largest impact on counties’ science funding are whether a district’s Member of
Congress serves on the House Committee for Science, Space, and Technology,
Appropriations, or Ways and Means Committee. In terms of the total funding for science,
the variable with the largest magnitude effect is whether a county is represented by a
Member of Congress who serves on the House Committee for Science, Space, and
Technology. Interestingly, this effect holds at the agency-level for NSF, but not for NIH
or the SBIR program.
One other aspect of this result involves investigating the question of whether
Republican and Democratic presidents use science funding to target funding to
Congressional co-partisans in different ways. Using the Republican-only and
Democratic-only president subsets, I examine the Election, Reelection, and the Core State
Models. Using these models, I find that Republican presidents target counties that are
represented by Members of Congress who are co-partisans. These counties can expect
between a 14.3% and 17.8% premium compared to like counties. On the other hand,
Democratic presidents appear to penalize counties whose Members of Congress are co-
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partisans with the president. Counties that are represented by Democratic Members of
Congress in years when there is a Democratic president can expect a penalty of between
10.7% and 11.2% compared to like counties.
On balance, there is mixed support for my fifth hypothesis. In total science
funding, NSF funding, and most models of SBIR funding, presidents target science
funding to counties represented by their Congressional co-partisans. Republican
presidents and Democratic presidents display different behaviors in how they target these
funds to their Congressional co-partisans. Republican presidents target science funding to
counties that are represented by their co-partisans, while Democratic presidents do not.
There also is evidence that whether a county is represented by a Member of Congress
who is from the same party as the president has an effect on the overall level of science
funding a county can expect.

Hypothesis 6: Peer Review as Antidote to Particularism
My last hypothesis looks at the differences between agencies, as it holds that all
else being held equal, agencies with binding peer-review processes show less
particularism than agencies without binding peer-review. There is a substantial difference
in the degree to which NIH and NSF treat peer review’s recommendation as binding. My
expectation is that counties in electorally and politically important states will not receive
more funding than other counties. I am looking for a difference between the two agencies
in how they are affected by the competitive state, core state, Member of Congress who is
the same party as president, and core county variables. According to my hypothesis,
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NIH’s political and electoral variables will not have a positive relationship with science
funding.
To test this hypothesis, I construct a table that shows the signs of statistically
significant results for the NIH-only and NSF-only data sets. Evidence that would reject
this hypothesis would be to find that the electoral and political variables have a positive
relationship with both of the agencies’ funding. Evidence that would support this
hypothesis would be that the political and electoral variables have a positive relationship
with NSF funding.
Using Table C-2, I find that there is mixed evidence that NSF is more influenced
by political and electoral variables than NIH, which indicates that binding peer review
may be an antidote to particularism. Counties in competitive states can expect a boost in
funding from NSF, whereas with NIH there is no significant effect. NSF targets funding
to counties in electorally competitive states and to counties that are represented by a
presidential co-partisan in Congress. I have controlled for other explanations for this
difference between the agencies by including variables for research infrastructure and
population educational levels. My statistical model itself accounts for enduring
differences between counties. The only explanation that is left is that there is something
different in the process by which NIH and NSF award science funding. However, there
are some other effects that require further explanation in order for this hypothesis to hold.
One of the areas that does not clearly provide support for my hypothesis is the
degree to which agencies target counties in core states. Both NSF and NIH do not
experience a statistically significant positive relationship between core states and science
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funding. NSF even penalizes these counties (see Table C.2). However, this evidence does
not necessarily reject the overall hypothesis. It is important to remember that 19 of the 35
years covered in the data set were ones in which Republicans served as president. Science
policy is not a major programmatic element of Republican presidents’ agendas and
therefore the core counties that support them just participate less in science. Therefore, it
is also important to look at the NIH and NSF data for a subset of only the years in which
a Democrat served as president. In years when a Democrat served as president, NSF
targeted core (Democratic) counties, while in years when a Republican served as
president there is no effect. In other words, NSF expands the degree to which it
participates in particularism under presidents for whom science is a major part of the
policy program.
But NIH is not less political; it is just political in a different way. Counties that
are represented by a Member of Congress who serves as a Chair of a House Committee
or who serves on the Appropriations or Ways and Means Committees have a clear
advantage over other like counties. This effect can be explained by more traditional
explanations of distributive politics that argue that Congress uses distributive politics to
improve its electoral outlook. One explanation is that agencies direct funds to the
counties represented by the Members of Congress who serve on important oversight or
appropriations committees in order to curry favor with these Members. Another
explanation is that Members of Congress who serve on these committees are able to
influence the way agencies distribute funds by exercising their oversight authority. The
exact reason in this case does not matter. What does matter is that the amount of NIH
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funding a county receives is positively related to these factors in Congress. Congressional
distributive politics typically happen in the appropriations process. NIH could be acting
particularistically by Congress’ design to send funds to important districts for elected
officials in that body. While NIH may act particularistically, the way it does so does not
emphasize the role of the president. There is still the possibility that the peer review
process is followed.
In summary, my exploration of this hypothesis is a preliminary step and I find
weak support for the hypothesis that strong adherence to peer review may be an antidote
in the distribution of funding. The major difference in the process by which NIH and NSF
award funding is whether peer review is binding or not. At NIH, in which peer review is
a binding recommendation, counties that are electorally or politically important for the
president do not receive more funding than other counties. In contrast, some counties can
expect a premium in NSF funding because they are in electorally competitive states and
are represented by a Member of Congress who is a presidential co-partisan. There needs
to be more research into this hypothesis to draw a robust conclusion.

Presidential Particularism in Science Funding
In conclusion, there is evidence that presidents and their surrogates affect the
distribution of science funding. The evidence for presidential particularism in science is
not as clear cut as it is in other domains such as disaster relief or federal aid; however,
some agencies such as NSF participate in presidential particularism. Some counties have
an advantage in competing for NSF funding because they are electorally or politically
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important. This effect is especially strong in years when a Democrat is serving as
president. Table A-2 presents the outcomes of my hypotheses.
The electorally competitive hypothesis receives strong support. In total science
funding, the NSF, and the SBIR data sets there is a positive relationship between counties
in swing states and science funding, but NIH does not exhibit this behavior. The agencies
that do exhibit this behavior indicate that the premium that counties can expect from
being in an electorally competitive state is substantial. These counties receive this
premium not because they have better scientists or have invested in scientific research
infrastructure; they receive this premium just because of the state’s political importance
to the president’s election.
The hypothesis that presidents target competitive states in election years more
than non-election years is not supported. In fact, in aggregate science funding, NSF, and
NIH funding there is a negative relationship in which counties can expect to receive less
funding in election years than in other years. The lack of support for this hypothesis has
more to do with science funding in general than it does with particularism. Science
funding is not necessarily the highest profile use of federal dollars for motivating voters
to the ballot box. Relatively few people in society directly benefit from science funding
versus other federal distributive policies. However, the result of this hypothesis is
important for my broader inquiry into the effect that politics has on science. I did not
hypothesize a negative relationship, but it is important.
The partisan targeting hypotheses are supported. There is evidence that
Democrats target electorally important states such as competitive states and core states.

137

They also target their core counties. While counties may receive less funding in election
years, electorally competitive and core Democratic states can still expect a premium.
Republicans, on the other hand, do not exhibit the same propensity for targeting science
funding. This behavior changes in election years when Republican core counties in both
core states and competitive states can expect to receive a premium in science funding.
The Congressional co-partisan hypothesis is supported. In general, presidents
target science funding to counties represented in Congress by their co-partisans. This is
the only hypothesis that is supported in all of the agency-level data sets. It also receives
support in the Republican presidents-only data set. Drawing causality as to why
presidents target counties that are represented by a Congressional co-partisan is a
question that requires further analysis. At the party level, Republican presidents target
funding to their Congressional co-partisans in the NSF and aggregate data sets.
Democratic presidents simply do not appear to engage in this behavior. Democratic
presidents’ lack of participation in this behavior indicates that Democratic presidents do
not use science funding as a tool to support their co-partisans. Therefore, when
Democratic presidents act particularistically, they are doing so on their own volition.
Lastly, there is support for the evidence that peer review may blunt the influence
of presidential particularism. NIH and NSF exhibit very different behaviors in the degree
to which the distribution of their funding is positively related to a county’s being
electorally or politically important. The most significant difference between the two
agencies is that NIH treats peer review recommendations regarding the distribution of
science funding as binding, whereas NSF does not. The evidence is weak because there
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needs to be other types of analysis conducted in addition to this one, to obtain more
evidence. However, it does point to the fact that binding peer review of awards can be an
antidote for the politicization of distributive politics.
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CHAPTER SIX
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

There is substantial evidence to support the theory of presidential particularism in
science. My research empirically establishes that not all scientists are equal in the eyes of
the president when it comes to the distribution of science funding. But what does this
mean? First, I discuss my results in the context of two effects that hold across all models
and all agencies. In this discussion, I explain the relationship between election years and
science funding through a mechanism that I call the politics of science cycle. I also
discuss the importance of electorally competitive states and political party. Then I
explore whether presidential particularism in science is a necessary evil and develop
some final thoughts on the matter. I finish my discussion by identifying some limitations
to my study and frontiers for future research.

Politics of Science Cycle
The most important finding of my dissertation is that science agencies target
politically important counties. In other words, presidential politics affects the distribution
of federal funding for science. This finding is significant because it points to the idea that
the funding cycle for science is inherently tied to the political cycle, which encompasses
the cyclic nature of elections and politically important events such as budgeting. It is no
secret that the science and political cycles happen on different time scales (Lambright,
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2014). Scientific research agendas may require decades of work, whereas political cycles
are driven by elections held every two, four, or six years, and by yearly budgeting
decisions. (Congress and the President only passed and enacted appropriations legislation
on time four times in the period between 1977 and 2012 (Tollestrup, 2016)). It is
believable that there could be an interaction between the science and political cycles
because it happens in other policy domains. Economists such as Schumpeter (2017a,
2017b, 1942), Kalecki (1943), and Nordhaus (1971) have argued and empirically
demonstrated that elected politicians make certain policies regarding the economy with
the goal of maximizing their chances of reelection. Economists call this behavior the
political business cycle (Dubois, 2016; Drazen, 2000). I explain the relationship between
electoral years and science funding through a mechanism, which has been previously
unnamed by the literature, that I call the politics of science cycle.
The relationship between presidential elections and science funding in the results
of my statistical analyses provides evidence for the politics of science cycle. My findings
demonstrate that counties, on average and controlling for other factors, can expect a drop
in science funding in presidential election years. Presidential election years lead to
changes in how federal agencies support scientists and distribute funding. In other words,
every four years the scientific community becomes subject to an external effect over
which it does not have control. My analyses indicate that counties can expect a decline in
funding. It is important to understand why this happens.
In election years, federal agencies award science funding to more counties than
they do in non-election years. On average, agencies award funding to 607 counties in
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non-election years and 718 counties in election years. The number of counties that
receive funding increases in both electorally competitive and non-competitive states.
However, there is a larger increase in the number of counties that receive funding in
electorally non-competitive states. As more counties receive funding, the average amount
of funding per county decreases. In non-election years, counties in electorally noncompetitive states can expect nearly $10.7 million per year on average. However, in
election years the average amount of funding per year reduces to approximately $3.5
million. Where do these funds go?
Since counties in electorally non-competitive states comprise a majority of both
the number of observations and total share of funding, they have the overall effect of
creating a negative relationship between the election year variable and science funding.
Interestingly, if I subset the data to look only at counties in competitive states, the
election year effect reverses. Counties in electorally competitive states can expect around
$945,000 in science funding in non-election years and nearly $3.4 million in election
years. This substantial increase indicates that the administration is targeting funding to
these counties because they are electorally important. The next step is to look for a
plausible administrative mechanism by which the president can shape the behavior of
agencies.
One explanation is that, while the politics of science cycle promotes an overall
reduction in science funding, the president and his administration seek to increase the
electoral impact of the funding that they do distribute. A potential causal chain by which
these events come to pass can be explained by bureaucratic budget dynamics in the
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executive branch. It is no secret that president’s top goals are to run for reelection or help
their co-partisan successors run for elections—that is the premise of my dissertation. In
election years, presidential administrations must divert attention and resources away from
governing and to the electoral process.
Distributing scientific funding requires agencies to work with other agencies
within the executive branch, such as the Office of Management and Budget (OMB),
Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP), and other elements of the Executive
Office of the President (EOP). Tomkin (1998), Lambright (2014), and Katz (1978) argue
that OMB frequently edits agencies’ budget requests to reflect priorities that support the
president’s reelection or co-partisan successor’s election. One of the president’s foremost
challenges is to persuade civil servants to carry out his policies (Lewis, 2008; Seidman,
1998; Neustadt, 1991). There is empirical evidence that presidents can, in fact, persuade
career civil servants to carry out their policy agendas through the president’s political
appointees.
There is empirical evidence that career civil servants can be influenced to carry
out presidential policy agendas in ways other than political appointments or reorganizing
the bureaucracy. Hudak (2014) finds in a survey of federal civil service executives that
OMB and political appointees actively influence agency behaviors to support the
president’s agenda. The same civil service executives also point out that they have nearly
daily contact with political appointees, which shapes their behavior (Hudak, 2014).
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In summary, there is concerning evidence that presidents and their surrogates carry out
presidential policy agendas, which may not be in the best interest of the country. In
election years, counties—on average—can expect to receive less funding than in other
years. The overall trend for changing the number of counties that receive funding and the
amount received per county in election versus non-election years points to a politics of
science cycle. To my best knowledge, I have coined this term. Electorally competitive
counties benefit in years in which there is a presidential election. In fact, electorally
competitive counties can expect more funding in all years of the data set. It is important
to discuss this finding further.

Targeting Electorally Competitive Counties
Another way that politics affects the distribution of science funding—across the
board—is that counties in electorally competitive states have a significant advantage over
other identical counties that are not in electorally competitive states. This effect holds
across presidents of both parties and in aggregate science funding, NSF funding, and
SBIR funding. This effect is extremely important because it indicates that some scientists
have an advantage in competing for scientific research funding, not because of their merit
as scientists, but because of the political importance of the county or state in which they
live. My finding flies in the face of nearly every goal of setting up a scientific system that
is insulated and autonomous from the political system. The whole goal of maintaining a
science system that is insulated from politics is to assure that the most talented
researchers and scientifically important research projects receive funding. It is not that
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these projects deserve funding out of entitlement, but they need to be funded because
they push science forward. This relationship is important because it indicates that the
science and political systems are out of balance.
If these systems are out of balance, then it is important to address the question of
causality: which comes first, electoral competitiveness or science funding? Science
funding could cause districts to become more electorally competitive because it
encourages people to migrate from one area of the country to another or provides
opportunities for people to become more educated. Conversely, an equally plausible a
priori argument is that states being electorally competitive helps them earn more science
funding. Understanding which direction the causality runs helps to strengthen the validity
of my findings. Fortunately, I can shed some light on this question.
I find that the statistical evidence is inconsistent with the argument that earning
more science funding leads states to be more electorally competitive, because the
competitive state effect is not present in the counties that win a majority of the available
funding. Of the 1,779 counties represented in my data set, 80% of the science funding for
the period of my data set is concentrated into about 75 counties from 32 states. The
competitive state effect is not present in these counties that win large amounts of science
funding year in and year out. For example, the mean amount awarded to these counties is
$187 million per county for the 35 years of data, while the mean award for these counties
is $194,022,057 per county when the states they are in are not electorally competitive and
only $175,521,408 per county when their state is electorally competitive. This difference
in means is statistically significant (p<0.01). It is safe to say that counties that are hubs of
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scientific research have not attained this status only because of the competitive state
effect. However, counties that receive marginally more science funding when their states
are electorally competitive drive this effect.
The significance of the competitive state effect is that counties that do not already
receive a large amount of science funding will receive more when their state is electorally
competitive. Counties in electorally competitive states average $6,582,530 for the time
period while counties in non-electorally competitive states averaged $6,258,550. This
difference in means is close to, but falls short of, statistical significance (p<0.13), without
controlling for any other factors that might increase the actual difference. Finding a
difference in magnitude is important because it provides evidence that, within the bottom
20% of counties, counties in electorally competitive states receive more funding on
average than those in non-electorally competitive states.
Why does the competitive state effect happen at the margins? One way to
interpret this effect is that efforts to make science more geographically diverse open the
distribution of science funding up to political influence, unless safeguards are put into
place. While the goal of decentralizing science from its hubs is noble, this goal runs the
risk of making the distribution of science funding more political. This tension goes back
to the very beginnings of NSF and the contemporary science system. In the 1960s, NSF
implemented its peer review system, which was met with skepticism by some in
Congress (Chubin and Hackett, 1990).
The power of distributive policies like scientific grants is that the policy winners
and losers rarely come into direct conflict. A policy winner is someone or a group of
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people who benefit from a policy; a policy loser is someone or a group of people whose
overall wellbeing decreases because of a policy. In the case of science funding, it is very
hard for the counties who receive marginally less funding because they are not in a
competitive state, to identify the counties that received marginally more funding and to
confront them. However, just because the policy winners and losers rarely confront each
other in distributive policy, it does not mean that there are no policy winners and losers.
My analysis has identified that counties in electorally competitive states are
policy winners from science funding under the current distributive policies because they
can expect marginal increases, compared to their peers, in science funding. Presidents
and science agencies—in effect—value the scientists in electorally competitive states
more than they value the scientists in non-competitive states. I have used the latest
statistical methods to control for differences in researchers and research infrastructure,
yet I found this effect in every model I ran. Scientists from two universities that are in
different states and are equivalent in every meaningful way, could be applying for
research funding from the same agency, but the scientist from the electorally competitive
state can expect to receive more funding than his peer. This finding should trouble the
scientific community because it indicates that presidents are able to impact the
distribution of science funding, which the scientific community likes to think about as
being protected from political influence. While particularism’s effects under all
presidents are clear, Democratic and Republican presidents have different strategies for
carrying out their particularism.
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Political Parties Matter
One of most important findings of my analysis is that there is a substantial
difference in targeting behavior between Democratic and Republican presidents. There is
evidence that Democratic presidents actively target science funding to counties in swing
states and core states. In other words, some counties that typically support Democratic
candidates for president can expect to receive more science funding in years when a
Democrat is president, while other counties, which are in every other way identical, will
be penalized because they do not typically support Democratic candidates for president.
So why do Democratic presidents target funds to these counties?
One reason why Democratic presidents may target funding to counties in their
core states is that states that tend to vote for Democratic presidents may have more
science infrastructure. However, this explanation is already controlled for by the
statistical model I use. My model controls for the differences between counties that are
relatively constant year over year. One example of the type of difference that the linear
fixed-effect model controls for is whether a national laboratory is present in a county.
The creation of new national laboratories is an exceedingly rare occurrence, so for most
of the counties and states the number of national labs remains fixed for all 35 years of
data. I have already accounted for the explanation that there are differences in
infrastructure. The explanation for why this effect happens has more to do with a quality
of the counties that changes over time, such as the people who live in the counties.
An alternative explanation that takes into account the dynamic nature of the
population is that people who live in the counties that conduct science tend to be more
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liberal. The people who live in areas that do science tend to be Democrats. Because they
tend to be Democrats, Democratic presidents target these areas with science funding. The
significance of Democratic presidents’ targeting these core states and counties cannot be
underlined enough. Democratic presidents target these counties because they view this
action as beneficial to their self-interest. Democratic presidents target funds to these
counties because of their electoral and political importance.
So, what makes Democratic presidents favor science, as compared to Republican
presidents? This question needs to be further investigated in future research, but I can
provide some possible avenues for its continued exploration. One possibility is that
science is a part of the Democratic policy program, while it is not part of the Republican
policy program. The reasons why Democratic presidents may view science as part of
their policy program are not necessarily the same for both Democratic presidents
represented in this data set. President Clinton focused on science for its practical purposes
such as spurring economic growth, supporting human health, protecting the environment,
and reducing global conflict (Gibbons, 2010). On the other hand, in 2008, President
Obama ran on a platform of combatting climate change and expanding funding for basic
research, and he named a team of very prominent science advisors—Harold Varmus,
Gilbert Ommen, Peter Agre, Donald Lamb, and Sharon Long—to his campaign (Keim,
2008).
In contrast, Republican presidents such as Ronald Reagan and George W. Bush
have typically focused on applied research and commercial uses of science or they have
actively attacked the legitimacy of scientific knowledge, conclusions of scientific
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research, or the premise of science as intrinsically good for society (Sarewitz, 2018;
Mooney, 2006). President Reagan focused on military initiatives such as stealth
technology that reduces a vehicle’s radar cross-section, the Strategic Defense Initiative
(SDI), and the nuclear deterrent, and space technologies such as the space shuttle and the
space station (Keyworth, 2010). President George W. Bush publicly focused on limiting
scientific research on genetics and on ignoring climate change research (Lambright,
2008). In general, science is not such a major component of the Republican policy agenda
as it is of the Democratic agenda. There is a substantial policy implication of this
difference.
The implication of Democratic presidents’ viewing science as part of their policy
program is that science funding is not a bipartisan activity, at least in the context of the
presidency. Democratic presidents see science as part of their partisan policy program;
Republican presidents either do not focus much attention on science or seek to use it
instrumentally in election years or with Congressional co-partisans. Scientists who live in
areas that support Democratic presidents should expect a reward in terms of more
funding when there is a Democratic president—this reward comes at the cost of the areas
that support Republican presidents. But scientists who live in areas that reliably support
Republican presidents and Republican Members of Congress, likely turn to their
Congress people to help bring funding back to their districts. They can expect a small
premium all the time and a premium in election years, versus Democratically held
territories.
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Science may fit part of the Democrats’ policy program. Democratic presidents
may be able to shape who and where research is conducted, which also affects what
research is done. If Democrats encourage science agencies to do different types of
research, then it implies that politics plays a role in deciding what domains of knowledge
we explore and how we learn about the universe.
My argument is supported by anecdotal evidence from presidential science
advisors themselves, indicating that presidents of different parties want scientists to focus
on different areas of research. For example, Lyndon Johnson sought to cut basic
biological research and instead focus on applied health research, because health research
fit with his overall Great Society programs (Lambright, 2014; Hornig, 2010). President
Clinton also had this same propensity. According to John H. Gibbons, Clinton’s first
science advisor, Clinton observed that NIH research funding was easier to defend in
budget requests to Congress than funding in other agencies such as NSF, because one day
NIH’s research could directly save someone’s life.
Another important finding to discuss is that Republicans do not target science
funding to counties in their core states. However, Republicans still engage in targeting.
First, they also target science funding to counties in electorally competitive states. But the
swing state effect is of less magnitude than it is for Democratic presidents. Second,
Republican presidents do target funding to districts that are represented by Congressional
co-partisans. The fact that Republican presidents target their Congressional co-partisans
indicates that Republican presidents may be willing to target science funding when it is
politically expedient. It is unlikely that Republican presidents would target science
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funding as a way to buy votes, because science funding touches comparatively few
citizens when compared with other policy domains such as social welfare programs,
school programs, and small business programs. Republican presidents may use other
mechanisms for impacting science funding.
While Republican presidents may not engage in as much targeting of funds as
Democratic presidents, they may still influence the science policy subsystem through
other means. My research does not shed light on other areas in which Republicans may
affect science, such as presidential budget requests, appointments, reductions in advisory
councils, and regulatory policies that limit the types of research that can be conducted.
There is ample evidence from the popular press that at least some Republican presidents
may impact science in these ways.
The two most recent Republican presidents, Donald Trump and George W. Bush,
negatively impacted science by attacking its funding, staffing at administrative agencies,
regulatory policy and legitimacy. For example, President Donald J. Trump has requested
decreased budgets for science agencies such as NIH and NSF in his budget requests he
made for the fiscal years 2018–2020 (Mervis, 2020). The Washington Post also reported
in 2020 that hundreds of scientists have been forced out of the Trump administration
since the administration’s inauguration in 2017 (Gowen et al., 2020). Gowen and
colleagues (2020) report that some political appointees, including the director of the U.S.
Geological Survey, personally review every scientific grant that the agency awards,
which “stalled” the agency’s ability to do climate adaptation research. The Union of
Concerned Scientists (2020) argues that President Trump has sought to “sidelin[e]
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scientific evidence” and “undo recent progress on scientific integrity.” But Donald Trump
is far from the only Republican president who has sought to directly shape science.
George W. Bush used regulatory policy that restricted federal funding of stem cell
research in 2001. Mooney (2006) argues that Bush used poorly reported information
about a real scientific study as his focus event for making this decision, although his
ultimate goal was to pander to pro-life voters. Bush also attacked science’s
epistemological legitimacy, especially on the issue of climate change. Lastly, Bush
downgraded the role of the science advisor in the White House from being a Senatorially
confirmed position—which endows the position as being an officer of the United
States—to being only a director of OSTP.
Yet, these presidents do not use science as a mechanism for geographically
targeting funding. While other actions these presidents take can be detrimental for
science, these presidents seem less likely to privilege the counties they deem electorally
and politically important with science funding. Instead, these presidents allow the
agencies and scientific community to distribute science funding through the peer review
process. Under these presidents, it is possible that agencies distribute funding to the most
deserving scientists rather than to the scientists who live in politically or electorally
important districts.
In summary, presidents of each party carry out presidential particularism in
slightly different ways. The implication of this finding is that the Democratic party may
perceive science to be part of its presidential agenda, while Republicans are more apt to
leave science alone except in election years. Finding that there are party differences is
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important for the overall study of presidential particularism because it is the first time that
party differences have been investigated.

Peer Review as Particularism Antidote
My analysis also found evidence to support the hypothesis that binding peer
review could be an antidote to presidential particularism. Binding peer review
recommendations are able to drastically decrease the effects of presidential particularism.
The support for the hypothesis is that agencies—in the case of my analysis, NIH—with
binding peer review do not target more funds to electorally important counties than to
other counties. Peer review allows the scientific community to decide how the scarce
resources of science funding should be used. Most peer review processes use some form
of evaluative criteria that rates the novelty of the research, its importance for the field,
and the importance of the research for society. All of the agencies I analyzed use peer
review. However, only NIH makes the recommendations for funding from their peer
review process a binding requirement. In other words, just having peer review does not
guarantee that a scientific community will be able to distribute funding on its own.
The significance of finding that binding peer review can be an antidote for
particularism cannot be underestimated for scholars of presidential particularism. Binding
peer review is a mechanism for diluting the president’s ability to target funding to areas
that are not efficient for the American taxpayer but are politically expedient for the
president. Peer review assures that the people who are reviewing funding proposals have
similar skills and knowledge to the people who are proposing the research to be funded.
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The power of binding peer review is that it forces the executive branch to make a
credible commitment about adhering to the recommendations of the community of
experts who evaluate proposals’ merit. A credible commitment is a concept from
institutional economics that describes a situation in which a person or organization must
invest enough resources into implementing a decision they make, so that they raise the
costs of backing out of the decision. Their investment in the decision means that the
person’s commitment to the decision is credible to other parties. In the case of binding
peer review, the executive branch assures that the decisions of the peer reviewers are
committed to credibility by creating very high costs for backing out of these decisions.
The other players in the space, to whom the funding agency’s decisions need to be
credible, are the awardees, the scientific community, agency leadership, and the president
him or herself. If presidents know that agencies can change behavior with little cost—
then it opens the door for presidents to attempt to make agencies do so. Binding peer
review forces agencies to shape their behavior according to the recommendations of the
community of reviewers.
The advantage of using binding peer review versus other methods for shaping
executive branch behavior is that binding peer review is implementable, exemplifies
values around community governance already present in liberal democratic governing
systems, and does not require extensive actions to realign the balance of power between
governmental branches.
However, binding peer review as a solution to presidential particularism also has
its limitations. First, binding peer review may reduce presidential influence over
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distributive policies, but it does not absolve Congress of its oversight responsibilities. The
system of checks and balances enacted in the Constitution exists in a broader context of
separation of powers between branches.
Second, binding peer review only matters if Congress does not use an earmarking
strategy to appropriate funding outside the context of merit review. Binding peer review
would be greatly reduced if Congress begins earmarking funds to the scientists whose
research was not recommended for funding through the peer review process. Currently,
Congress still maintains the earmarking moratorium that it put in place in 2007. If this
were to be lifted, then it could create an avenue for scientists to go around funding
agencies and gain their funds directly from the first branch of government. Enacting
statues that require peer review of the awards that agencies make would at least raise the
barrier for distributing grants to politically, rather than scientifically, important districts.
Third, binding peer review does not correct for any biases inherent in merit
review. Peer review is not perfect and still faces challenges in its administration. If peer
review is used more extensively, then it may become even increasingly important to
study the role of bias, panel composition, and panel administration. By studying peer
review, the science of science policy community can find out why panels work well and
why they do not. These insights can inform policymakers to institute policies that
promote merit review panels that fulfill their purpose of recommending the most
deserving proposals for funding.
Peer review could be an antidote for presidential particularism, but that leads me
to consider an even larger question: is presidential particularism a necessary evil of the
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contemporary science policy subsystem?

Interpreting Presidential Particularism in Science: Necessary Evil?
Now that I have interpreted the empirical results of my statistical analyses, it is
important to address the burning question: is presidential particularism a necessary evil?
The term necessary evil describes “something unpleasant that must be accepted in order
to achieve a particular result” (Cambridge English Dictionary, 2020). Casting my
discussion of presidential particularism in science as a necessary evil is relevant because
many people in the scientific community consider the idea that presidential politics may
affect allocations of science funding to be extremely concerning yet recognize that
scientists need federal support.
The problem with presidential particularism in science is that presidents could be
directing science funding away from the scientists that need it the most and moving it to
the scientists who happen to live in electorally important districts. The approach of seeing
presidential particularism as problematic, while cynical, falls in line with how Kriner and
Reeves (2015a, 2015b), Hudak (2012), Berry and colleagues (2010), Wood (2009), and
other scholars of presidential particularism interpret the phenomenon. The president,
constitutionally, is supposed to serve a national constituency of voters, which means that
the president should not engage in targeting benefits to specific voters geographically.
The cost for science is that the scientists who may be the most qualified or have the best
research infrastructure will not earn the amount of funding they need to provide the
American people with a maximum return on their investment.
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Distributing funding to the scientists who deserve it is important for the scientists
as individuals, the universities at which they work, and the taxpayers of the county.
Earning scientific funding helps to fund the actual costs required to carry out scientific
research and is a signal of the importance of the scientist and the research. It is also
important because the American people rely on the scientific community to address
questions that are crucial for advancing human knowledge substantially enough to
support the development of new technologies that improve human life. The argument that
presidential particularism drives the suboptimal geographic distribution of scientific
funding relies on an important assumption: that providing funds to the best scientists with
the best infrastructure provides the best return on investment for the American taxpayer.
It is valid for me to make this assumption because other studies have shown the
importance of minimizing bias in the distribution of funding (Teplitskiy et al., 2018;
Tomkins et al., 2017). However, these studies did not have the benefit of recognizing that
politics could bias their analyses. What happens if politics’ effect is even over time and
that scientists account for its effect in choosing the counties and states in which they live
and work? It is important to question the assumption that when politics affects the
distribution of funding, the output of science will be suboptimal. To question this
assumption, I propose an alternative analytical lens.
Is presidential particularism just part of the modern American political system?
Presidential particularism is not wholly problematic because there are some elements of it
that show presidents are responsive to voters. There is no question that the extra funds
distributed to districts that benefit from presidential particularism help those people.
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Presidential particularism also means that presidents are responsive—especially so—to at
least a subset of American voters. Could presidential particularism just be a necessary,
albeit unsavory, element of American politics? This question warrants further reflection
in future work, but I can provide some context.
The problem with presidential particularism, from a political standpoint, is that it
circumvents the way that the Constitution envisions the president as representing a
national constituency of American voters. Presidential particularism means that
presidents make decisions based on criteria that values some voters more than others,
which means that presidents do not value voters equally. Constitutional scholars (see
Levinson (2006), Kagan (2001), Farina (1999), Calabresi (1995), and Flaherty (1996))
argue that the president serves as a “constitutional backstop” (Calabresi, 1995, p.35)
against Congress’ propensity to engage in pork barrel politics simply because the
president serves a national constituency of voters. When the president does not serve a
national constituency of voters, he instead serves voters in key states that are important
for reelection or the election of his co-partisans. The core problem when the president
serves some constituents more than others is that the president becomes the executive
leader of a minority of Americans (rather than of a national constituency or at least a
majority). The American system of government was not designed for the president to
serve as a national leader of a minority number of Americans (Madison, 1787).
So, what would the country’s science enterprise look like if presidents acted as
partisans first and executives second when distributing funding? This question is
normative in nature and to respond I will draw from context and anecdote. Firstly,
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Democratic and Republican presidents would likely have different strategies. Democratic
presidents, recognizing that science policy likely is part of their policy agenda, would
seek to increase the amount of federal funding for science that agencies can distribute to
districts in general. Next, Democratic presidents would introduce policies that include
new programs to stimulate basic and applied research that had been advocated by
scientists and universities during the campaign.
Republican presidents, on the other hand, would focus on other policy areas
before addressing science policy. The Republican president may even push for reductions
in funding for scientific research; however, this proposal might be rejected by Congress.
Republican Congress people who represent districts that include universities and
scientists would push the presidential administration—either through the appropriations
process or through bargaining with the president—to help develop programs that direct
funding to their districts. In election years, the Republican president would make it
known that his political appointees need to do what they can to develop programs for
distributing funds to scientists’ districts that reliably vote Republican, or to swing
districts.
Presidential particularism in science shapes the decisions that the government
makes about the allocation of science funding. The scientific community tacitly accepts
presidential particularism as a necessary evil because scholars in the scientific
community, up until now, have failed to shed light on this topic. Now that I have
identified and named this behavior, it is important to understand why presidential
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particularism in science may have developed, to discuss the benefits and costs of this
system, and to understand what the scientific community can do about it.

Presidential Particularism in Science: Final Thoughts
Why does presidential particularism show up in science? Presidential
particularism in science happens because some science agencies make it easier for agency
leaders to make decisions without the benefit of peer review. Not all scientists benefit
equally from policies instituting merit review. Chubin and Hackett (1990) point out that
scientists from elite institutions and scientists who were elite in their fields argued for
peer review in the 1960s when NSF was first planning to institute it. Policies have both
policy winners and policy losers unless they are Pareto optimal (i.e., at least one party
benefits and no party is made worse off) (Just et al., 2004). Taylor (2016) and Sapolsky
and Taylor (2011) point out that the people and groups who win from policies seek to
keep policies from changing, while those who lose endeavor to change policies. The
political system can be used by policy losers to change the policies they feel hurt them
the most. It stands to reason that scientists who perceive that they lose from merit review
would advocate for policies that promote assuring that funding allocations are
geographically decentralized.
Scientists who advocate for these policies that encourage broader geographic
representation in the allocation of federal funding for science might not understand that
they open the science system up for the unintended side effect of presidential
particularism. Instead, the scientists who advocate for greater geographic representation
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in science funding probably perceive themselves as trying to get a chance at “their fair
share.” Merit review experiences biases that favor scientists who have already received
funding, scientists who are in the same scholarly networks as the reviewers, and scientists
who have political connections. At the university level, university reputation also biases
merit review. Some scientists may ask, “How did the scientists and universities who have
an advantage at earning funding originally gain that advantage?” or “Is it fair that the
same scientists and universities benefit from a system that excludes other scientists and
universities based on the valuation criteria of merit review?” Scientists that perceive
themselves to be at a disadvantage because of the bias inherent in peer review have every
reason to advocate for programs that help them earn their fair share.
There are two policy implications from this discussion. First, the scientists and
institutions that currently benefit from merit review would do well to minimize the
number of policy losers, geographically speaking, from the existing merit review system.
Policy losers such as states that do not traditionally have a robust infrastructure will seek
other ways to gain funding if they find that biases in merit review do not work. My
research shows they could possibly benefit from presidential particularism in a way that
is similar to how they benefited from Congressional earmarking. If the scientific
community values the current system of merit review and wants to keep it in place, one
action it can take is to assure that policy losers receive adequate compensation for their
reduction in welfare. By compensating policy losers—or at least minimizing their loss—
the policy winners are able to keep the current merit review regime in place and to
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continue benefitting from it. My discussion of policy winners and policy losers of merit
review ties into an enduring question of politics—and its relationship to science.
Going back at least to the times of Plato, science and politics have always had a
tenuous relationship. Science reveals new possibilities for seeing or being in the world
(Heidegger, 1977), and these revelations challenge the authority of political institutions.
Political institutions must accept that science creates major changes to the environment in
which they exist, such as increased capacity for destruction by the atom bomb, increased
ability to cure diseases by vaccinations, and new frontiers for expanding human
flourishing. Scientists in 19th century Germany created separation between the
institutions of politics and science by making science “value-free” by developing
universities that only focused on the natural and physical worlds (McClelland, 1980). The
values from which these German universities were free are ones related to the study of
society and government (McClelland, 1980). The concept of separating science from
society implies that the scientific community should distrust political institutions—that
politics could somehow taint pure science. Many STS scholars including Sarewitz (2018,
2016, 2007) and Douglas (2015, 2009) have argued, without empirical data, that science
and politics cannot be separated. My research supports their arguments because the cycle
of funding scientific research is influenced by the political cycle of elections. An
implication of my research is that the scientific community should find ways to
understand and integrate with the politics of science cycle.
How can the scientific community align itself with the politics of science cycle?
First, the scientific community should accept the importance of political processes, even
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when they give the scientific community suboptimal results. Political processes,
especially in democratic governments, are the means by which the people of a society
collectively choose how they want to live. It is imperative for the scientific community to
recognize that political processes such as elections help the public express its choices on
important issues. As long as there is a contract between the scientific community and
society, then the scientific community must recognize that sometimes the public will
express choices that are not scientifically optimal. Sometimes this means that the
scientific community must recognize there is a scarcity of time, money, and attention.
In accepting that science is subject to the politics of science cycle, the scientific
community should also find ways to exploit the opportunities that this cycle provides.
Every two, four, and six years there are elections and transfers of power. The scientific
community can develop resources that help candidates from both major political parties
develop science policies. Specifically for presidential candidates, the scientific
community can develop advising groups that help presidential candidates form their
policy agendas in science. But the scientific community also needs to recognize that
ultimately the politics of science cycle is subject to the opinions of the American people.
Being subject to the politics of science cycle necessarily means that the funding
environment will change every election cycle—for better or for worse.
Second, the scientific community should develop a watchdog organization that
can track scientific expenditures in the federal government. This watchdog organization
can be located either as an independent executive branch agency in an Inspector
General’s office (OIG) or in the legislative branch as part of the General Accountability
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Office (GAO). The Office of Technology Assessment, which was disbanded in 1995,
provided scientific and technical advice to Congress. However, unlike with previous
attempts to provide oversight in science, which saw extreme focus being placed on the
individual researcher; renewed attempts should also place focus on presidential
administrations and houses of Congress.
Third, the scientific community should seek the development of nongovernmental foundations that do not rely on federal funding, to support basic research.
My proposal is for a “foundation of foundations” that exists outside the context of
government and can harness the power of civil society and the private sector to raise
capital and invest it in basic research projects that may require a longer time span of
investment than what governments can honestly offer, or that require larger investments
than what governments can do. This “foundation of foundations” can help science step
outside the politics of science cycle. It can also relieve the pressure on government
agencies to distribute research funds to the most politically important districts or to be
subject to Congressional budgetary constraints. Ultimately, the scientific community
must expand its vision and reference points beyond the endless frontier of the 20th
century—that government should subsidize science simply because of science’s potential.
Instead, the scientific community should envision science as a vast ocean.
Envisioning a “vast ocean of science” is a better metaphor for the science policy
system because it recognizes that science is large but finite, interdependent with many
other systems, and science is inherently public in nature. Science is a common pool
resource, a type of economic good that is rival in consumption but from whose benefits
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people—who did not pay for the good—cannot be excluded (Ostrom, 1990). Forests, fish
stocks, and aquifers are examples of common pool resources. This metaphor is useful
because it helps to explain how the frontiers of science may feel endless to the individual
scientist or even an entire discipline, just as the oceanic horizon is endless to the mariner
or ship on its surface. But, like an ocean, failure to steward science’s resources leads to
scarcity and the cascading failure of systems within science and around it. In my
metaphor of the vast ocean of science, the government’s role is to promote good
“stewardship” of new knowledge and technology, which means assuring that the
mechanisms of awarding funding are driven by merit rather than external factors such as
politics.
The vast ocean metaphor emphasizes that science cannot be separated from
systems such as politics. Just as an ocean is fed by tributaries that wind their way through
hills and valleys to find their way to the coast, science is fed by tributaries from within
politics: problems on which to work, funding with which to work on them, and
coordination across different actors. Seeing science as a vast ocean will help the scientific
community prepare for the relationship between science and politics in the 21st century. I
also have recommendations for the presidents and political leaders.
Presidents and political leaders should also recognize their impacts on science—
intended and unintended. Presidents should be weary of their own appointees’ developing
programs that may be consistent with the president’s rhetoric but that decrease the
effectiveness of science policy in general. Political appointees may make decisions based
on what they believe the president’s intent is rather than the president’s actual goal. It is
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crucially important for presidents, their science advisors, and political appointees to form
clear policy statements about science policy. Clearly expressing the president’s goals for
science can help political appointees define success and understand how the president
expects them to behave.
In conclusion, studying presidential particularism in science contributes to science
policy, policy studies, and the study of the presidency. My study of presidential
particularism has pushed open a new frontier for research into the relationship between
politics and science. It is also important that I disclose the limits of my study.

Limitations
While I have endeavored to provide a comprehensive treatment of presidential
particularism in science, there are limitations to my study and its conclusions I must
disclose. First, while my study demonstrates that presidents and federal agencies for
science target science funding, I do not have empirical data on which to draw to calculate
what this means. There are two challenges. First, it is difficult to calculate the discount
rate that presidential particularism applies to the American taxpayers’ return on
investment in science. What is the cost of suboptimal distribution of science funding?
Calculating the return on investment of scientific research is one the foremost
challenges across several subfields of science policy (Bozeman and Sarewitz, 2018;
Largent and Lane, 2012; Sapolsky and Taylor, 2011; Jaffe, 2008; Marburger, 2015;
Cozzens, 2003; Nelson and Romer, 1996). At this time, there are few means other than
Bayesian inference for solving the problem of understanding the cost to society of
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presidents’ targeting the distribution of science funding to districts that are advantageous
to them.
Second, another limitation is that I have assumed that the effect of politics
necessarily leads to a suboptimal distribution of funding. My basis for this assumption is
the idea that merit review panels would distribute funding based on what is best for the
scientific community, which wouldn’t necessarily align with what is best for the
president. However, I have made painstaking efforts in my models to control for all of the
existing explanations of geographic variance in the distribution of federal funding for
science, and I used the latest statistical measures to control for differences between
districts and years. This limitation could happen by chance but is unlikely.
Third, my statistical studies are limited by data availability, which limited me to
studying the entities for which data was available—NIH, NSF, and the SBIR program. I
curated a comprehensive data set and one of the first data sets that merges science agency
funding data with county-level political data. However, I am relying on the government
agencies from which I collected the data to have accurately curated the data. I exhausted
considerable effort cleaning the data and checking it for missing data biases as I
recounted in Chapter 4. Any issues caused by missing data bias are random and should
not have an impact on the overall study.
Lastly, I endeavored to make my study as generalizable as possible; however,
there are some limitations. Study of the presidency is famously difficult because there are
so few presidents, which presents me with a very small population of presidential
administrations from which to work. Further, one could argue that each presidency is a
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research population unto itself. I attempted to overcome these limitations by studying the
five most recent completed presidencies and the first 24 months of the sixth.
Generalizing my results to the institution of the presidency is possible but is
limited to some of contextual parameters for the institution as it stands in the period
1980-2018. The contextual parameters that are common between these six presidents
include the importance of the electoral college in the presidential election, the winnertake-all criteria for winning elections, and the asymmetry of size between the Executive
and Legislative branches (i.e., the inability of the legislative branch to effectively
exercise its oversight authority (McCubbins and Schwartz, 1984)).

“So-What?” and Conclusion
My dissertation is significant for science policy, because it makes two
contributions to science policy scholarship. First, it offers a new data set that can be used
in future analysis. Second, it finds that presidential particularism extends to science
policy. I defined the term science policy and explored how other scholars studied it. The
science of science policy is one of the scholarly approaches to studying science policy
and it provides a systems-level understanding of how governmental decisions and science
interrelate using quantitative research methods. While science policy scholars
qualitatively identified that the presidency has a major impact on science policy, scholars
in the science of science policy area have yet to study the presidency’s role using
quantitative methods. Scholars of the presidency demonstrate with empirical data that
presidents target benefits –such as federal grants, disaster relief grants, and military
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bases—to districts that are electorally and politically important for them. These scholars
argue that presidents probably would not engage in these behaviors with scientist grants
because of peer review.
The gap that I identified in the literature is that the president is the most important
governmental official in the context of science policy, yet there are no studies to quantify
his impact. One of the best places to quantify a president’s impact is on the geographical
distribution of science funding. While scholars of presidential particularism have
empirically identified it in many other policy domains, they argue that science funding is
unlikely to experience presidential particularism because of merit review. In other words,
I could use an existing model of presidential behavior to explain the variation in a
different dependent variable.
My study is significant to the field of science policy because it uses empirical data
in a quantitative analysis to understand the relationship between presidential politics and
science. Using quantitative data is one of the major goals for the field of science policy—
and especially the approach called the science of science policy (Reedy et al., 2011).
Where other scholars studying the intersection of science policy and politics relied on
case study and argument, I have collected data and provided a study with generalizable
results and with conclusions that are clear enough to be tested in the future. Because I am
studying a topic that challenges the paradigm by which scholars and scientists think about
the role of government in science, cold, hard quantitative data adds to my study’s overall
validity. It should provoke a reaction from the scholars who hold to the orthodoxy that
science is apolitical, and that peer review alone insulates science from political winds.
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I also contribute to science policy by moving beyond analyzing only the impact of
a policy, and to understanding why some policies are made and others are not. My results
show that decisions are made because of politics, position, and power—to paraphrase
Harold Seidman (1998). Science is embedded in the politics of science cycle that is
dependent on the electoral calendar. The politics of science cycle is a concept that other
scholars have not identified and is a novel contribution. Along these lines, I also have
shown another result that should trouble the scientific community.
Partisanship does matter. Scientists and the science policy community—
especially groups such as the American Association of the Advancement of Science—
might like to think that science is non-partisan, or bipartisan. However, the way that the
distribution of science funding skews toward core Democratic states and Democratic
counties demonstrates that Democratic presidents believe science is an important part of
their policy program. On the other hand, Republican presidents target funding to their
core states and to competitive states when there is an election or to counties that are
represented by a Congressional co-partisan of the president. Scientists in electorally and
politically important counties are more important to presidents and science agencies than
scientists in counties that lack this importance.
My research opens the door for other science policy scholars to investigate the
impact of politics on science policy. I hope to motivate a paradigm shift away from the
fairly narrow lens of evaluating science policies based on the criteria outlined in the
policies’ chartering documents and toward analyzing science policies using scholarly
theories that provide insight to explaining why the government makes the decisions that it
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does. Connecting science policy to other fields also enables science policy scholars to
provide insight into their home disciplines. In my case, I also contribute to policy studies,
and the study of the presidency.
My research has contributed to policy studies and the study of the presidency by
identifying, with empirical evidence, that peer review is a potential antidote for reducing
the impact of presidential particularism on the distribution of federal funding. While
presidential particularism scholars argued that peer review would retard the amount of
presidential particularism, they had not found empirical evidence of this effect. My study
found empirical evidence that peer review, when agencies must take its recommendations
seriously, reduces the amount of presidential particularism. My conclusion that peer
review is an antidote to presidential particularism stands as an alternative to the proposal
of Kriner and Reeves (2015a, 2015b), who argue that increased Congressional oversight
is required to reduce presidential particularism. Congressional action is difficult because
it requires collective action on the part of 435 Members of Congress. In times when
competition for Congressional majorities is intense, it is even harder to activate collective
action on any other axis than political party (Lee, 2016). Just the fact that I found
presidential particularism in science in the distribution of scientific funding is also a
significant contribution to policy studies and the study of the presidency.
My research suggests that the “particularistic presidency” extends into the
territory of science. Berry and colleagues (2010) argued that it would be unlikely that
presidents would act particularistically in science because many science funding awards
undergo peer review. My study found that just having peer review is not sufficient
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protection against particularism. While the president—with the exception of Carter, who
was an engineer by training—may not see himself as the scientist-in-chief, the president
is nonetheless influential over where research is conducted. All presidents—of both
parties—impact the distribution of science funding by targeting electorally competitive
states, especially in election years.
I also contributed to the study of particularism by investigating the differences in
how Democratic and Republican presidents targeted funding to geographic districts. To
my best knowledge, no studies of presidential particularism to date have specifically
investigated differences in Republican and Democratic presidents’ targeting behaviors.
Based on the results of my research, there are at least some particularistic behaviors that
are programmatic to each party’s policy agendas. This finding is important because it
indicates that there may be some differences in the institution of the presidency that are
driven by political party.
In conclusion, my study has made contributions to science policy, policy studies,
and the study of the presidency. I have shown, using quantitative research methods, that a
relationship between presidential politics and the geographic distribution of science
funding exists. This relationship is also important because it opens several frontiers for
future research.

Frontiers for Future Research
One of the goals of my study is to motivate future research—and a research
agenda in science policy. Areas of future research fall into two categories. First, there are
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areas of future research that overcome the limitations of my study. Second, I identify
frontiers for future research on the theory of presidential particularism based on the
results of my study. Third, I identify other relationships within the interrelationship of
science and politics that require further examination.
The first avenue for future research is to continue improving my statistical
models. My model can be improved through increasing the number of years in my study,
increasing the number of agencies, and increasing the number of variables—within
reason. I chose the years for my study because 1984 was the first year of data available
for the SBIR program. In future studies, hopefully more agencies’ data, such as the
Department of Energy or NASA, will be available so that the study can be conducted
including earlier presidents, perhaps starting with Truman or Eisenhower and going
forward. Including more presidents contributes to the ability to generalize the conclusions
from my study. Increasing the number of variables will help with model fit. There are
variables that I wanted to have but the data for them simply did not exist. One such
variable is the number of people with a doctorate degree per county per year. While the
fixed effects model helps to explain differences between counties, adding these variables
can only increase the model fit and will likely help to remove the noise.
Another frontier for future research is to expand upon my existing research by
developing a way to predict if individual grants are being awarded based on presidential
particularism. This approach allows me to continue to mine the data I collected for my
dissertation project. Since I can identify the counties and states that are politically
important to the president using the explanatory variables of competitive state, core state,
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and core counties, I can then subset all the grants going to districts that can be
categorized by these variables. After subsetting the individual grants, there are two ways
I can analyze them.
First, I can analyze the content of the grants using natural language processing to
categorize the content of grant abstracts and post-project summaries. Analyzing abstracts
and post-project summaries allows me to understand what the people who were awarded
the funding thought to be important. The research questions I can answer using this
approach are, “What types of research tend to be used by funding agencies to fulfill
presidential particularism?” and “Are there some words or phrases that are typically used
in grants to politically important districts that are not used in other districts?”
Second, I can analyze whether some program officers are more likely to
participate in, and whether principal investigators are more likely to benefit from
presidential particularism by using network analysis. By learning if program officers are
more likely to participate in presidential particularism, I can then reach out to those
program officers to conduct qualitative interviews to understand their thoughts on
presidential particularism. I can also dig deeper into this topic by studying whether there
are certain career characteristics that make program officers more likely to engage in
presidential particularism behavior than others. Studying principal investigators allows
me to examine whether there are commonalities in the ones who receive funding largely
due to federal agency targeting.
Next, I identify frontiers for future research on the theory of presidential
particularism based on the results of my study. My study established that presidential
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particularism exists in science funding, which scholars had argued would be an unlikely
place for presidents to act particularistically because of peer review. My study highlights
the importance for presidential particularism scholars to now move to explaining the
causal mechanisms for how presidents influence the bureaucracy to behave
particularistically. Hudak (2014) provides some insight on this front by surveying career
civil servants in the George W. Bush and Obama administrations. However, studies of
this particular relationship between the presidency and bureaucratic behavior need to be
expanded to include more administrations, so that the causal story can be generalized to
the presidency in general. One specific research approach that scholars can pursue is to
identify the relationship between politicization of the bureaucracy and presidential
particularism.
Third, my research opens frontiers for further study of the relationship between
politics and science policy, especially in the context of the politics of science cycle.
Understanding that presidential politics affects the distribution of science funding should
open the floodgates for a deluge of research about the interrelationships of public
opinion, elections, and science policy. To date, there have been few studies on the role of
public opinion in shaping science policy (see Miller (1983) and Gauchat (2015, 2012)).
Scholars of the presidency have shown that both presidents and Congress can be
responsive to public opinion (Canes-Wrone, 2006). Is it possible that presidents pander to
their public when it comes to issues of science policy? Another important question is to
understand how elections impact science policy. It is important to understand how they
impact the government agenda for science, the size and organization of the science
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bureaucracy, political appointments in science agencies, and federal budgeting for
science.
In conclusion, my dissertation has envisioned a frontier for research that can form
the basis of a research agenda that explores the intersection of politics and science policy.
This research agenda is important because it can help policymakers, the scientific
community, and the public to make knowledgeable public policy decisions about science.
Assuring that public investments and the structuring of the science system are optimal is
important for unlocking the fundamental knowledge and developing new technologies
required to advance the human condition.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

Lastly, I make policy recommendations that scientists, science agencies, future
presidents, and—most importantly—the public should consider. Making policy
recommendations is important so that my research can be translated into a tangible, realworld courses of action that address the problem before us.
My first policy recommendation is for people in the scientific community who are
troubled by presidential particularism. The goal of this policy recommendation is to
reduce the effect of presidential particularism across other science agencies.
(1) Make Acting on Merit Review Panels’ Recommendations a Statutory
Requirement for NSF and other Science Agencies
Purpose
Codify merit review mechanisms in the Code of Federal Regulations for
the National Science Foundation and other science agencies. Codification
ensures that agencies have a credible commitment to accepting merit
review panels’ recommendations. If agencies are required to accept merit
review panels’ recommendations, then it will minimize the effect that
presidential electoral politics plays in the allocation of science funding.
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Task
Propose and make a new rule in the Code of Federal Regulations that
requires the National Science Foundation and other science agencies to
accept Merit Review Panels’ recommendations.

In the case of NSF, the following should be proposed and added to CFR
42.16 § 1862:

A) Except as otherwise provided by law, no awarding official shall
award a grant based upon on an application for a research
grant or continuing grant unless the application has been
reviewed by a peer review group in accordance with the
criteria in CFR 42 § 1862s and CFR 42 § 1862o-9.

Implementation Plan
The proposal for making this rule change can come from either Congress
or Executive Branch agencies (Kerwin and Furlong, 2019). From the
standpoint of Congress, the next steps are for the professional scientific
societies or Congressional staffs to draw up the legislation. In the case of
an executive branch agency, the agency’s politically appointed leadership
could propose a rule through the rulemaking process.
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Suggested Task Owners
National Science Board; House Committee on Science, Space, and
Technology; Senate Commerce, Science and Transportation Committee;
The White House/OSTP, Professional Societies such as AAAS and the
American Geophysical Union (AGU).

Next, it is important to develop a way to measure scientific agency grant allocations and
disseminate the results in an ongoing basis. It is important to measure the influence of
presidential particularism on an ongoing basis so that federal agencies and the scientific
community can manage its influence.

(2) Measure Agency Allocations of Grants for Political and Electoral Bias
on an Ongoing Basis
Proposal
Develop a mechanism for rating presidents and their appointees based
on the degree to which they participate in particularism. The
mechanism should also include a classification algorithm that can rate
individual awards’ likelihood to be based on particularism so that
funding agencies can make funding decisions in full disclosure.
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Implementation Plan
I am developing an online tool for presenting the results of my
research. This online tool will help users identify which counties are
most at-risk for receiving science funding because of presidential
particularism.

Scholars in the science of science policy should convene a workshop
to discuss the role of presidential particularism in science funding.
Scientific societies should participate in this workshop. These scholars
should publish journal articles to gain validation of their models and
make their models available in online repositories.

A non-partisan watchdog organization should be created to regularly
assess and publicly rate presidents and agencies on the degree to which
their awards are influenced by politics.

Task Owners
Scholars in the science of science policy, scientific societies

The next policy recommendation will help the scientific community better align
with the politics of science cycle. Two of the major pain points in the scientific
community are the short average length of grants and the fact that grant funding is
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susceptible to presidential particularism. Long-range projects of basic research
should be funded by a ‘foundation of foundations’ that can commit to funding
projects on the order of decades, half centuries, and centuries.

(3) Create a non-governmental, international foundation of
foundations to fund basic research in democratic countries
Create a foundation of scientific foundations that is non-governmental.
The goal of this foundation is to draw enough capital from
governments, corporations, the super wealthy, and ordinary people
that—through reinvestment—it can self-sustain funding large projects
for longer than the government can.

Implementation Plan
Further research needs to be conducted to understand how much
capital would be required.

Task Owners
Scholars in the science of science policy, philanthropic foundations,
civil society

The next three recommendations focus on developing educational resources so that
different stakeholder groups can learn about the impact of presidential particularism—
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and politics, more generally—on the distribution of science funding. The first stakeholder
group for which materials need to be developed is the scientific community.

(4) Develop educational resources for the scientific community about
the role of politics in the Science Policy Process
Proposal
Develop a workshop that helps members of the scientific community
learn about the role of political processes in science policy. The goal
of this workshop is to help members of the scientific community
develop skills for analyzing the intersection of public policy and
politics—such as being able to use the policy process, policy typology,
and presidential particularism—and to learn how to find information
about politics.
Implementation Plan
I will develop the syllabus for a two-day workshop. The syllabus will
include both interactive activities, lecture, and discussions. The
product at the end of the workshop is a policy analysis that addresses
an issue in the participant’s scientific domain that can best be
explained through political behavior.
Task Owners
The Author, Scientific Professional Societies
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CHAPTER VIII
EPILOGUE: THE NOVEL CORONAVIRUS (COVID-19) EPIDEMIC AND
PRESIDENTIAL PARTICULARISM IN SCIENCE
I finished writing this dissertation as the novel coronavirus, which causes the
disease COVID-19, began its pandemic spread across the globe. After nearly 200 pages
about presidential particularism in science, a natural question is, “How can presidential
particularism—and specifically presidential particularism in science—explain
presidential behavior in the time of COVID-19?” It is important to address presidential
particularism and COVID-19 because of the pandemic’s magnitude, the critical role of
science and technology in responding to it, and the importance of the president in leading
a national response. First, I provide background about the COVID-19 pandemic and the
potential solutions for overcoming it. Then, I disaggregate the overall question into three
sub-questions that I answer using available journalistic accounts and data. Lastly, I
provide an outlook for how I expect presidential particularism to impact the United
States’ recovery from this pandemic.
The COVID-19 pandemic is the greatest science-oriented societal challenge that
the United States has faced since the close of World War II. As of this epilogue’s writing,
over 2.1 million people had contracted the disease and 117,632 people have died of
COVID-19 in the United States (CDC, 2020).4 It seems nearly certain that soon twice as
many people living in the United States will have died of COVID-19 in the first six
months of 2020 than the 58,318 who died in the 16 years of the United States’ War in

4

The death toll will likely increase as more accurate reporting happens after the pandemic’s conclusion.
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Vietnam. There is no known clinically proven vaccine for preventing the pathogen’s
spread, or dependably curative therapy for treating people who have fallen ill. A strategy
called “social distancing” is the only course of action available to governments, industry,
and civil society to slow or prevent the spread of the disease. Social distancing involves
placing strict restrictions on the way people interact, such as ordering non-essential
businesses to close, limiting international and domestic travel, requiring people to “stay at
home” except for essential errands, and to maintain a physical distance of at least six feet
from other people when in public spaces. While social distancing is effective at limiting
the virus’ spread because it limits the number of people with whom each person interacts,
economic contraction is an unfortunate side effect. Many jobs such as hair stylists,
waiters, and other service industry roles require people to be in close quarters with other
people. The economic contraction resulted in unemployment’s surging to the highest
levels since the Great Depression (Tappe, 2020), the United States’ GDP contracting
faster than it did during the 2008 Great Recession (Badkar et al., 2020), and consumer
spending falling by its greatest percentage drop since 1980 (Badkar et al., 2020).
Governments took unprecedented action because the novel coronavirus presented a major
threat to humanity.
The novel coronavirus spreads quickly and is very lethal. It spreads through
aerosol droplets that are exchanged by people who are in close proximity to one another,
via coughing, sneezing or talking. The virus itself has been deemed to be the most
contagious virus since the 1918 Spanish Influenza (Soucheray, 2020; Yan, 2020). A
complicating factor is that many people who are infected by the virus do not show
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symptoms (i.e., “asymptomatic cases”) yet they are contagious and can infect others.
Asymptomatic people do not know they are infected unless they test positive for the
virus, which means that they may not be taking measures to keep from spreading the
virus. On the other side of the spectrum, there are some people for whom the virus is
lethal.
The virus can be lethal, especially for people who are older or have compromised
immune systems. As of 1 May 2020, the United States’ mortality rate for people
confirmed to be infected with COVID-19 was nearly 6% of the observed cases (Johns
Hopkins University and Medicine, “Mortality Analyses”, 2020). As of the time of my
writing, there is not yet an estimate of how many unobserved cases of the disease there
were, which would change the mortality rate. In comparison, seasonal influenza
experiences a mortality rate of 0.01% and season influenza is estimated to kill between
25,000 and 69,000 Americans per year. Even if better estimates for the number of
unobserved COVID-19 cases actually decreases the mortality rate--because the total
number of infected people increases while the number of deaths remain constant-- the
virus is still likely to be more lethal than flu. While the mortality rate percentages may
seem small, they lead to staggering numbers when I take the overall population of 330
million Americans into account. For example, assuming that 50% of Americans contract
the virus and that the mortality rate is 0.02%, which is a very conservative estimate, then
we could expect nearly 3.3 million Americans to die of this disease. Governments took
extreme action because of the novel coronavirus’ potential for greatly disrupting human
life; yet, governmental regulations are not a long-term solution. The only long-term
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solutions for mitigating or reducing the effects of COVID-19 require scientific research
and technological development to find a medical solution.
Medical research is a form of scientific inquiry. Governments across the globe are
working with private industry to develop a medical solution in the form of a vaccine
and/or cure. A vaccine is a preventative measure in which a healthy person is exposed to
biological material that helps him or her build immunity to a pathogen (CDC, 2019).
Political, business, and medical leaders all agree that a vaccine, which allows health
people to gain immunity without contracting the disease, would represent a paradigm
shift in addressing coronavirus because it would allow people to build immunity to the
virus without falling ill. In other words, a vaccine would allow governments to escape the
awful tradeoff between maintaining social distancing to protect their citizens, and the
damage that social distancing causes to the economy. While a vaccine is the end goal,
there is conflicting evidence about whether people can build immunity to the novel
coronavirus. It is far from certain that a vaccine will be a viable solution. Therefore,
governments are also investing resources to treat novel coronavirus.
Governments also seek a treatment that speeds people’s recoveries and decreases
the mortality rate. A treatment is a medication or therapy that can speed a person’s
recovery from a disease or limit the disease’s impact on a person. On 29 April, Gilead
Sciences reported results that Remdesivir, an antiviral medicine developed for Ebola
patients, was able to help monkeys in a treatment group recover from the disease 33%
faster than the ones in the control group (NIH, 2020a). Even with the Food and Drug
Administration moving at “lightning speed” (Hahn in Edney, 2020) to pave the
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regulatory path for introducing Remdesivir as a treatment, Remdesivir’s market entry
appears to be at least several weeks to months off from the present. In the United States,
the pathways for developing medical solutions to COVID-19 have involved the president
more than in less trying times.
The president leads the federal government’s response to times of crisis because
of his or her role in leading national opinion, ability to make unilateral decisions, and
influence political appointees. The country turns to the president for leadership during
times of national crisis. The president holds immense power as the commander-in-chief,
the country’s head of government and head of state, and one of only two offices elected
by a national constituency of voters. In the context of an emergency like the coronavirus
pandemic, the president also holds unilateral powers that allow him or her to make an
impact, such as the Defense Production Act, which grants the president power to ensure
that American industry prioritizes making the products needed for the country’s defense.
The president also holds the ability to influence his or her political appointees who
oversee agencies. The presidents’ unilateral powers are complemented by the president’s
favorable positioning for setting the national agenda through the media. In normal times,
the president’s actions are newsworthy; in emergencies, they are the news. In short, the
president always plays a role in politics and his or her role’s importance expands in
emergencies.
In summary, the COVID-19 pandemic is a major homeland security emergency
and there are currently no vaccines or clinically proven curative treatments for it.
Governments have had to use their coercive powers in ways normally thought to be
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unthinkable. While social distancing saves lives, it comes with economic and political
costs. Therefore, governments must ultimately turn to scientific research for developing
vaccines and treatments. The role of the president includes being a major player in setting
the national agenda for responding to the novel coronavirus pandemic. Because of the
degree of a president’s influence, it is natural to relate the government’s response to the
novel coronavirus pandemic to presidential particularism. In the next section, I analyze
whether presidential particularism is useful for explaining the President’s—and his
surrogates’—decisions about responding to the novel coronavirus pandemic.
The hypothesis that a president could target resources for addressing the novel
coronavirus pandemic to the districts and states that are most important to his political
and electoral fortunes, rather than to the ones that need resources the most, is concerning.
Based on the work of scholars such as Kriner and Reeves (2015a), Hudak (2014), Berry
and colleagues (2010), and my dissertation, this idea is also extremely plausible. I view
this idea as the foundation of an overarching problem: How did presidents’—not just
President Trump’s but also his predecessors’—decisions to target funding to electorally
and politically important states and districts shape the federal response to the coronavirus
pandemic?
To analyze presidential actions, I have identified three pressing questions to
guide my analysis based on the effect of presidential particularism on the United States’
preparedness before the pandemic, the effect of presidential particularism on the United
States’ response to the pandemic, and the likely effects of presidential particularism on
the United States’ recovery. The questions are:
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•

Did presidents’ targeting of resources for scientific research to politically and
electorally important districts—rather than to the most appropriate ones
scientifically--lead to America’s lack of preparedness for handling this pandemic?
Preparedness is a concept from the Homeland Security domain that describes
having, “the capabilities required across the whole community to prevent, protect
against, mitigate, respond to, and recover from the threats and hazards that pose
the greatest risk” (Department of Homeland Security, “National Preparedness
Goal”, 2020). This concept applies to all types of hazard including manmade
terrorist, cyber, and conventional military attacks, as well as natural disasters such
as hurricanes, fires, floods and pandemics (Department of Homeland Security,
“National Preparedness Goal”, 2020).

•

Did President Trump target resources for responding to the pandemic to
politically and electorally important districts? If so, what was the effect? While
this question is not directly related to presidential particularism in science, the
potential consequences of presidential targeting of funding to politically and
electorally important districts are dire.

•

Did President Trump—and is he continuing to—target resources for researching
COVID-19 vaccines and treatments to electorally and politically important
districts rather than to the districts with the best scientists and infrastructure?
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I conduct my analysis using journalistic accounts and the limited quantitative data
that is available. My goal is to shed light on a pressing issue that is directly related to my
dissertation—in fact, during my defense, a committee member asked the question of how
presidential particularism in science can be used to understand the coronavirus pandemic
better. I draw on intelligence analysis methodologies that I learned while completing my
Homeland Defense and Security certificate, because the information I analyze is
incomplete, conflicting, and sometimes false. Using these methods, the analytical pictures
reveal answers—or the approaches for finding answers—to my three questions.
It is unlikely that presidential targeting of scientific research funding to
electorally and politically important districts are the cause of America’s lack of
preparedness for the coronavirus emergency. There are two reasons why it is unlikely
that presidential particularism impacted the nation’s preparedness. First, there was no
time for research to be conducted on the novel coronavirus before it arrived on the United
States’ shores. Chinese officials identified the novel coronavirus in late December 2019
(Ma, 2020). Chinese governmental authorities believe that the virus did not make the
jump from animals to humans until mid-November 2019 (Ma, 2020; Huang et al., 2020).
Washington state public health officials confirmed a case on 23 January 2020, which was
the first confirmed case in the United States (Taylor, 2020). The one or two months
between when the first cases appeared in China and when the virus reached the United
States would not have provided enough time for any new research projects to be awarded.
The research cycle for developing a vaccine normally requires the better part of a decade
(Young et al., 2020). The compressed amount of time from when the virus first appeared
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to when it arrived in the United States is inconsistent with the hypothesis that presidential
particularism affected the United States’ scientific research and development efforts that
would have mitigated COVID-19. There is more evidence that is inconsistent with this
hypothesis, rather than supporting it.
Second, the major federal agency that oversees research into medicine and health
does not show a propensity for facilitating presidential particularism. Based on the
evidence presented in Chapter 5, the National Institutes of Health does not target funding
to counties and states that are important for the president, more than they do to other
counties and states. While there are other agencies that support medical and health
research, NIH is one of the largest agencies and would likely be involved.
While presidential particularism in science may not be the cause of America’s
unpreparedness, it does not preclude the possibility that presidents’ past decisions and
actions may have contributed to the problem. I identify three factors by which
presidential decisions and activities might have affected the United States’ preparedness:
cognitive biases, organizational processes and biases, and perverse incentives.
Presidents sometimes make poor decisions—just like everyone else—because of
cognitive biases, which are subconscious mental procedures for processing information
(Heuer, 2006). An example of a cognitive bias is the availability heuristic, which refers to
a cognitive process by which people judge the probability of an event happening in the
future based on the number and frequency of events that they can remember in the past
(Thaler and Sunstein, 2008; Heuer, 2006; Tversky and Kahneman, 1973). In homeland
and national security, the availability bias tends to play out in the context of deciding
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whether to commit resources to unlikely events that are extremely consequential, such as
a global pandemic, or a likely event that is not as broadly consequential, such as a lonewolf terrorist using a knife to attack people at a train station. While preparing and
responding to natural disasters such as pandemics are within DHS’ jurisdiction, DHS and
presidents tend to focus on threats such as terrorism, border security, and cyberattacks.
My evidence for this is that the word “pandemic” is used only twice in the DHS Strategic
Plan FY 2020-2024 (2019), whereas threats such as terrorism, border security, and
cybersecurity are mentioned 17 times, 13 times, and 22 times, respectively. It is quite
possible that the President—and the administration at large—just simply could not
conceive that a pandemic was possible and allocate the resources necessary to protect
against it.
Second, presidential decision-making may be influenced by the organization of
which they are a part and the routines of that the organization. Organizational
explanations for presidential decision-making have been used to explain everything from
the Cuban Missile Crisis (Allison and Zelikow, 1999) to presidents’ ability to enact their
policy agendas (Walcott and Hult, 1995). The National Security Council is an example of
an organization that plays a prominent role in organizing information and decisionmaking about threats to the American homeland. An example of an organizational
routine is the President’s Daily Brief (PDB), which is a daily summary of high-level, allsource information and analysis on national security issues for the president, key cabinet
members, and advisors. It is important for analysts seeking to explain presidential
decision-making relating to COVID-19 to find out if the organization around the
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President identified the pandemic as a valid—and impending—threat. What actions did
the organization around the President recommend him to take? Did any of the Presidents’
routines fail by leaving information about this consequential but unlikely threat to the
briefing’s end?
Next, the president makes decisions about how his White House is organized. The
president has discretionary power over most advisors in the White House and the
organizations that comprise the White House and his office. It is important for analysts
investigating this vein to explore questions around White House organization such as,
“How had the White House organized its information processing about global pandemic
risks?”, “Were there changes in funding or staffing in the organizations that processed
information about global pandemics?”, and “What relationship does the president have
with organizations that consume and produce this type of intelligence?”
Third, presidents may value their reelection and their successors’ elections more
than what is optimal for the American people. This explanation is related to presidential
particularism because it draws from the same assumption set; however, it differs from
presidential particularism because this explanation expands beyond the distribution of
resources. Could the president value other types of electoral currencies more than the
distribution of federal money? With President Trump, one potential electoral currency in
which he may trade is to achieve—or at least to lead people in his base to believe he
achieves—a policy agenda. Another tool that he may use is to promote individual voters’
opinions through Twitter by retweeting or liking their tweets, thereby providing them
with attention from other users, which can be converted into economic gain.
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In sum, presidents likely impacted the United States’ readiness to deal with the
novel coronavirus pandemic. However, presidential particularism—alone—is not a likely
explanation for the United States’ lack of preparedness. Now it is important to answer the
next question, which asks whether the current president engaged in particularism when
distributing small business loans and hospital equipment.
While more evidence and analysis are needed, there is no evidence that
President Trump’s administration directed more small business loans to politically
and electorally important states. In fact, the states that reliably vote Republican
actually receive a penalty in the amount of funding that is allotted to them.
Resources become scarce and precious in an emergency and effectively allocating
resources to the areas of highest need is important for recovering from the emergency.
Small business loans are particularly important for businesses because the loans allow the
businesses to pay for expenses such as rent that it otherwise could not pay for because of
the pandemic. In the case of the coronavirus pandemic, Congress enacted a small
business loan program called the Payroll Protection Plan (PPP) loan program, which the
Small Business Administration administered. Past findings in presidential particularism
research indicate that it is important to test the hypothesis that politically and electorally
important states could receive more loans than other states. Based on my work in the
other chapters of my dissertation, two types of states are especially politically and
electorally important: Swing and Core states.
My first step is to describe the data I analyzed and its summary statistics. I
collected and created a data set that included these variables: PPP loan program
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distributions by state, coronavirus cases, coronavirus deaths, coronavirus testing rate, and
coronavirus recovered rate, state population, state GDP, and whether the state was a
Swing or Core state. The amounts for the PPP loan program are reported in dollars,
which leads to a skew in the data because states with larger populations, by nature, will
receive more funding. To control for this skew, I divided each numerical, continuous
variable by the state’s population to yield a new per capita version of the variable. I
wanted to compare the amount of funding per state while holding state populations
constant so that I could isolate whether political or electoral importance influenced the
distribution of funding. Unless otherwise noted, the numerical values I report are per
capita. The two categories in which I am most interested are Core States—which by
virtue of only analyzing one presidential term are Republican Core States— and Swing
States. I also created a control group of states, which are neither Core nor Swing States,
for the purpose of a comparison group. The Control group will be largely representative
of states that typically vote Democrat. From a Republican president’s perspective, these
states are not attractive options for engaging in targeting funding because the president is
unlikely to experience an electoral benefit. Figure B-9 visualizes the categories into
which I classified the states.
In terms of a first glance at these variables, Non-core States receive an average of
$508 dollars per capita in PPP loans, whereas Core States receive $330 dollars per capita.
This difference is statistically significant. For testing whether the two samples are the
same, I used a two-sample t-test in which I treated Core States and Non-core States as
separate samples. My null hypothesis was that there is no difference in means between
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the two categories. Based on the results, I have over a 99% certainty that the two
samples’ means are different. When I used the same method to test whether the means in
the Swing State and Non-swing State samples are the same, the test results did not allow
me to reject the null hypothesis that the two samples’ means are the same.
In comparison, Swing States and Non-swing States receive very similar amounts
of funding on average: $442 per capita and $434 per capita, respectively. I repeated the ttest using the same procedures as above and could not reject the null hypothesis that, on
average, Swing States and Non-swing States receive the same amount of funding per
capita. The average of the Non-swing States could be reduced by the fact that Non-swing
States also include Core States that received little funding. To test this assertion, I will
compare the means of the three categories of state: Control, Core, and Swing.
Control states received an average of $583 per capita, which is the highest
average of the three groups. We can infer that the three categories, which I identified,
receive different amounts of funding on average. The inference that these three groups
have different means holds up to an analysis of variance (ANOVA) test. The ANOVA
result indicates, with 99% percent certainty, that the means of these three groups are
different. Based on these summary statistics I draw two inferences. First, states with
different political and electoral importance to the President received different amounts of
funding. Second, the sample that received the most money, on average, is the one
comprised of the least political and electoral importance for the President. However, I
need more evidence to help shed light on the potential causes of this effect.
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After controlling for contextual variables such as the effect of coronavirus on the
state and the state’s GDP, the evidence indicates that Core States received less funding
than Swing or Control States—although the states’ economic sizes also play a role. I
accounted for the impact of the coronavirus on the state by including variables for the
number of confirmed cases, the number of tests administered, and the interaction term
between the two. Controlling for the coronavirus’ impact is important because I would
expect states that are more affected to need more funding, since they likely incurred
larger negative effects on their economy. Using these controls, I ran three models.
•

Model 1 treats the political importance of the state as a three-value categorical
variable, and it finds that on average and with a greater than 90% confidence
level, Core States can expect $107 fewer dollars per capita than Swing or Control
States. It also highlights that the size of a state’s economy explains variance in the
amount of PPP funding states received. For every $1 million of state GDP per
capita, a state can expect $5,142 per capita in PPP loan funding.

•

Model 2 uses a dichotomous variable for states in the control group and does not
find that variable to be statistically significant. State GDP per capita is positive
and statistically significant, which reiterates the importance of a state’s
economy’s size. The important takeaway from this analysis is that all else being
held equal, just being in the control group does not make the state receive any
more or less funding.

•

Model 3 uses Core State and Control as the dichotomous variables and finds that
Core States can expect $84 fewer dollars per capita than other states, all else
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being held equal. It also finds that the size of the state’s economy plays a role in
explaining the variance.
Based on these results, I conclude that it is unlikely that the President is targeting funding
to states that are electorally and politically important to him. There are two other
potential explanations that are plausible and need to be considered in the future. First, it is
possible that Congress—in which the House is held by the Democrats and the Senate by
the Republicans—directed funding to the Control States. Second, it is also possible that
the small businesses in Control States applied for more funding, either because there were
more applications or because they systematically needed more funding. These two
explanations do not take away from the fact that it is unlikely that President Trump
distributed more small business loan funding to states that are politically and electorally
important for him.
In conclusion, it is unlikely that President Trump is engaging in presidential
particularism, at least with regard to small business loans related to COVID-19. The
bigger question that needs to be asked is, “Why isn’t the President acting
particularistically?” Just because the President is not targeting funding, this does not
preclude him from using other tools to shape the United States’ response in ways that are
politically and electorally to his benefit. Several hypotheses that need to be investigated
in future studies are:
•

The president tries to act particularistically but cannot either because of agency or
Congressional actions that emphasize distributing funding based on efficiency.
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•

The president uses a different valuation mechanism for politically important states,
instead of the “Swing” and “Core” categories.

•

The president perceives other activities, such as creating a narrative around focus
issues, as more electorally beneficial than targeting funding.
Now that I have discussed the past and present, I turn to the future. What is the

potential of presidential particularism to affect the United States’ recovery from the
coronavirus pandemic? Forecasting political behavior is always a challenge because
politics is an open and complex system in which cause and effect are rarely clearly
identified. To answer this question, I will offer a logic tree that can guide the reader to the
scenarios I find most plausible. It is important to note that these scenarios certainly are
not necessarily the ones that are most consequential or important.
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LOGIC TREE FOR IDENTIFYING POTENTIAL OUTCOMES
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Using this logic chart, I identify three hypotheses that analysts should watch for in the
next year:
•

President Trump may favor an electoral strategy other than geographic
particularism for increasing his electoral chances.

•

Particularistic policies over the next 180 days are likely to involve the allocation
of subsidies rather than medical resources.

•

If former Vice President Joe Biden is elected, he is likely to engage in
particularism. A contributing factor is that traditionally Democratic states have
been more affected by the coronavirus than other states, which provides cover for
marginal increases in resources.

In conclusion, presidential particularism does not appear to be playing a major role in
explaining the federal government’s response to COVID-19. In fact, it appears that states
that are electorally important for the Democratic candidate receive marginally more
funding in small business loans than other states. It is important to note that presidential
particularism’s inability to explain this phenomenon does not weaken the theory’s
strength in explaining other contexts.
Further, this exercise highlights that it is important, as a scholar, to analyze applied
problems using different theoretical and explanatory tools. The theoretical asymmetry
between the case in this epilogue and the findings of my other chapters can be related to
Isaiah Berlin’s (2013) metaphor of the hedgehog and fox, which Berlin uses to explain
different types of thinkers. “Hedgehog” thinkers know one thing deeply and have trouble
adapting their thought when the one thing they know does not predict and explain the
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world. On the other hand, “fox” thinkers are constantly finding out new information and
adjusting the way they explain and predict the world. These thinkers recognize that a
theory may work very well in one setting and not at all in another. Rather than
interpreting the limitations of a theory as a failure of the theory itself, “fox” thinkers build
and adapt the theory to incorporate each revelation of new information. I hope my
epilogue demonstrates that presidential particularism is not the only or even the best
explanation of all presidential behavior; rather, it is very good at explaining certain types
of behavior. In finding that presidential particularism does not play a major role regarding
COVID-19 funding, I recognize that there are alternative strategies, which also lead to
inefficiency, that presidents can use to win their reelection. In the future, some of these
strategies need to be further explored.
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Appendix A: Tables
Table A-1: Hypotheses

Figure A-1: Table of Hypotheses that guide my statistical analysis.
Table A-2: Hypotheses and Results

Figure A-2: Table of Hypotheses and the conclusions at which I arrived after analyzing
the data
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Appendix B: Figures and Maps
Figure B-1: Q-Q Plots of Dependent Variable: NSF Funding

Figure B-1: Q-Q plots show the distribution of the NSF funding dependent variable.
Normally distributed data should align on a 45-degree angle from the origin. The panel
on the left shows that the dependent variable is not normally distributed, but rather fits an
exponential distribution. The panel on the right shows how transforming the data to a
logarithmic scale helps to ease this effect.
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Figure B-2: Q-Q Plots of Dependent Variable: NIH Funding

Figure B-2: These Q-Q plots show the distribution of the NIH funding dependent
variable. Normally distributed data should align on a 45-degree angle from the origin.
The panel on the left shows that the dependent variable is not normally distributed, but
rather fits an exponential distribution. The panel on the right shows how transforming the
data to a logarithmic scale helps to ease this effect.
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Figure B-3: Q-Q Plots of Dependent Variable: SBIR Funding

Figure B-3: These Q-Q plots show the distribution of the SBIR funding dependent
variable. Normally distributed data should align on a 45-degree angle from the origin.
The panel on the left shows that the dependent variable is not normally distributed, but
rather fits an exponential distribution. The panel on the right shows how transforming the
data to a logarithmic scale helps to ease this effect.
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Figure B-4: Q-Q Plots of Dependent Variable: Total Science Funding

Figure B-4: These Q-Q plots show the distribution of the Total Science Funding
dependent variable. Normally distributed data should align on a 45-degree angle from the
origin. The panel on the left shows that the dependent variable is not normally
distributed, but rather fits an exponential distribution. The panel on the right shows how
transforming the data to a logarithmic scale helps to ease this effect.
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Figure B-5: Geographic Distribution of Science Funding

Figure B-5: This figure compares the amount of funding that states received from all
three agencies during the course of the study. The bottom panel shows that over 50% is
concentrated in 15 states.
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Figure B-6: Geographic Distribution of NSF Funding

Figure B-6: This figure compares the amount of funding that states received from NSF
during the course of the study. The bottom panel shows that over 50% is concentrated in
15 states.
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Figure B-7: Geographic Distribution of NIH Funding

Figure B-6: This figure compares the amount of funding that states received from NIH
during the course of the study. The bottom panel shows that over 50% is concentrated in
16 states
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Figure B-8: Geographic Distribution of SBIR Funding

Figure B-8: This figure compares the amount of funding that states received from SBIR
during the course of the study. The bottom panel shows that over 50% is concentrated in
25 states. SBIR funding represents the least geographically concentrated agency in my
study.
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Figure B-9: States by Category for Epilogue COVID-19 Analysis
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Appendix C: Statistical Models
Table C-1. Results of Regression Analysis on Total Science Funding
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Table C-2. Results of Regression Analysis on NSF Funding
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Table C-3. Results of Regression Analysis on NIH Funding
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Table C-4. Results of Regression Analysis on SBIR Funding

Table C-5. Results of Regression Analysis of Presidents’ Political Party on Science
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Funding
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Table C-6. Results of Regression Analysis of Presidents’ Political Party on NSF
Funding
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Table C-7. Results of Regression Analysis of Presidents’ Political Party on NIH
Funding
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